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In this dissertation I approach “delirium” as an aesthetic and poetic discourse in early 
20th century German literature.  Through a series close readings of texts by Wilhelm 
Worringer (1881-1965), Rainer Maria Rilke (1875-1926) and Gottfried Benn (1886-
1956), I argue that “delirium” emerges as a style of writing that strives to bring tactile 
immediacy to the poetic word. In this context, words are no longer merely symbols or 
signifiers, but rather poetic elements that act directly on the body of the writer and 
reader. As writers and readers pursue such words, they also pursue the loss of 
subjective and linguistic control that such words necessarily entail. It is this oscillation 
in language between conscious striving and the breakdown of consciousness that I 
describe as a delirious style. 
In the Introduction, I explain my method of reading (I call it a phenomenology of 
verbal sensation) by tracing the genealogy of delirium as an aesthetic concept through 
the work of Michel Foucault (on “Unreason” and “the thought from outside”) and 
Gilles Deleuze (on “sensation” and the “clinical aesthetic”). I also situate delirium 
historically at the confluence of early 20th century discourses on vitalism, haptic vision 
and Expressionism, and point out the critical advantages of my methodological 
approach to the writers in question.  
In Chapter 1, I read two poems—Rilke’s “Der Lesende” (1901) and Benn’s 
“Staatsbibliothek” (1925)—as the two poles between which delirious style oscillates. 
Chapter 2 connects Wilhelm Worringer’s art-historical work on expression and non-
 organic life to the aesthetic and discursive concept of delirium through a reading of 
Abstraktion und Einfühlung (1908) and Formprobleme der Gotik (1911). 
In Chapter 3, I approach Rilke’s Die Aufzeichnungen des Malte Laurids Brigge (1910) 
as a delirious text by contrasting it with his earlier reflections on the visual arts in 
Worpswede (1903) and Briefe an Cézanne (1907).  
In the fourth and final Chapter, I offer a close or “haptic” reading of Benn’s 1915 
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PREFACE 
“It astonished her to think that so much could be lost, even the quantity of 
hallucination belonging just to the sailor that the world would bear no further trace of. 
She knew, because she had held him, that he suffered DT’s. Behind the initials was a 
metaphor, a delirium tremens, a trembling unfurrowing of the mind’s plowshare. The 
saint whose water can light lamps, the clairvoyant whose lapse in recall is the breath 
of God, the true paranoid for whom all is organized in spheres joyful or threatening 
about the central pulse of himself, the dreams whose puns probe ancient fetid shafts 
and tunnels of truth all act in the same special relevance to the word, or whatever it is 
the word is there, buffering, to protect us from. The act of metaphor then was a thrust 
at truth and a lie, depending on where you were: inside, safe, or outside, lost.” 
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For now we no longer have that primary, that absolutely initial, word upon which the 
infinite movement of discourse was founded and by which it was limited; henceforth 
language was to grow with no point of departure, no end, and no promise. It is the 
traversal of this futile yet fundamental space that the text of literature traces from day 
to day.1 
—Michel Foucault 
It may seem self-defeating to invoke a language “with no point of departure, no end 
and no promise” at the beginning of a dissertation on literature.  Indeed, Foucault’s 
sense of literature here reads like a cross between an epitaph and a Sisyphean 
nightmare: here lies literature, cut off from its vital, primal “word” and condemned 
forever to drag itself, if not exactly up an impossible slope, then back and forth in an 
impossible movement that starts nowhere and goes nowhere, promising only a futile 
oscillation of the same. Yet precisely in limiting literature in this way, Foucault also 
gives us enough ideas and images to construct a theory of literary writing and reading 
that may be more productive than one would first think. 
First of all, we note the two-fold temporality of the above passage: once upon a 
time there was a primal or initial word, some power of language that was capable of 
generating an “infinite movement of discourse.” Now that word is gone, and in its 
wake language merely grows “with no point of departure, no end, and no promise.” 
Nevertheless, this language is still situated in a particular place (“a futile yet 
fundamental space”) and literature is given to follow its particular kind of repetitive 
movement (the “traversal” that “literature traces from day to day”). If that movement 
has “no point of departure, no end, and no promise,” then there is a certain sense in 
                                                
1Michel Foucault. The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. Trans anon. New 
York: Vintage Books, 1970, p. 44. 
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which that movement, precisely in departing from and arriving nowhere, creates the 
very space, or non-space, of its traversal. Literature is a language that both occupies 
the space allotted to it by the absence of that primal word, and at the same creates that 
space through the movement that traces its limits, a movement that takes place literally 
nowhere except in itself. And the “tracing” movement that Foucault describes can be 
understood both as the writing of the marks that double as the limit of its movement, 
and the reading of those traces it leaves behind. 
 In this dissertation, I describe such literary (non-)spaces by tracing the 
movement that constitutes them in certain texts of modern German literature, drawing 
principally from my three main authors Wilhelm Worringer (1881-1965), Rainer 
Maria Rilke (1875-1926), and Gottfried Benn (1886-1956)—and their respective texts 
to which I devote an entire chapter each—Abstraktion und Einfühlung: Ein Beitrag zur 
Stilpsychologie (1908), Die Aufzeichnungen des Malte Laurids Brigge (1910), and 
“Gehirne” (1915). These spaces may be found in a landscape, a cathedral, a canvas, a 
city, a human brain, or, last but not least, a sheet of paper; yet the movement that 
traverses and defines those spaces – creative and futile, fundamental, yet ungrounded 
– will be same each time. And its written trace will pose the same problem for reading 
that I call “delirium.” 
 I approach “delirium” in two ways: (1) in the broadest conceptual terms, 
delirium denotes for me a structure of language (by which I also mean: thoughts, 
words, concepts and their aesthetic experience) that incorporates or seeks to 
incorporate chaos within it. Delirium is the ultimate structuring principle not because 
it seeks to turn all chaos into order, but rather to absorb chaos into itself as a rhythm or 
oscillation of its very nature. It thus lies between a total systematizing impulse and a 
radically anarchic fragmentation of thought. Likewise (and closer to its more 
conventional usage as “hallucination” or “delusion”), I situate delirium between 
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reason and madness. But this “between-ness” of delirium is not an alternative to the 
“either/or” of reason and its opposite; rather it is a single movement of thought and 
expression that seeks to comprehend both poles at once: reason and madness, totality 
and fragmentation. 
In Part I of this Introduction, I explicate my sense of “delirium” by 
appropriating Foucault’s clinical definition of delirium from his 1961 History of 
Madness in conjunction with two other Foucauldian concepts that the above epigraph 
already implies: namely, exteriority (or the “thought from outside,” from Foucault’s 
1966 essay of the same name) and Unreason (also from the History of Madness). 
Taken together, these two concepts make possible an understanding of Foucauldian 
delirium that is not just a phase in the history of madness, but also as a specific kind of 
language that transcends ordinary discourse and lands itself in that “fundamental, 
futile space” of literature. Through my specific connection of Foucault’s diffuse 
speculations of the “thought from outside,” Unreason and clinical delirium, I 
effectively appropriate “delirium” as a concept of literary style.  
 (2) I show in Part II that “delirium” characterizes an entire poetic and aesthetic 
discourse in the German context at the beginning of the 20th century. Not strictly 
speaking identical with Expressionism, yet very much a part of its development, I 
argue that “delirium” fuses the verbal radicalism of Expressionist poetics with the 
contemporary art-historical discourse on haptic vision (e.g., Worringer) into a 
particular literary style that moves away from traditional notions of mimesis, 
representation and signification and approaches a language of pure abstraction and 
verbal autonomy. It is a question of the need or desire to break away from linguistic 
“depth” (by which I mean grammar, syntax and meaning) toward a pure or primal 
power of language that would be in essence non-referential, immediate and poetic. 
Yet, in the specific texts I analyze of Rilke and Benn, that desire oscillates with, on the 
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one hand, a paralyzing uncertainty or inability to access that primal “surface” of 
language, and on the other, the reluctance or even fear of being exposed to the very 
subjective and linguistic structures that one wants to abandon. 
 In Part III, I explain my approach to reading the literature of this period 
through the visual problematic of haptic vision. And in Part IV, I situate my approach 
within the field of recent approaches to these authors and this period. 
 
Part I: Delirium as a Style 
Here I construct a theory of delirium as a literary style out of Michel 
Foucault’s essayistic speculations on literature and the History of Madness (1961). I 
connect two of his concepts—“the thought from outside,” and “Unreason”—to 
configure “delirium” as a fundamental structure of thought and a style of writing.   
Foucault’s “thought from the outside” is not so much a concept as a movement 
of thought and, implicitly, language.2 He uses a richly mixed spatial metaphoric to 
express this movement which emanates throughout the ambiguities of his language, 
but is nowhere localizable it:  
A thought that stands outside subjectivity, setting its limits as though 
from without, articulating its end, making its dispersion shine forth, 
taking in only its invincible absence; and that, at the same time, stands 
at the threshold of all positivity, not in order to grasp its foundation or 
justification but in order to regain the space of its unfolding, the void 
serving as its site, the distance in which it is constituted and into which 
its immediate certainties slip the moment they are glimpsed – a thought 
that, in relation to the interiority of our philosophical reflection and the 
positivity of our knowledge, constitutes what in a word we might call 
“the thought from the outside.” (150) 
The thought from outside depends on the spatial metaphor of a pure interiority of the 
subject and of language, and a pure exteriority that is radically without the subject 
                                                
2 “La pensée du dehors” in Critique, 229, 1966. I cite from the English translation by Brian Massumi, 
which appears as “The Thought of the Outside” in Foucault’s Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology. 
Essential Works of Foucault, II. Ed. James Fenton. New York: The New Press, 1998. 
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(though as we will see, not necessarily without language). This is not a dialectical 
opposition: Foucault elsewhere insists that the outside not be understood as the 
negation of the inside (152) because that dialectical move would only reinscribe a new 
form of interiority, would only think exteriority from the fixed, centered position of 
the inside. The metaphor of the thought from outside is still spatial, but in a different 
way: a space of interiority surrounded at its edge by an outside that it will not 
interiorize, but rather into which it unfolds, scatters and disperses itself. This 
movement neither negates the inner, nor does it interiorize the outer, rather it empties 
itself into the void that is paradoxically also the space through which its movement 
passes, a non-space that is “raw,” “naked,” “distant,” “shimmering (148-9)” This 
thought (this speech, this writing) is thus not outside thought (or language), but the 
outside of thought (and language), a movement toward the outside that both exceeds 
and is sustained by the catachresis of inside and outside. It is a thinking and writing 
that is not constrained by logic and grammar, but that uses logic and grammar insofar 
as it seeks to undo them. 
When the subject crosses that threshold that is also a void, it must surrender 
itself to language’s scattering in order to risk the thought from outside.3 Without 
surrendering itself, exposing itself to the “danger that the naked experience of 
language poses” (149), the subject would only reinscribe its form of (dialectical) 
interiority, and whatever outer thought is shimmering there in the distance would 
remain unseen and unthought. What is at stake for Foucault, then, is the difficulty of a 
“breakthrough to a language from which the subject is excluded, the bringing to light 
                                                
3 Foucault’s thought here may be indebted here to Martin Heidegger’s discussions of the language of 
German poetry, particularly his 1946 essay on Rilke “Wozu Dichter?” in Holzwege (originally 
published in 1949/50). See my Chapter 3 for a discussion of Heidegger’s essay in the context of Rilke’s 
Aufzeichnungen. For more on the relation of Foucault’s early thought to Heidegger’s thought 
(particularly through their respective confrontations with phenomenology and their connections to 
Swiss existential psychiatrist Ludwig Binswanger), see Allan Megill’s Prophets of Extremity: 
Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985, pp. 199-201. 
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of a perhaps irremediable incompatibility between the appearing of language in its 
being and consciousness of the self in its identity [. . .]“ (149). He writes: 
In short, it is no longer discourse and the communication of meaning, 
but a spreading forth of language in its raw state, an unfolding of pure 
exteriority. And the subject who speaks is less the responsible agent of 
a discourse [. . .] than a non-existence in whose emptiness the unending 
outpouring of language uninterruptedly continues. (148) 
The paradox of this statement is that the speaking subject must transform itself into a 
non-existence precisely through speaking. But how does one become non-existent, and 
how does one write or speak oneself into a non-existent time or place? The subject 
must, through conscious will or an impulse of questioning, pursue language beyond 
the point where its subjective coherence remains intact. The subject must consume 
itself, not to be reborn of its ashes like a dialectical phoenix, but rather to persist in the 
void of non-existence so that language itself will begin to speak from the non-point 
where the subject breaks down.  
What I investigate in this project is the movement toward this point of 
exteriority where language speaks itself, a movement that, as Foucault envisions it, is 
perpetually suspended, interrupted precisely where it is at the same time unfolding and 
dispersing. The subject, as both the agent of this movement of thought and that 
through which it passes, thus retreats from the void by the very same gesture that it 
casts itself into it. It is this gesture of writing, in a primal sense of the metaphor, that I 
analyze as a style called delirium. 
But how to proceed from Foucault’s concept of the exteriority of thought to a 
style, and even a gesture of writing? I suggest that the link is to be made through 
“Unreason,” another elusive Foucauldian concept that emerges in his History of 
Madness (1961). The history of the title of that book already speaks to the difficulty of 
the concept. The book first appeared as Folie et Déraison: Histoire de la folie à l’âge 
classique, with “Déraison” given special emphasis by its capital “D.” In subsequent 
 7 
French editions the phrase “Folie et Déraison” only appears in smaller type on the title 
page, but not the cover. For the 1972 French edition, it disappears altogether, and the 
book’s new title is reduced to its former subtitle: Histoire de la folie à l’âge classique.4 
Ian Hacking traces this genealogy in his forward to the new English edition of 
Foucault’s text, suggesting that the disappearance of “Unreason” from the text marks 
Foucault’s shift away from what Hacking calls the “romantic” approach to madness 
and toward the “archaeological” method of his later works.5 It seems that in shifting 
away from a phenomenological engagement with madness as an experience to an 
“archaeological” excavation of madness as a discourse, the emphasis on “Unreason” 
had to be excluded. Here I want to define “Unreason” to the extent that Foucault’s 
sparse and scattered reflections on it throughout his History allow it, to show how this 
difficult and eventually abandoned term can be recuperated as a concept for the 
description of a literary style.  
Unreason is Foucault’s term for the fundamental affinity and shared origin of 
the supposedly opposed forces of reason and madness. Throughout his book, Foucault 
is interested in this primary, originary phase of madness when it was not exactly and 
explicitly opposed to (and oppressed by) reason, but rather one with it. Both madness 
and reason are captured and swept along by the same movement of bodily and mental 
forces (body, soul, passion, spirit) that contain and express them. The vicissitudes of 
                                                
4 See History of Madness. Ed. Jean Khalfa. Trans. Jonathan Murphy and Jean Khalfa. London: 
Routledge, 2006. This edition also reproduces all the prefaces and appendices of the various editions, 
which also underwent considerable cutting and re-writing.  
5Foucault’s own terms for this shift would be from a “phenomenological approach” to a “theory of 
discursive practice.” In the 1970 preface to the English edition of The Order of Things, Foucault writes: 
“If there is one approach that I do reject, however, it is that (one might call it, broadly speaking, the 
phenomenological approach) which gives absolute priority to the observing subject, which attributes a 
constituent role to an act, which places its own point of view at the origin of all historicity – which, in 
short leads to a transcendental consciousness. It seems to me that the historical analysis of scientific 
discourse should, in the last resort, be subject not to a theory of the knowing subject, but rather to a 
theory of discursive practice” (xiv). Foucault may want to reject a “theory of the knowing subject” for 
the purposes of discourse analysis, but I suggest here that such a “subject,” as a heuristic device, is 
crucial for reconstructing the writing and reading of the literary style of delirium. 
 8 
the movement itself, of the mutual activity of forces that constitute madness and 
reason as a unity, is, I suggest, the object of his study, and by “object” I mean that 
which, in precisely the “phenomenological” way he will later dismiss, he tries to 
evoke, recreate and allow to speak in his discourse, not merely that which he talks 
about. He wants to trace that movement to the point where it divides itself, where the 
union of forces conjoining madness and reason tears itself apart, where reason once 
and for all distinguishes itself from madness. In doing so, he presumes nothing of 
“reason” and “madness” from a modern perspective as normative, self-sufficient terms 
or concepts; rather they become for him signifiers of forgotten, misunderstood 
concepts that must be reconstructed out of discursive fragments from the past, so that 
there mutual movement and eventual separation can be understood. Hence his 
discursive analysis has fundamental affinities with literary analysis: he is interested in 
a particular kind of language as an expression of human reason/madness: “all those 
imperfect words, of no fixed syntax, spoken falteringly, in which the exchange 
between madness and reason was carried out” (Preface xxviii).  
It is here that Foucault’s concept of delirium is crucial for understanding how 
Unreason relates to madness, and how both can be connected back to “the thought 
from the outside” and, eventually, to my readings of Worringer, Rilke and Benn. In a 
word, delirium is the language of madness, its discourse and its structure. It describes 
and is that movement of the passions, body and soul which expresses both the unity of 
madness and reason, and their perpetual slippage back into the primal disintegration of 
Unreason. The following lengthy passage is worth citing in full for the richness and 
complexity of the concept it unfolds: 
The parallelism and complementarities, all the immediate forms of 
communication that we have seen manifest themselves in madness 
between the soul and the body, depend on this [delirious] language and 
its powers. The movement of passion that is followed through until it 
reaches its breaking point and turns on itself, the eruption of the image, 
and the agitation of the body that was the visible concomitant – all that 
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we were trying to exhume was already secretly animated by this 
language. If the determinism of passion is surpassed and undone in the 
fantasy of the image, and if the image in its turn took over the whole 
world of beliefs and desires, it was because the delirium of language 
was already present in the form of a discourse that liberated passion 
from its limits, and clung to the liberated image with the constraining 
weight of its affirmation.  
     It is in that delirium, which is both body and soul, language and 
image, and grammar and physiology, that all cycles of madness end and 
begin. The rigorous meaningfulness of delirium organized these cycles 
from the outset. Delirium is both madness itself, and beyond each of its 
phenomena, the silent transcendence that constitutes it, in its truth. 
(237-8) 
Delirium is a concept that is its own transcendence, and that precisely in moving 
beyond itself, also constitutes itself as what it already always was. It is a structure that 
is also the temporal unfolding and reversing of a structure upon itself, a unity (of body, 
mind, soul, passion, language) that disperses itself into its constituent parts and at the 
same time draws them all together as speech and gesture. It is the liberation from a 
limit that is itself constrained by its liberation. As difficult and contradictory as it may 
be to think this concept, we can note for now its fundamental similarity to the “thought 
from outside.” Both concepts depend on the suspension of a moment of disintegration 
or dispersion: on the one hand, the casting out of the subject into a void or non-place 
and, on the other, the exposure to the “endless night” of Unreason (156). But how can 
we bring them together into a single gesture of writing? 
At one point in his discussion of delirium, Foucault cites an 18th century 
medical textbook that contains the following definition: “‘Delirium – from Deliro, to 
rave or talk idly; which is derived from Lira, a Ridge or Furrow of Land. Hence 
Deliro properly imparts, to deviate from the Right, that is, right Reason.’” (237).6 At 
the root of delirium is a metaphor, which is worth taking quite literally: a farmer 
plowing furrows across his limited plot of land in the most rational, economical way. 
To move beyond the furrows would be a literal delirium: an irrational trespass or 
                                                
6 See Foucault’s History, p. 619 n.61.  
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inefficiency on the part of the farmer and perilous exposure for the crop. Yet the 
movement that creates a furrow in the first place (the movement of the plow back and 
forth across a field), is the same movement that could deviate from it any point. At the 
end of its passage, at the proper limit of the field, the plow reverses on itself, but it 
could turn too much or not enough. It risks a literal delirium at every turn.  
As I take my own risk of belaboring this point too much, I turn to another 
primal metaphor not of madness, but of writing, namely boustrophedon, literally “as 
the ox turns”, a phase in the history of European writing when lines were written right-
to-left and then left-to-right, like the movement of a plow (a metonym for ox) across a 
field. The metaphor of writing in furrows survives (as a dead metaphor) in the 
etymologies of several modern European works for reading that suggest harvesting or 
gathering from the furrows (German lesen, French lire, Spanish leer etc). Although 
numerous contemporary historians of script have described this procedure, a passage 
from Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Essay on the Origin of Languages (1765) is particularly 
salient: 
At first [the Greeks] adopted not only the characters of the 
Phoenecians, but also the direction of their lines from right to left. Later 
it occurred to them to write in furrows, that is, writing alternately from 
left to right and right to left. Finally, they wrote according to our 
present practice of starting each line from left to right. This 
development is quite natural. Writing in furrows is undoubtably the 
most comfortable to read [la plus commode à lire]. I am even surprised 
that it did not become the established practice with printing; but, being 
difficult to write manually, it had to be abandoned as manuscripts 
multiplied. (20)7  
What is interesting in this speculative history of writing is that it preserves a structure 
of belatedness. Reading, Rousseau suggests, is fundamentally reversible, but writing 
by hand is not. Yet even after the invention of a technology that effectively 
emancipated the reading eye from the writing hand, the more “comfortable” style of 
                                                
7 On the Origin of Languages. Trans. John Moran and Alexander Goode. U of Chicago Press, 1966. 
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reading was avoided, the printed text was styled as if it were a manuscript. The 
reading eye still follows a path prescribed for it by the writing hand, and thus on some 
level, Rousseau seems to suggest that we read any and every text through the 
metaphor of a manuscript.8  
Yet if that metaphor carries over in Rousseau’s speculative account, then I 
would argue that the boustrophedonic metaphor also survives alongside it as a possible 
way of conceiving writing as a literal and metaphorical movement (of a writing hand, 
of language, of thought), oscillating back and forth between the limits of a “field,” a 
“territory,” in a word, a space. This space may be a literal one (e. g., a piece of paper), 
but I argue that it is also the same space that Foucault describes in the “Thought from 
Outside”: a “placeless place” (24), an abstract territory constituted by thought, speech 
and writing. The “thought from outside” uses the very material of this “space” and the 
laws of its composition to thwart it and suspend it: it is not simply a question of 
getting outside that space, nor of remaining in it, but rather of arriving at the outside of 
the space, the exteriority that is still proper to it and to which one only gains access by 
the delirium of writing. For what is that placeless place if not also Unreason, “the 
subterranean peril of unreason, the threatening space of absolute liberty” (157), that 
primal “field” traversed by a movement of reason that is also necessarily the 
possibility of the deviation from reason: not just madness, but quite literally delirium? 
And to step out of the furrows, to de-viate via de-lirium into Dé-raison, is that not a 
possibility inherent to the very gesture of writing? It is a question of a contradictory 
gesture in writing and in thought that, according to the after-life of the 
boustrophedonic metaphor, both turns toward and away from itself in the same 
movement of reversal, return and detour. I thus appropriate Foucault’s concept of 
                                                
8 I derive this reflection in part from Jacques Derrida’s commentary on this passage of Rousseau’s 
Essay in Of Grammatology. Trans. Gayatri Spivak. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974, 
pp. 287-9.   
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delirium (as the link between Unreason and the “thought from outside”) to describe a 
contradictory movement toward an exteriority of thought and language that is at once 
liberating and threatening. 
I call this movement a “style” because it evokes the palimpsest of metaphors 
that surrounds the gesture of writing and because it serves as a descriptive tool for the 
reading of texts. Setting aside the aesthetic and art-historical problem of style and the 
school of literary criticism known as stylistics, I use the term here to mobilize the 
metaphors of writing toward a reading of texts by Worringer, Rilke and Benn.9  
Jacques Derrida makes a similar heuristic and etymological experiment in Spurs: 
Nietzsche’s Styles (1978): 
In the question of style there is always the weight or examen of some 
pointed object. At times this object might be only a quill or a stylus. 
But it could just as easily be a stiletto, or even a rapier. Such objects 
might be used in a vicious attack against what philosophy appeals to in 
the name of matter or matrix, an attack whose thrust could not but leave 
its mark, could not but inscribe there some imprint or form. But they 
might also be used as protection against the threat of such an attack, in 
order to keep it at a distance, to repel it—as one bends or recoils before 
its force, its flight, behinds the veils and sails (des voiles). [. . .] Thus 
style would seem to advance in the manner of a spur of sorts (éperon). 
(37-9)10 
The spur as stylus becomes the metaphor by which Derrida describes the style of 
Nietzsche’s text. The ambiguity of the spur (as spur and as éperon)—it both attacks 
                                                
9 Such an investigation into stylistics is beyond the scope of this project, but to carry it out, one would 
have to examine the parallel development of what Worringer calls Stilpsychologie in the visual arts (a 
discipline that would also include the work of Alois Riegl and Heinrich Wölfflin) and the linguistic and 
literary analyses undertaken by Leo Spitzer in his Stilstudien (1928). Karlheinz Barck has already 
suggested such an investigation in “Worringer’s Stilpsychologie im Kontext der Stilforschung” in 
Hannes Böhringer and Beate Söntgen (eds.) Wilhelm Worringers Kunstgeschichte (München: Fink, 
2002), 23-34. Incidentally, Helga Grebing has shown that Worringer and Spitzer were friends and 
colleagues during Worringer’s professional appointment in Bonn. See Grebing’s 
“Bildungsbürgerlichkeit als Lebenssinn: Soziobiographische Annäherungen an Wilhelm und Marta 
Worringer” in the same volume, p. 203. Grebing has gone on to publish a full-length biographical study 
of Wilhelm and Marta Worringer, which is unfortunately unavailable to me at the time of this writing. 
See her Die Worringers: Bildungsbürgerlichkeit als Lebenssinn. Wilhelm und Marta Worringer (1881-
1965). Berlin: Parthas, 2004.  
10 Spurs: Nietzsche’s Styles. Éperons: Les Styles de Nietzsche. Trans. Barbara Harlow. Forward by 
Stefano Agosti. Drawings by François Loubrieu. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978.  
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and protects, exposes the truth and keeps it at a safe distance, blinds the eyes of the 
philosopher and penetrates through the blinding veil of thought—makes possible for 
Derrida a literal, metaphorical and multilingual reading of Nietzsche’s spurs (i.e., his 
Spuren, German for “marks” or “traces,” hence his style) that questions hermeneutics, 
ontology and sexuality.  
The metaphoric of the spur anticipates Derrida’s later conception of a 
“problem” in Aporias (1993) as both a protection and projection of thought.11 To be in 
the “nonpassage” of aporia does not simply mean that one faces an insoluble problem. 
Rather it suggests a position of the utter inability even to pose a problem in the first 
place: 
[. . . a position] where the very project or the problematic task becomes 
impossible and where we are exposed, absolutely without protection, 
without problem [. . .]. There, in sum, is this place of aporia, there is no 
longer any problem. Not that, alas or fortunately, the solutions have 
been given, but because one could no longer even find a problem that 
would constitute itself and that one would keep in front of oneself, as a 
presentable object or project, as a protective representative or a 
prosthetic substitute, as some kind of border still to cross or behind 
which to protect oneself. (12). 
Although the content of each Derrida’s texts does not connect specifically to my 
project, his work opens the possibility of using a metaphoric of style as both a tool for 
the investigation of a specific body of texts and as a way of questioning the very 
structure and movement of philosophical problems. In a similar way, I simultaneously 
use the metaphoric of delirious style to question a specific body of texts and to reflect 
on the functioning of style itself as that which, always in specific ways and in specific 
contexts, creates the limits of literary language.  
Before I discuss the specific historical and stylistic continuities between 
Worringer, Rilke and Benn in Part II, I want to anticipate how the texts of theirs that I 
have chosen can be read in the context of “delirium” as I describe it above. The non-
                                                
11 See p. 12-3 in Aporias. Trans. Thomas Dutoit. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993.  
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points or “placeless places” of exteriority become a literal reality in the literary texts 
of Rilke and Benn and the art-historical texts of Worringer that I have selected. Malte, 
the protagonist of Rilke’s Aufzeichnungen writes: 
Es ist lächerlich. Ich sitze hier in meiner kleinen Stube, ich, Brigge, der 
achtundzwanzig Jahre alt geworden ist und von dem niemand weiß. Ich 
sitze hier und bin nichts. Und dennoch, dieses Nichts fängt an zu 
denken und denkt, fünf Treppen hoch, an einem grauen Pariser 
Nachmittag diesen Gedanken: [there follows the so-called “great 
questions”12]. Wenn aber dieses alles möglich ist, auch nur einen 
Schein von Möglichkeit hat, – dann muß ja, um alles in der Welt, etwas 
geschehen. Der Nächstbeste, der, welcher diesen  beunruhigenden  
Gedanken gehabt hat, muß anfangen, etwas von dem Versäumten zu 
tun; wenn es auch nur irgend einer ist, durchaus nicht der Geeignetste: 
es ist eben kein anderer da. Dieser junge, belanglose Ausländer, Brigge, 
wird sich fünf Treppen hoch hinsetzen müssen und schreiben, Tag und 
Nacht: ja er wird schreiben müssen, das wird das Ende sein. (6: 728)13 
 
[It is ridiculous. Here I sit in my little room, I, Brigge, twenty-eight 
years old now and known to no one. Here I sit, and I am nothing. And 
yet, this nothing begins to think, and five flights up, on a grey Paris 
afternoon [. . .]. But if all of this is possible, if there is even so much as 
a glimmer of possibility to it, then something must be done, for pity’s 
sake. Anyone – anyone who has had these disquieting thoughts – must 
make a start on some of the things that we have omitted to do; anyone 
at all, no matter if he is not the aptest to the task: the fact is, there is no 
one else. This young foreigner of no consequence, Brigge, will have to 
sit himself down, five flights up, and write, day and night: yes, that is 
what it will come to – he will have to write. (14, 16-7)]14 
Rilke’s protagonist pronounces himself a nothing, and despite his precise temporal and 
spatial coordinates (28 years old, a gray Paris afternoon, in a little room on the sixth 
floor), it is from the time and place of non-existence that Malte begins to write. His 
writing is a risk, a wager: if it is possible that so much experience has been wasted, has 
                                                
12 See Manfred Engel’s afterword (p. 332) to the Reclam edition of Die Aufzeichnungen des Malte 
Laurids Brigge. Stuttgart: Philippb Reclam, 1997. 
13 Rilke, Die Aufzeichnungen des Malte Laurids Brigge. Sämtliche Werke, Band 6. Frankfurt am Main: 
Insel Verlag, 1966. All of Rilke’s works are cited in German according to this edition. I discuss this 
passage again in Chapter 3. 
14 Throughout the dissertation, whenever published English translations are available, I cite them in 
brackets following passages cited from the original German. See here The Notebooks of Malte Laurids 
Brigge. Trans. Michael Hulse. London: Penguin Books, 2009. 
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passed by unnoticed, has been omitted (versäumt), then Malte will have to write. Not 
knowing for certain if his project is possible or even has a semblance of possibility, he 
undertakes it anyway, in a simultaneous gesture of incipience, endlessness and 
finality. He will begin to do something about das Versäumte through writing, he will 
write ceaselessly, day and night, and that constant beginning will already be the end of 
his project. Thus Malte situates his writing, impossibly, at the outside of thought, 
effacing his temporal and spatial existence, yet writing down the paradoxical traces of 
what that defacement leaves behind.  
Dr. Werff Rönne, Benn’s protagonist in the series of so-called “Novellen” 
published under the title Gehirne (1916), also writes from an existential no man’s 
land. In the first of the novellas, Rönne asks himself, “Wo bin ich hingekommen? Wo 
bin ich? Ein kleines Flattern, ein Verwehen“ (III: 31).15 Simply by posing the question 
of his physical location, Rönne renders irrelevant the obvious answer (namely, in a 
rural hospital in southern Germany) and thereby situates himself elsewhere: outside of 
geographical coordinates, professional activity, and the history of a personal 
inwardness, Rönne is a flutter, a blowing-away, a passing phenomenon that occupies 
no space and time at all, an image of pure transience without location or duration. In 
“Der Geburtstag,” another piece from Gehirne, Rönne makes a link between his 
nowhereness and a Rilkean Versäumte of humanity as a whole: 
Welches war der Weg der Menschheit gewesen bis hierher? Sie hatte 
Ordnung herstellen wollen in etwas, das hätte Spiel bleiben sollen. 
Aber schließlich war es doch Spiel geblieben, denn nichts war wirklich. 
War er wirklich? Nein; nur alles möglich, das war er. (III: 57) 
 
[What had been mankind’s way thus far? An effort to bring order into 
something that should have remained play. Bu after all, it had remained 
play in the end, for nothing had reality. Did he have reality? No; all he 
                                                
15 Benn, Sämtliche Werke,. Band III, Prosa 1. Ed. Gerhard Schuster. Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Verlag, 1986. 
I cite this edition of Benn’s work throughout.  I discuss this passage further in Chapter 4.  
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had was every possibility. (9)]16 
Like Malte, Rönne has an insight into the errors and omissions of a humanity that 
mistakenly believes it has established reality out of pure chance, gamble, or play. And 
like with Malte, that insight brings with it both the abandonment of reality and the 
arrival of a sense of possibility: nothing is real, not even Rönne himself, but he is all 
that is possible, he is a totality of possibility beyond the limits of a self, indeed of an 
entire humanity. And that sense of exposure to the nothingness and the nowhereness 
of reality, an exposure which is always also an openness to absolute possibility, is 
accompanied by the imperative to write. In the opening paragraph of “Gehirne,” 
Rönne announces, “Ich will mir ein Buch kaufen und einen Stift; ich will mir jetzt 
möglichst vieles aufschreiben, damit nicht alles so herunterfließt” (III: 29). 
 Wilhelm Worringer belongs to this same category of delirious writing not just 
through his historical influence on both Rilke and Benn and the Expressionist 
movement as a whole (see Part II of the Introduction and especially Chapter 2), but 
more so through the particular style in which he writes. His writing on ancient and 
medieval art and architecture is a sustained performance of ekphrasis whereby all the 
expressive visual qualities he attributes to historical styles are presented tacitly as 
rhetorical qualities of his own writing. The style of his writing effectively usurps the 
style of the objects under consideration, folding the referentiality of his language back 
onto itself. Morever, the main style that Worringer wants to describe, the expressive 
Gothic style in northern medieval Europe, is itself a confused and contradictory hybrid 
of organic-empathetic and inorganic-abstract styles that violates its own structural 
principles and the viewer’s sensibility.17 In his Formprobleme der Gotik (the 1911 
                                                
16 Benn, “The Birthday” Trans. E. B. Ashton in Primal Vision: Selected Writings of Gottfried Benn. Ed. 
E. B. Ashton. New York: New Directions Publishing, 1971.   
17 I discuss Worringer’s style in detail in Chapter 2. Throughout I cite the standard edition of 
Worringer’s work, his Schriften. Ed. Hannes Böhringer, Helga Grebing, Beate Söntgen. München: 
Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2004, which retains the pagination from the last editions of the works originally 
published during Worringer’s lifetime: Abstraktion und Einfühlung: Ein Beitrag zur Stilpsychologie. 
München: Piper, 1959; and Formprobleme der Gotik. Piper, 1930. For English translations, I cite: 
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sequel to Abstraktion und Einfühlung), Worringer writes that the Gothic line 
[. . .] vergewaltigt unser Empfinden zu einer ihm unnatürlichen 
Kraftleistung. Nachdem einmal die natürlichen Grenzen organischer 
Bewegtheit durchbrochen sind, gibt es kein Halten mehr; immer wieder 
wird die Linie gebrochen, immer wieder in ihrer natürlichen 
Bewegungstendenz gehemmt, immer wieder gewaltsam von einem 
ruhigen Auslaufen zurückgehalten, immer wieder zu neuen 
Ausdruckskomplikationen abgelenkt, so dass sie, durch all diese 
Hemmungen gesteigert, ihr Äusserstes an Ausdruckskraft hergibt, bis 
sie schliesslich, all der Möglichkeiten natürlicher Beruhigung beraubt, 
in wirren Zuckungen verendet oder unbefriedigt im Leeren abbricht 
oder sinnlos in sich selbst verläuft. (32) 
 
[{. . .} forces our sensibility to an effort unnatural to it. When once the 
natural barriers of organic movement have been overthrown, there is no 
more holding back: again and again the line is broken, again and again 
checked in the natural direction of its movement, again and again it is 
forcibly prevented from peacefully ending its course, again and again 
diverted into fresh complications of expression, so that, tempered by all 
these restraints, it exerts its energy of expression to the uttermost until 
at last, bereft of all possibilities of natural pacification, it ends in 
confused, spasmodic movements, breaks off unappeased into the void 
or flows senselessly back into itself. (41)] 
Worringer transposes the paradox of unperceiveble lines in art and architecture into 
unreadable lines of written text. Such lines do not come to a conclusion nor do they 
ever properly begin; they are rather constantly (that is, “immer wieder” – Worringer 
repeats the phrase no less than four times in the above passage) deflected, interrupted, 
retarded and accelerated by the forces that constitute them and yet work against them 
at the same time. The self-violation and self-referentiality of the line is also the 
violation of the viewer’s ability to perceive and, implicitly, the reader’s ability to read. 
The Gothic line is traced as much in the lines of a cathedral as on the pages of 
Worringer’s text, and the experience of unthinkability in those lines is the same 
whether seen in the cathedral or read on the page. Worringer’s writing thus embeds 
                                                                                                                                       
Abstraction and Empathy: A Contribution to the Psychology of Style. Trans. Michael Bullock. Intro. 
Hilton Kramer. Chicago: Elephant Paperbacks, 1997; and Form in Gothic. Ed. Trans and Intro. Herbert 
Read. New York: Schocken Books, 1957. 
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one paradox within another to create a self-referencing, self-undermining textual 
movement which he describes as follows: “Wir finden keinen Punkt, wo wir einsetzen, 
keinen Punkt wo wir haltmachen könnten. Jeder Punkt ist innerhalb dieser 
unendlichen Bewegtheit gleichwertig, und alle zusammen sind sie gegenüber der 
durch sie reproduzierten Bewegtheit wertlos” (37) [“We find no point of entrance, no 
point of rest. Every point in this endless movement is of equal value and all of them 
combined are without value compared with the agitation they produce” (56)]. With no 
starting point or end point, and with an infinite movement that voids its position 
precisely as it occupies it, Worringer’s writing becomes as delirious as Benn’s and 
Rilke’s, tracing the same “futile, yet fundamental space” that Foucault described at our 
point of departure.  
 
Part II: Delirium as Verbal Sensation: Haptic Space and the Poetic Word 
 Worringer’s writing provides a crucial link between vision and reading. Over 
and over again, he implies that reading his text supplants looking at the artifacts he 
describes. Gothic style, Worringer suggests, can be translated into literary language 
without remainder; or better yet, since the Gothic style is itself already a failed 
translation (namely of organic form into/onto inorganic structural principles), the 
literary translation is only the ceaseless repetition and escalation of the same failure, 
the same impasse of thought and vision, and implicitly, of writing and reading. 
Worringer mobilizes one particular concept that makes this translation 
possible: haptic vision. Haptic vision endows the sense of sight with the immediacy of 
touch: seeing an object in a haptic space (a plane or surface) amounts to immediate 
and total physical contact with the true essence of the form, an essence which optical 
representation can only distort. The appeal of Worringer’s rhetoric can only reside in 
this chain of substitution: vision equals touch; vision equals reading; therefore, reading 
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equals touch. The frustrated, suspended movement of the Gothic line becomes legible 
only because of the promise of an immediate total knowledge attained directly through 
reading, through verbal-visual-tactile sensation. Of course the promise is never 
realized, and his writing remains, to say it with Foucault, without promise. Yet the 
allure of that immediacy characterizes all of Worringer’s writing and, I argue, the 
entire aesthetic and poetic discourse in which Worringer’s writings were situated—the 
same discourse in which, as I will show, Benn and Rilke also belonged. 
The concept of haptic vision was inaugurated by Viennese art historian Alois 
Riegl who first used the term in Stilfragen: Grundlegung zu einer Geschichte der 
Ornamentik (1893) and developed it in Spätrömische Kunstindustrie (1901).18 But it 
was Riegl’s influence on Worringer and his propagation of Riegl’s ideas in 
Abstraction and Empathy that disseminated this concept throughout the aesthetic and 
poetic discourses of the early 20th century.19 Haptic vision, as both a model of vision 
and an organization of space structured around the sense of touch, rather than sight, 
presupposes a need for the suppression of depth in the representation of space. Here 
Worringer cites Riegl directly and at length: 
“Diese Ebene ist nicht die optische, die uns das Auge bei einiger 
Entfernung von den Dingen vortäuscht, sondern die haptische 
(taktsiche), die uns die Wahrnehmungen des Tastsinnes suggerieren, 
denn von der  Gewißheit der tastbaren Undurchdringlichkeit hängt auf 
dieser Stufe der Entwicklung auch die Überzeugung von der stofflichen 
Individualität ab” (AE 78) 
 
[“This plane is not the optical, with which, if we are at any distance 
from things, the eye deludes us, but the haptic (tactile), which is 
suggested to us by the perceptions of the sense of touch; for it is upon 
the certitude of tangible impermeability that, at this stage of 
                                                
18 I owe these references to Claudia Öhlschläger’s Abstraktionsdrang: Wilhelm Worringer und der Geist 
der Moderne. München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2005, p. 43. 
19 For a close account of what Worringer borrowed—and distorted—from Riegl in historiographical 
terms, see Michael W. Jennings, “Against Expressionism: Materialism and Social Theory in 
Worringer’s Abstraction and Empathy” in Invisible Cathedrals in Invisible Cathedrals: The 
Expressionist Art History of Wilhelm Worringer. Ed. Neil Donahue. Penn State University Press, 1995, 
87-104. 
 20 
development, the conviction of material individuality also depends” 
(41)] 
According to this model, the sense of touch is the only reliable means of ascertaining 
the material individuality of an object, the “Ding an sich” of sensory experience. The 
suppression of depth in a visual representation, the presentation of the object on a 
single plane or surface, comes as close as possible in visual terms to achieving the 
certainty of the sensation of touch. Numerous critics have noted the connection 
between Worringer’s hostility toward optical space (his own term is “geistiger 
Raumscheu”) and the abstract style.20  But to my knowledge no critic has emphasized 
the bizarre biologistic fantasy that grounds Worringer’s concepts of haptic vision, 
spatial dread and abstract redemption:  
Jene körperliche Platzangst läßt sich volkstümlich erklären als ein 
Überbleibsel aus einer normalen Entwicklungsstufe des Menschen, in 
der er, um mit einem sich vor ihm ausdehnenden Raum vertraut zu 
werden, sich noch nicht allein auf den Augeneindruck verlassen konnte, 
sondern noch auf die Versicherung seines Tastsinnes angewiesen war. 
Sobald der Mensch Zweifüßler und als solcher allein Augenmensch 
wurde, mußte ein leises Unsicherheitsgefühl zurückbleiben. In seiner 
weiteren Entwicklung aber machte sich der Mensch durch Gewöhnung 
und intellektuelle Überlegung von dieser primitiven Angst einem 
weiten Raum gegenüber frei. (49-50). 
 
[In popular terms, this physical dread of open places may be explained 
as a residue from a normal phase of man’s development, at which he 
was not yet able to trust entirely to visual impression as a means of 
becoming familiar with a space extended before him, but was still 
dependent upon the assurances of his sense of touch. As soon as man 
became a biped, and as such solely dependent upon his eyes, a slight 
feeling of insecurity was inevitably left behind. In the further course of 
his evolution, however, man freed himself from this primitive fear of 
extended space by habituation and intellectual reflection. (15-6)]  
                                                
20 This is the starting point of Neil Donahue’s study of German Expressionist prose in his Forms of 
Disruption: Abstraction in Modern German Prose. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993, pp. 
28-30. See Part IV below for my critique of Donahue’s argument. Claudia Öhlschläger’s recent book 
argues that Worringer’s concept of abstraction functions as a fundamental discursive element in the 
intellectual-historical, art-historical and scientific transformations of the beginning of the 20th century. 
She connects Worringer’s theory of abstraction to the “Erzeugung des Unsichtbaren” which she views 
as a crucial aesthetic, poetic and scientific problem in and around those discourses where Worringer’s 
influence was felt.  
 21 
It seems a biological “fact” for Worringer that every primitive culture, just like every 
individual person, suffers from a fear of the outside world that can only be allayed by 
the sense of touch. When the primitive individual (one almost wants to say “infant” in 
the psychoanalytical sense 21) learns to walk on two-feet and thus becomes once and 
for all an “ocular man” (Augenmensch), the feeling of uncertainty before an optical 
space that will remain forever untouchable remains as an instinctive urge hard-wired 
into the physiology of perception, if not explicitly present to the intellect. Worringer’s 
entire theory of abstraction and empathy rests on this foundation, approaching the 
history of culture and art implicitly through the biological fiction of a single human 
moving towards and away from a haptic plane. 
 The haptic aspect of Worringer’s theory resonated particularly with Viennese 
literary critic Herman Bahr, who in his book Expressionismus (written in 1914 and 
published 1916), saw it as the basis of the entire epoch in which art serves the same 
function for the modern man as the sense of touch served for primitive man 
(Urmensch): 
Und wenn ihn [den Urmenschen] die Wirklichkeit durch ihre Tiefe 
verstört dadurch, daß er sie sich nicht ertasten kann, daß sie weiter 
reicht, als er greifen kann, daß immer hinter allem noch ein anderes und 
immer wieder etwas droht, so befreit ihn die Kunst, indem sie die 
Erscheinung aus der Tiefe holt und sie in die Fläche setzt. Der 
Urmensch sieht Linien, Kreise, Quadrate, und sieht alles flach. Beides 
aus demselben inneren Bedürfnis, die drohende Natur von sich 
abzuwenden. Sein Sehen hat immer Angst, überwältigt zu werden, und 
so verteidigt es sich gleich, es leistet Widerstand, es schlägt zurück. 
Jeder äußere Reiz alarmiert sogleich den inneren Sinn, der immer bereit 
steht, niemals die Natur einläßt, sondern sie Stück für Stück aus der 
Flucht der Erschienungen reißt, aus der Tiefe in die Fläche bannt, 
entwirklicht und vermenschlicht, bis ihr Chaos von seiner Ordnung 
                                                
21 Sigmund Freud’s Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1903) contains an implicit theory of haptic 
vision: see his discussion of scopophilia as the analogy of looking and touching in Three Essays. Trans. 
James Strachey. Basic Books, 1962, pp. 22-3. Worringer’s writing does not seem to bear any explicit 
Freudian influences, yet if one substitutes “infantile” for “primitive” in the above passage, one ends up 
with a distinctly psychoanalytic analogy of individual to cultural development: every culture, like every 
subject, has its infancy, its primitive stage, which it never quite overcomes through a process of 
development in which each subsequent stage bears the traces of all previous ones.  
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bezwungen ist. (cited in Öhlschläger, 44-5) 
Written clearly under Worringer’s influence22 (not only conceptually, but 
stylistically—we note, in advance my discussion in Chapter 2, the long sentences, 
repetition of clauses, even phrases such as a “immer wieder”), Bahr’s text suggests the 
same fundamental analogy of primal and modern man. The visual fear of the primitive 
before an endlessly receding optical space is homologous to the anxiety and alienation 
of the modern subject who needs to banish the chaos of optical space by the order of 
haptic space.  
This shift (or relapse) from an optical to a haptic paradigm of visual 
representation had arguably long permeated the atmosphere of the visual arts in 
Europe at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century. For example, 
although he avoids the biologistic and existential categories of Worringer and Bahr, 
Heinrich Wölfflin suggests a similar reversal of haptic and optical space in his 1915 
study Kunstgeschichtliche Grundbegriffe: das Problem der Stilentwicklung in der 
neueren Kunst. 23 Wölfflin’s distinction between linear and painterly style corresponds 
essentially to haptic and optical models of vision.24 And yet Wölfflin goes on to 
describe the possibility, within the overall development of style, of a synthesis of these 
two styles:  
                                                
22 See also Viktor Žmegač’s “Zur Vorgeschichte des Expressionismus: Hermann Bahr und Wilhelm 
Worringer” in his edited volume Tradition und Innovation. Studien zur deutschsprachigen Literatur seit 
der Jahrhundertwende. Wien: Böhlau, 1993, pp. 213-33. I owe this reference to Öhlschläger. 
23 See Principles of Art History: The Problem of the Development of Style in Later Art. Trans. M. D. 
Hottinger. New York: Dover Publications, 1950. I regret that the original German text, 
Kunstgeschichtliche Grundbegriffe: das Problem der Stilentwicklung in der neueren Kunst, was not 
available to me at the time of this writing. 
24 In a linear style: “[t]he tracing out of a figure with an evenly clear line has still an element of physical 
grasping. The operation which the eye performs resembles the operation of the hand which feels along 
the body, and the modeling which repeats reality in the gradation of light also appeals to the sense of 
touch. A painterly representation, on the other hand, excludes this analogy. It has its roots only in the 
eye and appeals only to the eye, and just as the child ceases to take hold of things in order to “grasp” 
them, so mankind has ceased to test the picture for its tactile values. A more developed art has learned 
to surrender itself to mere appearance. With that, the whole notion of the pictorial has shifted. The 
tactile picture has become the visual picture—the most decisive revolution which art history knows.” 
(21). 
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And if we can say that in the linear style the hand has felt out the 
corporeal world essentially according to its plastic content, the eye in 
the painterly stage has become sensitive to the most various textures, 
and it is no contradiction if even here the visual sense seems nourished 
by the tactile sense—that other tactile sense which relishes the kind of 
surface, the different skin of things. Sensation now penetrates beyond 
the solid object into the realm of the immaterial.” (27).  
The notion of an immaterial sensation, of a sensation that fuses the tactility of haptic 
vision with distance and holism of the optical and painterly, is a crucial component of 
the visual discourse of this period. And it is homologous to Worringer’s concept of 
Gothic style (itself a kind of synthesis of abstract and empathetic stylistic impulses) 
and lends support to the idea that the discourse of the visual arts saw itself in a return 
or transition to a haptic stylistic paradigm. I want to suggest here that Worringer’s 
writing—borrowing from Riegl and here echoed by Bahr and, mutatis mutandis, 
Wölfflin—makes that shift explicit and, given Worringer’s rapid dissemination among 
artists, critics and writers involved in Expressionism, led a generation of artists to 
understand their own artistic activity, on some level, as the production of haptic space.  
 The difficultly for literature in this case is to find an analogous technique of 
abstraction that would create a haptic space in language, to find the equivalent of the 
suppression of optical depth that presents an image of abtract totality directly to the 
reader. Hence the guiding presupposition of my readings of Rilke and Benn: as I read 
the their texts, I presume that they are, on some level, engaged in a experiment in 
writing that seeks to imitate or translate visual abstraction into a literary form. But I 
suggest that the literary version of visual abstraction is in fact a particular kind of 
concretion of language: the way to make literary language abstract is to render it as 
tangible, concrete and material as possible. Language, as it is traditionally conceived, 
is abstract in its essence: it is a designation in sound or script of some absent referent. 
Visual arts, on the other hand, reproduce their referent or object in form and color; 
they make it visible in the work. If painting is to become abstract, the object as such 
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must be removed from the work, and/or the processes of reproduction and perception 
must be seen to interpose themselves explicitly between the object and the viewer. If 
literary language is to be analogously “abstract,” then its inherent abstraction must be 
reversed: rather than pointing beyond itself to an absent or imaginary referent, the 
literary text must be made to point back at itself, become a closed system, a formal 
composition, a material object open to visual scrutiny. Accordingly, I propose that, to 
a certain extent, such a self-referential text is to be looked at as much as it is to be 
read. Each sentence stands alone and is worthy of contemplation, each word is 
composed as to capture the eye.25 Gottfried Benn, in the 1951 speech, “Probleme der 
Lyrik,” has emphasized the role of visual appearance in reading poetry:  
[I]ch persönlich halte das moderne Gedicht nicht für vortragsfähig, 
weder im Interesse des Gedichts noch im Interesse des Hörers. Das 
Gedicht geht gelesen eher ein. Der Aufnehmende nimmt von 
vornherein eine andere Stellung zu dem Gedicht ein, wenn er sieht, wie 
lang es ist und wie die Strophen gebaut sind. [. . . D]as optische Bild 
unterstüzt meiner Meinung nach die Aufnahmefähigkeit. Ein modernes 
Gedicht verlangt den Druck auf Papier und verlangt das Lesen, verlangt 
die schwarze Letter, es wird plastischer durch den Blick auf seine 
äußere Struktur, und es wird innerlicher, wenn sich einer schweigend 
darüber beugt. (VI: 41) 
The modern poem for Benn becomes paradoxically more inward when it becomes 
“more plastic,” and that plasticity is constituted by a certain way of reading that more 
closely resembles seeing or looking: the reader’s eyes see a visual-tactile object first, 
and Benn suggests that reading is less a cognitive, temporal process than a glance by 
which the “receiver” (not the reader) takes in the silent, outer structure through verbal-
ocular contact.  
Benn’s comments from 1951 look back upon an entire poetic discourse that 
understands itself as searching for the same visual immediacy in poetic language that 
                                                
25 Frederic Jameson’s describes a similar development in the style of Wyndam Lewis’ Tarr (1918), “a 
book which, as in few others, the sentence is reinvented with all the force of origins, as sculptural 
gesture and fiat in the void” (2) in Fables of Aggression: Wyndam Lewis, the Modernist as Fascist. 
Berkeley, University of California Press, 1979.   
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the visual arts present in haptic space. One sees this striving for verbal immediacy 
already in the programmatic writings of early Expressionism. If we look briefly at the 
writings of some of the major proponents of the Expressionist movement, we see that 
a central concern of Expressionist poetics was something like the emancipation of the 
word from its linguistic depth and its presentation on a haptic verbal plane. The word 
was to be endowed with an explosive, expressive power to rewrite grammar and 
syntax, attaining an immediate expression rather than a meaning mediated by 
conventional linguistic structures. Such an expression toward haptic immediacy is the 
precondition for the writing and reading of delirium in this historical context. 
Kurt Pinthus, in his preface to Menschheitsdämmerung (1920), the most 
important anthology of German Expressionist poetry, characterizes the poetic 
language of that movement as a tendency toward “Eruption, Explosion, Intensität,” 
toward the conscious breaking-apart of language, world and reality that would 
simultaneously effect the building of a new world of poetic expression, word for word, 
feeling for feeling.26 The ambiguity of Pinthus’ description (always pairing destruction 
with creation, fragmentation with composition, despair with ecstasy) and even the 
ambiguity of the title itself suggests something of delirium as an intensification of the 
word toward both pure form and pure formlessness, absolute meaning and absolute 
destruction of meaning.  
The programmatic writings of Expressionist poet Franz Werfel speak to a more 
specifically linguistic intervention of Expressionism that emancipates the word from 
the sentence and inaugurates a new mode of poetic signification that I call delirious. In 
a text that originally appeared in the Expressionist journal Die Aktion in 1917 under 
the title “Substantiv und Verbum: Notiz zu einer Poetik,” Werfel describes the 
                                                
26 Menschheitsdämmerung: Ein Dokument des Expressionismus. Ed. Kurt Pinthus. Berlin: Ernst 
Rowohlt Verlag, 1955. 
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liberation of the poetic word as follows: 
Das Substantiv des Verses ist vieldeutig, assoziativ, symbolisch. Es ist 
ein Gefäß, das es dem Leser überläßt, die eigene durch das Verbum des 
Dichters aufgerufene Vision einzufüllen. [. . .] Und gerade in dieser 
Tausenddeutigkeit besteht sein überwältigend Konkretes. Konkret ist 
nicht, was sinnlich eindeutig faßbar, sondern was am assoziativsten ist, 
was mehr Welt in sich hat. Das Substantiv des Verses ist delphisch, es 
hat die innere vieldeutige Überdeutlichkeit, doch auch das Gedämpfte 
des Geheimnisses. [. . .] Das Verbum des Verses ist mehr, als eindeutig. 
Es ist überbestimmt und gegen den Leser unerbittlich, denn es ist der 
Träger der Leidenschaft und der Tat. Nicht ist es der Ausdruck eines 
Tuns, sondern dieses Tuns selbst. (157-8)27 
Werfel describes two interesting effects of the poetic word on the reader: because of 
the radical ambiguity of the poetic word (its polysemy, its overdetermination), the 
reader is put into an unspecified, but active role, forced to interpret words according to 
his own vision (“die eigene Vision. . . einzufüllen”), which the text should provoke 
rather than simply provide. Secondly, this poetic word, for all its ambiguity, is not 
abstract, but rather concrete. When the univocally referential, semantic dimension of a 
word is obscured, the word itself attains a special concreteness, the immediacy of an 
act.  
If we turn to another programmatic piece by Herwarth Walden, the founder of 
the Expressionist journal Der Sturm, we see how a similar poetics of the word 
grounds, albeit programmatically, an entire aesthetic theory. Like Werfel, Walden, in a 
piece entitled “Das Begriffliche in der Dichtung” that appeared in his journal Der 
Sturm in 1918, describes the supremacy of the word over the sentence, and his 
repetitive, rhythmical language presumably intends to perform the style about which 
he speaks:  
Das Wort herrscht, das Wort beherrscht die Dichter. Und weil die 
                                                
27 Franz Werfel,“Substantiv und Verbum: Notiz zu einer Poetik” in Die Aktion. Vol. 7, no. ½, pp. 4-8. 
Reprinted in and cited according toTheorie des Expressionismus. Ed. Otto F. Best. Stuttgart: Reclam, 
1976. 157-63. 
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Dichter herrschen wollen, machen sie gleich einen Satz über das Wort 
hinweg. Aber das Wort herrscht. Das Wort zerreißt den Satz, und die 
Dichtung ist Stückwerk. Nur Wörter binden. Sätze sind stets 
aufgelesen. (156)28  
The unity of the sentence is derived from the double power of words both to tear the 
sentence to pieces and to bind it together. The sentence, then, is Stückwerk, an 
unfinished montage of words, and only possesses meaning insofar as it is picked up or 
gathered together (aufgelesen) with other sentences. The word aufgelesen implies a 
different mode of reading in addition to the different mode of poetic composition: one 
does not read a sentence so much as one looks at words. For the word, in Walden’s 
view, becomes a visual, plastic object, part of visual structure of words that is both 
concrete (as in Werfel) and abstract (in the sense of ungegenständlich), but visible all 
the same: 
Das Material der Dichtung ist das Wort. [. . .] Wort muß zur Wort 
gefügt werden, wenn ein Wortgebäude entstehen soll, das man 
Dichtung nennt. Die sichtbarkeit jeder Kunst ist die Form. Form ist die 
äußere Gestaltung der Gesichte als Ausdruck ihres inneren Lebens [. . .] 
Ein Kunstwerk gestalten heißt ein Gesicht sichtbar machen. [. . .] Jedes 
Kunstwerk fordert seinen Ausdruck. Der äußere Ausdruck ist die innere 
Geschlossenheit. Die innere Geschlossenheit ist die Schönheit des 
Kunstwerks. Die innere Geschlossenheit wird durch die logischen 
Beziehungen der Wortkörper und der Wortlinien zueinander 
geschaffen. [. . .] Jedes Wort hat seine Bewegung in sich. Es wird durch 
die Bewegung sichtbar. Die einzelnen Wörter werden nur durch ihre 
Bewegung zueinander, aufeinander, nacheinander gebunden. Nichts 
steht, was sich nicht bewegt. Kreist doch selbst die Erde. Kreist doch 
die Welt. Das ist die innere Sichtbarkeit. Die ungegenständliche 
Dichtung. (149, 156) 
Walden’s paratactic language does not so much offer an articulate aesthetic theory as a 
barrage of words and concepts that accumulate a certain kind of rhythm, intensity and 
expressiveness. Just as he describes, his words seem to mean more than the sentences 
                                                
28 Herwarth Walden. “Das Begriffliche in der Dichtung” in Der Sturm. Vol. 9 (1918). pp. 66 and ff. 
Reprinted and cited: Best (ed.), Theorie des Expressionismus.  
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of which they are apart. This is an aesthetic of the word, of form, of expression (as the 
union of outer form and inner essence [Geschlossenheit]), of the visibility of the 
abstract, of verbal bodies and lines, of life and of movement. Walden seems 
deliberately to elide conceptual contradictions (e.g., how the outside is the inside, how 
the visual is also non-objective, how standing is a kind of movement), implying that 
our reading of the text must follow not the meanings of the words, their logic or 
conceptuality, but rather attend to the movement and rhythmical power of their 
accumulation on the page.29 In other words, Walden implies a delirious reading as a 
consequence of this compressed aesthetic theory.  
 Lothar Schreyer’s “Expressionistische Dichtung”30 echoes Walden’s ideas on 
rhythm and verbal power as well as his paratactic style. He writes, “Jeder Dichter ist 
Wortschöpfer. Jeder Dichter hat jedes Wort neu zu schaffen” (176). The word, as the 
creative element of poetry, must be recreated, and to underscore this poetic imperative, 
Schreyer refers less and less to poetry (Dichtung or even Gedichte), but instead to the 
Wortkunstwerk, the verbal work of art: “Das Wortkunstwerk wirkt in der Zeit, ist ein 
Nacheinander von Wortgestalten, die nur durch die Bewegung, das Nebeneinander zu 
einer Einheit zusammengeschlossen werden können” (175). The unity of the poem 
depends upon the juxtaposition of “Wortgestalten,” a syntax of verbal figures that 
comprises a rhythmical movement, but not a meaning: 
Das Wortkunstwerk ist keine Mitteilung von Gedanken oder von 
                                                
29 For a recent account of rhythm as a major discursive and aesthetic concept in and around the time of 
German Expressionism, see Michael Cowan’s “Die Herz-Turbine: Rhythm and Urban Experience in the 
Poetry of Gerrit Engelke (1890-1918)” in German Quarterly. Vol. 81. Fall 2008, no. 4. pp. 424-48. 
Cowan does not focus particularly on Expressionist poetics, but rather through the example of 
Engelke’s poetry, shows how the alienating rhythms of modern life can be re-appropriated aesthetically 
and re-harmonized with the individual and social body. In his account, rhythm seems to be inherently 
productive and positive as a vital force and poetic device. In the discussion of Deleuze in this chapter 
and of Benn’s “Staatsbibliothek” in Chapter 1, I suggest that rhythm is not inherently structuring, but 
rather itself a delirious oscillation between structure and chaos. 
30 Originally published in Sturm-Bühne, Jahrbuch des Theaters der Expressionisten. Berlin: Verlag Der 
Sturm, 1918-19. Folge 4/5, pp. 19f. Reprinted and cited: in Best (Ed), Theorie des Expressionismus.  
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Gefühlen, sondern Kunde einer Offenbarung. Das Wortkunstwerk kann 
wohl Gedanken und Gefühle auslösen, aber kein Gedanke und kein 
Gefühl gibt uns den Zustand der Offenbarung. Erst im Nichtdenken und 
Nichtfühlen sind wir und das Kunstwerk eins. (179)  
The Wortkunstwerk does not appeal to the understanding or even to the emotions; 
rather precisely in not-thinking and not-feeling does the poem have its revelatory 
effect, its epiphanic fusion of the reader and the work through the rhythm of verbal 
figures.  
 And returning to Benn and his concept of verbal expression, we see that, in his 
“Expressionismus” (1933), he characterizes as “rein expressionistisch” the poet’s 
relation to the autonomous, isolated word:  
Beladung des Wortes, weniger Worte, mit einer ungeheuren 
Ansammlung schöpferischer Spannung, eigentlich mehr ein Ergreifen 
von Worten aus Spannung, und diese gänzlich mystisch ergriffenen 
Worte leben dann weiter mit einer real unerklärbaren Macht von 
Suggestion. (IV, 80) 
Benn refers again and again to that same inexplicable power of the word that emerges 
out of a mystical void, charged with a tension both aesthetic and metaphysical, and he 
says that a poem composed of such words cannot be read by the rational mind so 
much as grasped by the brain itself. In the “Epilog und Lyrisches Ich,” (1928) he 
writes: 
Es gibt im Meer lebend Organismen des unteren zoologischen Systems 
bedeckt mit Flimmerhaaren. Flimmerhaar ist das animale Sinnesorgan 
vor der Differenzierung in gesonderte sensuelle Energien, das 
allgemeine Tastorgan, die Beziehung an sich zur Umwelt des Meers. 
Von solchen Flimmerhaaren bedeckt stelle man sich einen Menschen 
vor nicht nur am Gehirn, sondern über den Organismus ganz total. Ihre 
Funktion ist eine spezifische, ihre Reizbemerkung scharf isoliert: sie 
gilt dem Wort, ganz besonders dem Substantivum, weniger dem 
Adjektiv, kaum der verbalen Figur. Sie gilt der Chiffre, ihrem 
gedruckten Bild, der schwarzen Letter, ihr allein. (III: 131) 
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Benn links the printed word with the primal biology of prehistoric life. The sensorium 
of the human brain is reduced to the crude differentiating function of a Flimmerhaar, 
grasping either a word or nothing as the organism’s sole connection to the outside 
world. This is perhaps the most radical verbal poetics of the period, so radical that the 
poetic model is distorted into a regressive biological fantasy (not unlike Worringer’s) 
in which the rational mind, the cerebral self, and the lyrisches Ich are all reduced to a 
primal, total, tangible relation to the word or the void. 
To situate Rilke in the same poetic and aesthetic discourse of Expressionism 
proper is not altogether implausible. Though his more productive periods may have 
been both before and after the “Expressionist decade,” Christa Saas has exhaustively 
shown that his work bears significant thematic and poetic overlaps with 
Expressionsm.31 Moreover, the impact of painters like Van Gogh and Cézanne on 
Rilke’s theory and practice of art place him firmly within the same artistic wake that 
influenced the Expressionists.32 A poem of Rilke’s (“Ausgesetzt auf den Bergen des 
Herzens,” which I discuss in Chapter 3) was included in an important Expressionist 
anthology Die Erhebung (1919).33 And Rilke’s name appears 15 times in the pages of 
Albert Soergel’s literary-historical compendium Im Banne des Expressionismus 
(1925).34 In my discussion of Die Aufzeichnungen des Malte Laurids Brigge, I argue 
                                                
31 Christa Saas, Rilkes Expressionismus. [Dissertation]. AnnArbor: University Microfilms Inc, 1968.  
32 For the decisive influence of Van Gogh and Cézanne on German Expressionism, see John Willet, 
Expressionism. New York: McGraw Hill, 1970, especially pp. 25-33. See also Wolf-Dieter Dube. 
Expressionism. Trans. Mary Whittal. New York, Oxford University Press, 1972, pp. 14-6. For the 
impact on Rilke of Van Gogh and Cézanne, see his Briefe II, pp. 107-12; 263-5; and all the letters to 
Clara Rilke dating from October, 1907 in Briefe II and III. These letters are reprinted respectively in: 
Rainer Maria Rilke, Über moderne Malerei. Ed. Martina Krießbach-Thomasberger. Insel Verlag, 2000; 
and Rainer Maria Rilke, Briefe an Cézanne. Ed. Clara Rilke. Afterword Hans Weigand Petzet,. 
Frankfurt am Main: Insel Verlag, 1952. I discuss the impact of Van Gogh and particularly Cézanne on 
Rilke in Chapter 3. 
33Ed. Alfred Wolfenstein. Die Erhebung. Jahrbuch für neue Dichtung und Wertung. 2 vol. Berlin: S. 
Fischer, 1919-1920. 
34 This volume, which went through multiple editions and printings, was a special supplement to 
Soergel’s history of early 20th century German literature, Dichtung und Dichter der Zeit: Eine 
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that a new mode of writing  (which is also a new mode of perception and reading) 
named in that text as “die neue Auslegung” plays a structurally similar role to the 
Expressionist word: it is a new interpretation of reality to be achieved through seeing 
and writing that both compels and terrifies Malte, forcing his writing out of the 
furrows as he oscillates back and forth between these two alternatives. The delirium of 
his writing in the Aufzeichnungen is central to the thesis of this project. 
In terms of a direct connection between Rilke and Worringer in particular, we 
know from a 1913 letter to Lou Andreas-Salomé that Rilke read Worringer’s 
Abstraktion und Einfühlung “mit unbedingter Zustimmung.”35 That Benn was familiar 
with Worringer’s work we know only in passing from later texts,36 but given Benn’s 
proximity before and after WWI to the Expressionist literary circles in Berlin 
(especially Herwarth Walden’s Der Sturm, which published Worringer’s 1911 article 
where he used the term “Expressionist” for the first time), we can assume that Benn 
certainly knew of Worringer’s work. 
It is now clear that Expressionism already contains its own implicit linguistic 
theory, however fragmentary, programmatic or exaggerated, of the autonomy of the 
word. This word destroys and rebuilds language and is charged with a mystical or 
rhythmical power that does not speak to the rationality of the understanding, but 
attains the immediacy of an expression. And expression is illegible, in the 
conventional sense of the word: it is a perceptual immediacy that works directly on the 
                                                                                                                                       
Schilderung der deutschen Literatur der letzten Jahrzehnte, and was published as Neue Folge: Im 
Banne des Expressionismus. Leipzig. R. Voigtländer Verlag, 1925. 
35 Briefe aus den Jahren 1907-1914. Ed. Ruth Sieber-Rilke and Carl Sieber. Leizig: Insel Verlag, 1933. 
Christa Saas is the first to point out this connection between Rilke and Worringer’s “Bibel des 
Expressionismus” as another proof of Rilke’s proximity to the movement (Saas, 225). Neil Donahue 
also cites this Rilke passage in his argument to link Worringer and Rilke through the concept of spatial 
form. See Donahue, Forms of Disruption, p. 7.  
36 There is a brief mention of Worringer in Benn’s “Rede auf Stefan George” (1934) as well as in the 
section “Stil und Entartung” from Doppelleben (1949, V, 153) and in “Einleitung zu Lyrik des 
expressionistischen Jahrzents” (1955, VI: 209). 
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body, not the mind. What is most interesting in this survey of Expressionist meta-texts 
is that the expression that seems to the conscious goal of these writers stands 
necessarily beyond the grasp of conscious linguistic activity. If a writer’s words no 
longer mean what he wants them to mean, even if he wants those words to be precisely 
ambiguous in their meaning, he is no longer in control of his language. And from the 
reader’s perspective, if the words on the page do not speak to the rational mind, but to 
the eye, to the body, to a self-less brain covered with crudely groping cilia, then the 
process called reading also becomes a loss or surrender of self. To anticipate a claim 
by Worringer in his Formprobleme der Gotik (1911), there is such a thing as an auto-
expression (Eigenausdruck) in a work of art that is not a question of our perception of 
the work, but rather of the imposition of the work’s own life and expressive power 
(Ausdrucksmacht) over us.37  
To read such an Eigenausdruck in its literary manifestation is the paradox of 
reading delirium. What is at stake here, then, is the confrontation between a rational, 
linguistic movement for expression (either through writing or reading) and the 
necessarily irrational, non-linguistic forces unleashed by that expression. When 
language is consciously used to violate its own rules, the reader’s or writer’s self 
(insofar as it, too, is a linguistic and perceptual agency) is also somehow violated. Yet 
that violation can also be seen as a liberation, an activation of the potential for new 
forms of thought, sensation and experience. It is the question of an expression at the 
edge of language, reason and perception that pulls the writer or reader back and forth 
across a limit of intelligibility. The depiction of that back-and-forth movement as 
delirium is the object of my readings in the subsequent chapters. 
                                                
37In Formprobleme der Gotik, Worringer writes, “Kurz: die nordische Linie lebt nicht von einem 
Eindruck, den wir ihr willig geben, sondern sie scheint einen Eigenausdruck zu haben, der stärker ist als 
unser Leben” (32) [“In short, the Northern line does not get its life from any impress which we 
willingly give it, but appears to have an expression of its own, which is stronger than our life” (41)]. I 
discuss this passage again in Chapter 2.  
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Part III: Reading Delirium as the Outside of Language 
Such an oscillating structure (whether it is called “delirium” or not) is already a 
feature of some critical approaches to the literature of this period. Hugo Friedrich’s 
magisterial study, Die Struktur der moderne Lyrik: von Baudelaire bis zur Gegenwart 
(1956) points out the impasse faced by the reader of a poem that has explicitly 
abandoned meaning as one its essential characteristics: 
Wie in der modernen Malerei das autonom gewordene Farben- und 
Formengefüge alles Gegenständliche verschiebt oder völlig beseitigt, 
um nur sich selbst zu erfüllen, so kann in der Lyrik das autonome 
Bewegungsgefüge der Sprache, das Bedürfnis nach sinnfreien 
Klangfolgen und Intensitätskurven bewirken, daß das Gedicht 
überhaupt nicht mehr von seinen Aussageinhalten her zu verstehen ist. 
Denn sein eigentlicher Gehalt liegt in der Dramatik der äußeren wie 
inneren Formkräfte. Da ein derartiges Gedicht immerhin noch Sprache 
ist, aber Sprache ohne mitteilbarn Gegenstand, hat es die dissonantische 
Folge, daß es den, der es vernimmt, zugleich lockt wie verstört. (12)38 
The reader of the verbally autonomous poem is lured on by the phatic or semantic 
functions inherent to language, yet disturbed by the conscious thwarting of those 
functions in the poem. The meaning of the poem is transferred from its content 
(Aussageinhalt) to the dramatics of its exterior formal powers, a contradiction that, 
Friedrich insists, cannot be overcome. The modern poem remains inassimilable and 
incomprehensible, stranding the reader between the seductive and impassive qualities 
of its language, and the only recourse lies not in reading, but in recognizing and 
describing such poems: 
Das Erkennen solcher Dichtung nimmt ihre schwierige oder 
unmögliche Verstehbarkeit als ein erstes Merkmal ihres Stilwillens auf. 
                                                
38 Hugo Friedrich, Die Struktur der moderne Lyrik: von Baudelaire bis zur Gegenwart. Hamburg: 
Rowohl Verlag, 1956. 
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Weitere Merkmale können festgestellt werden. [. . .] Das Erkennen 
folgt schließlich der Vieldeutigkeit dieser Texte, indem es sich selbst in 
den Prozess eingliedert, den sie beim Leser in Gang bringen wollen: 
den Prozess der weiterdichtenden, unabschließbaren, ins Offene 
hinausführenden Deutungsversuche. (13) 
Once meaning is excluded from poetry, the readerly task is an autopsy-like 
examination, a cataloging of the structure of the poem, recognizing and describing the 
various stylistic parts that are, as it were, no longer animated by the life of meaning or 
understandability. At best, one hopes to forge another link in a chain of 
“weiterdichtenden, unabschließbaren, ins Offene hinausführenden Deutungsversuche,” 
a chain that encircles the central problem of a linguistic structure (a text, a poem) that 
has exploded the agency of its writing and reading. So long as one forecloses the 
problem of an impersonal, non-linguistic agency that speaks through the writer and de-
stabilizes the position of the reader, the work of recognition and description can 
progress.  
When Benn mentions Worringer in his 1949 autobiographical piece, 
Doppelleben, he places him in the middle of a jeremiad on the current state of literary 
criticism: 
Aber auch hierüber habe ich mir schon gelegentlich gewisse Gedanken 
gemacht. Darunter den, daß unsere Literaturgelehrsamkeit, die 
sogenannte Literaturhistorie, keine eigenen Methode entwickelt hat, 
wie es die Kunstgeschichte durch Wöfflin, Pinder, Worringer getan und 
wie es Taine für die Literatur in Frankreich besorgte. Sie hat keine 
Grundlagenthetik zu schaffen vermocht, keine 
Grundbegriffsoperationen durchgeführt, sie nimmt sich ihre Begriffe 
aus fremden Disziplinen: Philologie, Psychologie, Moral, Politik, 
Geschichtswissenschaften und aus diesem Sammelsurium entstehen 
dann Urteile, die dem Dilettantismus sehr nahe stehen. Wenn sie 
“Zusammenhänge” glaubt feststellen zu können, dann ist das Glück 
schon groß, notabene thematische und biographische Zusammenhänge 
– stilistische, sprachliche, sprachtechnische, syntaktische, 
metaphorische Probleme erörtert sie kaum. (V, 153-4) 
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Benn laments the inability of most German literary historians to say anything about 
literature that is itself proper to literature, i.e., that works with concepts unique to 
literary language and that works directly with the stylistic, syntactical and 
metaphorical problems posed by literary language. This is a strange criticism from a 
writer like Benn, whose literary production (and especially his essayistic and critical 
writings) consist so profoundly of borrowings from “foreign” disciplines.39 Yet as a 
provocation, Benn’s comparison contains some value: what would a literary history 
look like if it were modeled after a discipline with a “proper method” like 
(Worringerian) art history, yet at the same time worked fundamentally with the 
elements of literary language, that is, with the poetics of the word? Here I want to take 
Benn’s provocation literally, as well as Hugo Friedrich’s passing analogy of the study 
of modern poetry to modern painting, and appropriate some “foreign” concepts from 
Gilles Deleuze’s book on Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation (1981).  
The first is the concept of sensation itself. One thesis of Deleuze’s book is that 
Francis Bacon (1909-1992) is the painter of sensation par excellence. Sensation, 
opposed to perception, is a form of aesthetic experience that explodes the subject-
object relation in a shared interaction of the movements, forces and rhythms that 
traverse a work of art and its spectator. Bacon, following a path in modern painting 
initiated by Cézanne, does not so much paint images or figurative representations, or 
even colors: he paints the rhythms and movement of sensations that act directly on the 
nervous system of the viewer.  
Sensation is the opposite of the facile and the ready-made, the cliché, 
but also of the ‘sensational,’ the spontaneous, etc. Sensation has one 
face turned toward the subject (the nervous system, vital movement, 
                                                
39 See for example Holger Hof’s Montagekunst und Sprachmagie: Zur Zitiertechnik in der 
essayistischen Prosa Gottfried Benns. Aachen: Shaker Verlag, 1997, which exhaustively tracks all of 
Benn’s citations in three paradigmatic essays, according to the thesis that Benn’s major intellectual and 
artistic achievement in his prose is his montage of the thoughts and words of other writers.  
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‘instinct,’ ‘temperament’—a whole vocabulary common both to 
naturalism and Cézanne), and one face turned toward the object (the 
‘fact,’ the place, the event). Or rather, it has no faces at all, it is both 
things indissolubly, it is Being-in-the-World, as the phenomenologists 
say: at one and the same time I become in the sensation and something 
happens through the sensation, one through the other, one in the other. 
And at the limit, it is the same body that, being both subject and object, 
gives and receives the sensation. As a spectator, I experience the 
sensation only by entering the painting, by reaching the unity of the 
sensing and the sensed. (31)40   
Deleuze significantly (though with a dubious neurological accuracy) excludes the 
brain from the nervous system. The brain, as the organ of cognition and perception, is 
incapable of participating in the immediacy of the painting’s sensation, which happens 
both in the painting and in the non-cerebral nervous system of the spectator. Aesthetic 
sensation is too primal and too immediate for the brain, which depends upon spatial, 
temporal and perceptual structures that sensation precisely defies. In his introduction, 
Deleuze’s English translator Daniel W. Smith compares sensation to a reversal of the 
Kantian model of synthetic perception: instead of a rational process that unites a 
sequence of apprehended images (however chaotic) into an object of perception, the 
logic of sensation dismantles the “object” into raw sensory impressions and reveals 
both the rhythm and chaos of their effect on the body.41 In the case of painting, 
sensation comes in at the eye, as it were, though it also depends on a rhythm that 
unites all of the sensory organs into one pure visual function: 
Painting gives us eyes all over: in the ear, in the stomach, in the lungs 
(the painting breathes . . .). This is the double function of painting: 
subjectively, it invests the eye, which ceases to be organic in order to 
become a polyvalent and transitory organ; objectively, it brings before 
us the reality of a body, of lines and colors freed from organic 
representation. And each is produced by the other: the pure presence of 
the body becomes visible at the same time that the eye becomes the 
destined organ of this presence. (45) 
                                                
40 Gilles Deleuze. Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation. Trans. Daniel W. Smith. Afterword Tom 
Conley. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003.  
41 Ibid, pp. xv-xxiii. 
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Deleuze creates an image of a body covered with eyes to describe how sensation in 
painting turns the organic body into a body without organs, a body capable of 
sensation in each and all of its now primal, eye-like zones. Benn’s vision of a brain-
becoming-body covered with primitive cilia would be another version of non-cerebral 
sensation in response to the autonomous, expressive word freed from its representative 
function, communicating directly with the its writer and reader. And the reciprocity, or 
non-dialectical, subjective-objective immediacy of sensation echoes the Worringerian 
concept of Eigenausdruck.42 
 A second, related concept from Deleuze that bears on my theory of reading is 
the Figure. As I state above, I am interested in delirium as the attempt to fuse the 
expressive power of the word (its potential for absolute meaninglessness or 
meaningfulness, its transformation into a visual, plastic and sonorous object) with the 
notion of a self that simultaneously shapes and is disfigured by his language. The self, 
in delirium, is constantly posited, effaced, re-inscribed and defaced by writing and 
reading, at the mercy of forces that it simultaneously invokes and eludes. In 
(Deleuze’s account of) Bacon’s paintings, this self would be called the Figure. The 
Figure is not figurative (i.e., it does not represent some object or person in a mimetic 
or realistic way) nor is it entirely an abstraction (pure lines and color, e.g., Kandinsky, 
Mondrian or Pollock). In Bacon’s paintings, the Figure is rather a kind of figurative, 
representational formation (usually of a human and/or animal) that is constantly 
distorted by a movement toward abstraction (toward the contours and structures that 
isolate, deform and dissipate the figurative qualities). The Figure thus avoids both 
figurative and abstract painting, but the forces of each, in acting upon it, unleash a 
                                                
42 For a detailed account of the connections between Worringer’s and Deleuze’s aesthetics, see Joseph 
Vogl’s “Anorganismus: Worringer und Deleuze” in Wilhelm Worringers Kunstgeschichte. Ed. Hannes 
Böhringer, Beate Söntgen. München: Wilhelm Fink, 2002. 181-92. 
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sensation that either extreme would keep trapped: “The Figure is the sensible form 
related to a sensation; it acts immediately upon the nervous system, which is of the 
flesh, whereas the abstract form is addressed to the head and acts through the 
intermediary of the brain, which is closer to the bone.” (31). The task of the painter is 
to “make visible a kind of original unity of the senses, [which] would make a 
multisensible Figure appear visually” (37).  
 Sensation and the Figure are the key terms of what, in this text, Deleuze 
loosely calls a clinical aesthetic. If the sensation of the Figure transforms the spectator 
into a body covered with eyes, a body in which all organic functions are subsumed to a 
single visual function, which reconstitutes the organic body as an all-seeing body 
without organs, then this amounts to a kind of hysteria. Hence the hysteria of Bacon’s 
Figures (as spastics or paralytics with indeterminate body parts) and the hysteria of 
sensation, of the organic body having been colonized by a host of transitory eyes. But 
Deleuze does not take this in a psychoanalytic sense as the pathology of a subject who 
would be susceptible to analysis; rather the clinical condition becomes a kind of 
metaphor for sensation: a pathology, its experience, etiology, and symptoms, become a 
way of theorizing the sensation of a work of art. The line between the clinical and the 
aesthetic is heuristically effaced, and each provides a way of thinking about the other, 
since the forces and energies that drive them are indeed the same.43  
And if painting and hysteria are the privileged aesthetic form and clinical 
pathology of the Logic of Sensation, then, in the Essays Clinical and Critical (1993), 
the privileged form is literature and its pathology is delirium. In his preface to this 
                                                
43 “What we are suggesting, in effect, is that there is a special relation between painting and hysteria. It 
is very simple. Painting directly attempts to release the presences beneath representation, beyond 
representation. The color system is a system of direct action on the nervous system. This is not a 
hysteria of the painter, but a hysteria of painting. With painting, hysteria becomes art. Or rather, with 
the painter, hysteria becomes painting.” (45) 
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collection of essays on literary texts, Deleuze says that writers are constituted by their 
ability “bring to light new grammatical or syntactic powers. They force language 
outside its customary furrows, they make it delirious [délirer]” (v).44 Paraphrasing a 
remark by Proust that describes the task of the writer as the invention of a new or 
foreign language within the mother tongue, Deleuze suggests the invention of such a 
language requires distortions of grammar and syntax, that is, distortions of the 
“customary furrows” of language. He adds that:  
when another language is created within language, it is language in its 
entirety that tends toward an “asyntactic,” “agrammatical” limit, or that 
communicates with its own outside. The limit is not outside of 
language, it is the outside of language. It is made up of visions and 
auditions that are not of language, but which language alone makes 
possible. (v)  
Language attains a certain exteriority that is not outside or beyond itself, but rather its 
own outside, an exterior limit that is nevertheless proper to it.45 And this exteriority of 
language is the limit which language shares with seeing and hearing. When a writer 
brings language to its outside, he allows certain “visions and auditions” to come into 
language that would be impossible if the writer (as seer and hearer) remained entirely 
in language, or entirely outside of it. It is thus a question of coming out of the furrows 
of language, but not out of language altogether, hence the aptness of delirium as the 
(clinical) metaphor of literature:  
It is a delirium that invents [these visions and auditions], as a process 
driving words from one end of the universe to the other. They are 
                                                
44 Deleuze, Essays Clinical and Critical. Trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco. Minneapolis: 
Univeristy of Minnesota Press, 1997. 
45 Deleuze is paraphrasing Michel Foucault’s essay, “The Thought from Outside.” Other literary 
discussions of delirium (délire) in the French context tend to focus on the literature of the 19th century 
and/or on psychoanalysis. See Shoshana Felman. Writing and Madness: Literature / Philosophy / 
Psychoanalysis. Trans. Martha Noel Evans and Felman, with Brian Massumi. Ithaca, Cornell University 
Press, 1985. Jean-Jacques Lecercle, Philosophy Through the Looking-Glass: Language, Nonsense, 
Desire. La Salle, Il: Open Court, 1985. Juan Rigoli. Lire le délire: Aliénisme, rhétorique et littérature 
en France au XIXe siècle. Preface Jean Starobinski. Fayard, 2001. 
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events at the edge of language. But when delirium falls back into its 
clinical state, words no longer open out onto anything, we no longer 
hear or see anything through them except a night whose history, colors 
and songs have been lost. Literature is a health. (v) 
Literature is a health, but it is a delirious health that oscillates between a positive, 
liberating creative potential, and the impasse of paralysis, chaos, and “the night.”46 
Delirium is the indeterminacy of the impasse and the way out of the impasse. The 
writer must risk the creation a delirious language in order to save himself from the 
clinical delirium that, at the same time, constitutes his openness and sensitivity to the 
vitality of sensation and the chaos of “the night.”  
The world is a set of symptoms whose illness merges with man. 
Literature then appears as a measure of health: not that the writer would 
necessarily be in good health [. . .], but he possesses an irresistible and 
delicate health that stems from what he has seen and heard of things too 
big for him, too strong for him, suffocating things whose passage 
exhausts him, while nonetheless giving him the becoming that a 
dominant and substantial health would render impossible. The writer 
returns from what he has seen and heard with bloodshot eyes and 
pierced eardrums. (3) 
To fuse the clinical aesthetic of painting with that of literature: the distortion of 
language that brings it into contact with its own outside allows sensation to pass 
through language; it creates delirious, extra-linguistic Figures or Words with a certain 
powerful immediacy that asserts itself in or through language. It reconstitutes the word 
as a visual and acoustic object, and reconstitutes the body as, following Benn, a 
grasping brain entirely attuned to the sensation of words.  
Through this detour into Deleuzian aesthetics, I want to borrow a general 
structure or logic of aesthetic experience predicated on the immediacy (sensation) and 
                                                
46 Like Foucault, Deleuze also associates these sensations at the limit of clinical-aesthetic-bodily 
experience with the “night.” In Francis Bacon he writes: “We can seek the unity of rhythm only at the 
point where rhythm itself plunges into chaos, into the night, at the point where the differences of level 
are perpetually and violently mixed” (39).  
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on the “representation” of that immediacy in a syntactic Figure, that is, in a delirious 
writing. I am also interested in a mode of reading that attends closely to the distortions 
of the Figure (which, according to the logic of sensation, are necessarily distortions of 
the writer and the reader or spectator) in order to reconstruct the extreme experience of 
sensation that is transmitted in reading. For Deleuze, it is crucial that the Figure 
emerge between two poles of painting: neither figurative (representational), nor totally 
abstract, the Figure still strives for a fixed form, but is constituted by the series of 
detours and distortions that interrupt its formation. Likewise, Worringer’s art historical 
concepts, Rilke’s Aufzeichnungen and Benn’s “Gehirne” cannot be contained within a 
realist, representational aesthetic, nor have they attained a completely abstract, 
expressive style. The writers are moving from the former to the latter, and their texts 
are characterized by the oscillation between those two poles.  
I call my own method of reading in this dissertation a phenomenology of 
verbal sensation, a method that describes the experience of reading texts in which 
individual words erupt out of the structures of syntax and meaning, demanding to be 
read as isolated verbal-visual-acoustic elements. The elemental word, semantically and 
grammatically “flattened” as it were, represents the surface of language and demands a 
close-sighted, haptic reading to attend to the sensation it enacts. Such texts (try to) 
suspend syntax, grammar, meaning, and temporality, all of which create the illusion of 
“depth” in language: an organization of semantic and linguistic space according to the 
temporal process of understanding.47 The stylistic unity of the texts of Rilke and Benn 
that I read, and the deep background connection between them and an entire aesthetic 
and poetic discourse of their time, is their pursuit of verbal sensation, their attempt, 
                                                
47 Although I am here describing these two dimensions in language in visual terms, the fundamental 
structure is no different than the Saussurian distinction between the diachronic and synchronic 
dimensions of linguistic signification, represented respectively by the paradigm and the syntagm. See 
pp. 122 and following in Ferdinand de Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics. Ed. Charles Bally and 
Albert Sechehaye, with Albert Riedlinger. Trans. Wade Baskin. New York: McGraw Hill Book 
Company, 1959. 
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following the example of the visual arts and art-history named by Worringer’s concept 
of Gothic expression, to produce or to describe a pure relation to the word without the 
unnecessary “depth” of grammar, meaning, and temporality.  
But I must insist that it is not a matter of pure verbal abstraction in the example 
of, say, a Dada sound poem, a nonsense poem of Christian Morgenstern, or a 
Surrealist experiment in automatic writing. As aesthetic discourses, Dada and 
Surrealism can be seen as emerging out of—yet distinct from—the discourse I 
describe here in the following way: Dada takes the formal and material distortions of 
the Expressionist poetics of to a different level by intensifying, de-romanticizing and 
politicizing them.48 Surrealism develops out of Expressionism by explicitly locating 
the source of aesthetic expressive force in the (Freudian) unconscious and describing a 
psychic and poetic technique of liberating that expressive power.49 But to give a more 
concrete example, I follow a passage Helmut Lethen’s recent biography of Benn, 
where he makes an important distinction between Benn’s poetry and the concept of 
“absolute Poesie.” In discussing Carl Einstein’s review of the 1927 publication of 
Benn’s Gesammelte Gedichte, Lethen shows how Einstein’s praise of Benn (which 
Benn himself seems to have accepted as accurate) may only be true to a point. Lethen 
writes: “Puristisch stellt [Einstein] Kriterien ‘absoluter Wortkunst’ auf, die nichts 
weiter als ‘durch keine Wirklichkeit vorbestimmtes Sprachspiel’ sind, und glaubt sie 
                                                
48 See Hugo Ball’s “Manifest zum 1. Dada-Abend in Zürich 1916” reprinted in Best (ed) Theorie des 
Expressionismus. For example, “Jede Sache hat ihr Wort; da ist das Wort selber zur Sache geworden. 
Warum kann der Baum nicht Plupusch heißen, und Pluplubasch, wenn es geregnet hat? Und warum 
muß er überhaupt etwas heißen? Müssen wir denn überall unseren Mund dran hängen? Das Wort, das 
Wort, das Weh gerade an diesem Ort, das Wort, meine Herren, ist eine öffentliche Angelegenheit ersten 
Ranges” (236). One could hardly imagine the humor and phonetic and onomatopoetic playfulness of 
such a passage in a text of Benn or Rilke.  
49 See André Breton’s well-known definition of Surrealism from his 1924 manifesto: “ SURREALISM, 
n. Psychic automatism in its pure state, by which one proposes to express—verbally, by means of the 
written word, or in any other manner—the actual functioning of thought. Dictated by thought, in the 
absence of any control exercised by reason, exempt from any aesthetic or moral concern” (26). In 
Manifestoes of Surrealism. Trans. Richard Seaver and Helen R. Lane. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1969. 
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in vollkommener Reinheit in Benn Lyrik verwirklicht” (86), but Lethen goes on to 
suggest that Benn’s poetry does not in fact fulfill the criteria for absolute, autonomous 
poetry.50 For Lethen, reality is still there in Benn’s poetry. Benn proceeds from 
semantic, social and historical contexts, even if the words that he wrenches out of 
them are to be almost unrecognizably transformed. This distinction keeps Benn’s 
poetics of the word apart from a purely autonomous verbal aesthetic of Dadaism and 
within the general poetic discourse of Expressionism that I describe here (though 
Benn, in theory and practice, goes well beyond the efforts of the writers of the so-
called “Expressionist decade,” 1910-20). 
Benn and Rilke, I argue, do not want a pure materiality of the signifier, or a 
pure autonomy of expression. Rather than going beyond that dimension of language, 
they want to go to the outside of that dimension, the exteriority that is neither within it, 
nor dialectically beyond it, but rather nevertheless still proper to it. That stylistic 
expression is what I call delirium. The term is at once historically indebted to the 
artistic and art-historical discourse of expression and haptic vision (a discourse both 
coalesced and propagated by Wilhelm Worringer in [and in the wake of] Abstraktion 
und Einfühlung) and conceptually indebted to Foucault’s reflections on “thought from 
outside” and “Unreason.” The suspension and dispersion of language that Foucault 
theorizes is analogous to the suspension of linguistic “depth” via delirious writing in 
the texts of Worringer, Rilke and Benn that I bring together here. 
 
                                                
50 Lethen’s distinction is a valid one, though he perhaps attributes a position to Einstein that is not 
entirerly there in Einstein’s original piece. In Chapters 1 and 4, I cite specific passages from Einstein’s 
text which suggest that Einstein himself had a more nuanced and specific conception of Benn’s poetic 
language than Lethen suggests here. For an account of the friendship between Benn and Einstein, see J. 
Siemon’s “Einstein und Benn: Geschichte einer Entfernung?” In Carl-Einstein-Kolloquium. Ed. K. H. 
Kiefer. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Verlag, 1994, 89-104. For their specific interaction in wartime 
Belgium, see Hubert Roland, Die deutsche literarische “Kriegskolonie” in Belgien, 1914-1918. Ein 
Beitrag zur Geschichte der deutsch-belgischen Literaturbeziehungen. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang 
Verlag, 1999. I owe the reference to Simeon’s article to Roland.  
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Part IV: Other Critical Approaches to the Problematic of Reading 
Delirium 
The first writer to use Worringer’s ideas for literary criticism (even before 
Benn suggested it) was Joseph Frank, who, in an essay originally published in 1945 
entitled “Spatial Form in Modern Literature,” argues that modernist literature is 
characterized by a suppression of temporality in favor of a purely spatial form of 
composition.51 Making use of Worringer’s categories of abstract and empathetic art, as 
well the concept of artistic volition (Kunstwollen), Frank argues that modernist 
literature is written according to spatial principles of contiguity and fragmentation 
(and therefore abstraction), not according to the organic, continuous (and empathetic) 
principle of time.52 What is of immediate interest to my argument is Frank’s 
presupposition that the literary suppression of temporality necessitates a “unified 
spatial apprehension.” Just because a novel like James Joyce’s Ulysses (1922) 
represents continuous time in a series of fragments, or conversely, represents disparate 
temporalities in one contiguous narrative line, this does not necessarily entail a 
“unified spatial apprehension” on the part of the reader (19, emphasis added JD). In 
other words, simply because literature makes a montage of the temporality of its 
presentation is not a sufficient reason for insisting on its spatial form. For a counter 
example, consider Wolfgang Iser’s argument in his essay “Interaction between Text 
                                                
51 See a revised version reprinted on pp. 3-62 of Frank’s The Widening Gyre: Crisis and Mastery in 
Modern Literature. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1963.  
52 For a discussion of the (temporal) understanding of “spatial form,”see especially William 
Holdheim’s: “Wilhelm Worringer and the Polarity of Understanding” and Joseph A. Buttigieg’s 
“Worringer among the Modernists” in Boundary 2, Vol. 8, No. 1, The Problems of Reading in 
Contemporary American Criticism: A Symposium (Autumn, 1979), pp. 339-358 and pp. 359-66. See 
also William V. Spanos’ “Modern Literary Criticism and the Spatialization of Time: An Existential 
Critique” in Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 29, No. 1. (Autumn, 1970), pp. 87-104. For 
more on the reception of Frank’s essay, see Geoff Waite’s article “Worringer’s Abstraction and 
Empathy: Remarks on its Reception and on the Rhetoric of its Criticism” in Invisible Cathedrals: The 
Expressionist Art History of Wilhelm Worringer. Ed. Neil Donahue. Penn State University Press, 1995. 
13-40.  
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and Reader” where he argues that every reader situates a text within a “field of vision” 
and explores the text as a kind of spatial form from a “wandering viewpoint” (113-
4).53 The reader’s viewpoint wanders back and forth between a foreground of explicit 
meaning and a background of implied meaning. Hence what drives the reading 
forward is precisely the wandering of the reader’s gaze, the visual scrutiny that 
unfolds in time as the vague background of unstated meaning eventually comes into 
the foreground of explicit meaning. Iser uses a spatial metaphor to understand the 
temporal process of implying, suspending and finally revealing meaning in a novel in 
much the same way that Frank uses spatial form to discuss the temporal discontinuity 
of a modernist text like Ulysses. However, all of Iser’s examples in the article derive 
from Jane Austen’s prose. The point here is that Frank’s argument (that modernist 
prose strives toward spatial form through the suppression of temporality) does not 
suggest a different kind of readerly experience (in terms of temporal suspension) from 
that of the most conventional of 19th century fiction. I would take Frank’s argument 
one step further toward a “haptic reading” of spatial form, namely the process of 
attending to the sequence of verbal sensations that radiate outward from words as they 
simultaneously burst forth and dissolve back into the structures of meaning and 
temporality inherent to language. This would make Frank’s argument, which is 
already compelling at the thematic and conceptual level, more useful as an analytical 
tool for reading the style of the texts in question.  
Another critic who takes Frank’s one step further is Neil Donahue. His study 
Form of Disruption (1993) is a sustained attempt to appropriate Frank’s concept of 
spatial form toward a visually inflected theory of literary abstraction for German 
                                                
53 In the collection The Reader in the Text: Essays on Audience and Interpretation. Ed. Susan R. 
Suleiman and Inge Crosman. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980. 
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Expressionism.54 Donahue argues that “the prose of this period strives essentially to 
resemble the visual arts” (vii), and uses Worringer’s aesthetics (via Frank’s essay) as 
both the historical glue and the analytical reference for his close readings of the 
“spatial form” of, among many crucial texts of German modernism, Rilke’s 
Aufzeichnungen and Benn’s “Gehirne.” He locates spatial form first of all on: 
[. . .] the immediate textual level, as the arrangement of words on the 
page, that is, in the visual and typographical dimension as parataxis in 
greater or lesser degrees of disjunction; and second, on the level of 
overall coherence of a work, the organization of material against the 
temporal imperative of narrative according to principles of recurrence 
or varied repetition, as in the leitmotiv. Or we might say that spatial 
form reveals itself in terms of a work’s style and overall construction. 
(10) 
Donahue translates Worringer’s concept of visual abstraction quite literally: the work 
of (visual) art gratifies the need for abstraction by reducing itself to pure geometric 
lines on a flat surface, thus abstracting itself from the caprice and chaos of spatial 
existence. Thus the literary work, in order to provide a similar abstract release, needs 
to suppress its inherent medial element: not space, but time. Therefore, all the 
temporally articulating, story-telling, depth-creating functions of narrative language 
are to be suppressed in favor of terse, paratactic, a-temporal language that is to be 
regarded as “spatial.” Although this proves a fruitful point of departure for Donahue’s 
close readings, I wish to raise two objections. First: in crudely Worringerian terms, 
abstraction is supposed to gratify a need for abstraction, to provide an aesthetic release 
from the chaos and terror of existence. But the reading of “abstract” literature (e. g., 
the Aufzeichnungen or Benn’s prose) provides the very opposite of release: such 
literature reflects, if not exaggerates, the existential and psychological unease that give 
rises to it. It is, at least, not exactly gratifying, not exactly a clarification of the 
obscurity of existence. For a counterexample, consider Erich Auerbach’s famous 
                                                
54 See Neil Donahue’s discussion of Benn in Forms of Disruption: Abstraction in Modern German 
Prose. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993. 
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comparison of the rich syntax of Homeric language and the terse parataxis of Biblical 
language in the opening chapter of Mimesis (1946). 55 The suppression of temporality, 
terse style, and lack of explicit connections between events of the Biblical narrative 
give rise to tension, suspense, narrative depth and an almost Worringerian-sounding 
need for interpretation (“Deutungsbedürfnis”). In contrast, the rich syntax of Homeric 
language, which fills in every detail and seamlessly articulates different temporal 
moments in a perpetually present fullness of narration, presents in itself the pleasure of 
entering a fuller world. Parataxis, as Auerbach would have it, seems to create precisely 
the experience from which, in Worringerian terms, it is supposed to be the escape. In 
any case, I suggest that the experience of reading “spatial form” only intensifies the 
existential confusion it should resolve. Donahue takes Worringer too much at face 
value and does not emphasize enough the contradictions at play in his concept of 
abstraction (which, as I show in Chapter 2, is always tinged with the hyperbolically 
escalating force of expression). Indeed, I argue that Worringer’s main contribution to 
the history of style and to the aesthetic and poetic discourses of his time is not a theory 
of abstraction, but the Gothic line. Whereas abstraction, as a drive and as a style, is 
complete and total, the Gothic is restless, incomplete, delirious. The Deleuzian 
Worringer, I suggest, is more accurate than the Worringer of Frank and Donahue.  
 A second objection to the analogy of spatial form to literature is that it only 
takes into account one dimension of literary language, namely, syntax (or more 
specifically its breakdown as parataxis56). But one could also analyze such a 
breakdown of syntax in terms of the word, a redefinition of the power of the word, 
which in turns breaks down the laws of syntax and creates a style that Donahue calls 
                                                
55 Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: Die dargestellte Wirklichkeit in der abendlandischen Literatur. 9th 
Edition. Tübingen and Basel: Francke Verlag, 1994. 
56 Donahue nevertheless offers a productive analysis of Benn’s syntax at the end of “Gehirne.” See 
especially pp. 177-8 in Forms of Disruption.  
 48 
abstract, but that I call delirious. But to make the analogy to the visual arts more 
complete and to prove more fully the thesis that “the prose of this period strives 
essentially to resemble the visual arts” (vii), one would need to connect all the 
fundamental units of visual representation to the units of linguistic representation. 
This, I suggest, would mean mapping color, line/contour and figure onto word, syntax 
and (grammatical) person, respectively. Color is, as it were, the word of the visual 
image; lines/contours represent the articulation and demarcation of colors in the same 
way that syntax combines words into larger structures or patterns; and the figure as the 
highest integration and organizing force of color and line, is analogous to the 
grammatical person of language as the agent (speaker, writer, listener, reader) that 
fundamentally underlies it. I am here interested in the modes of experimental writing 
that re-conceive each of these fundamental units and the totality of their interaction. In 
literary terms, purely verbal experimentation would remind one of the work of James 
Joyce. August Stramm’s poetry could be thought of as a poetry that strives solely for 
the suppression of syntax, whereas Kafka’s prose (especially in the case of Das 
Schloss, famously rewritten from first to third person) could be seen as a conscious 
intensification of the ambiguity of grammatical person. But, to my mind, Rilke’s 
Aufzeichnungen and Benn’s “Gehirne” interrogate all three of these basic literary 
dimensions through the figures of their protagonists: the “ich,” however distorted and 
ex-pressed by his language, provides the necessary tension for their poetic 
experimentation. Thus the “ich” of Rilke and Benn, is analogous to the Figure (in 
Deleuze’s sense), as the point of aesthetic contact that makes sensation possible and, 
in this case, legible as delirium. 
 The legibility of such texts becomes a problem in Friedrich Kittler’s account of 
the literature of this period in his Discourse Networks 1800/1900 (1985).57 However, 
                                                
57 Kittler, Friedrich A. Discourse Networks 1800/1900. Trans. Michael Metteer, with Chris Cullens. 
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Kittler is not interested in legibility as part of a hermeneutic process of reading and 
understanding the meaning of texts; rather, for him, legibility is a matter of the 
transcription and decoding of information in the discourse network of 1900, with 
literature being reduced merely to one self-reflective discourse among others (e.g., 
psychophysics and psychoanalysis) and written language being reduced to one 
linguistic medium among others (e.g., the phonograph, the radio). Writers around 
1900 have cast off meaning and any connection to “nature” or “soul” and instead 
merely follow the example of the natural sciences and media technology and 
transcribe their cerebral engrams into written form, often to the point of madness. 
Indeed, Kittler defines literature around 1900 as “a simulacrum of madness,” with the 
writings-down of Rilke’s Malte and Benn’s Rönne as the prime examples of delirious 
writing.58 Here it goes without saying for Kittler that the notions of a creative human 
subject or of artistic agency simply fall away according to the discourse of literature 
around 1900. Writers like Benn and Rilke are compelled like machines to transcribe 
their texts not from their thoughts and experiences, but from a pre-given verbal matrix 
in the brain that dictates words to the writing hand automatically. Kittler does not have 
to make any historical claims about why such a delirious style comes about because 
“[l]iterary writing is its own justification precisely in its empty self-referentiality” 
(304). Hence Kittler’s summary remark that Rönne’s “literary impulses are to be fed 
on the vivisected fruit of his own brain. That is why the hero procures himself a 
journal and a pencil” (314), or his equally terse commentary on Malte’s practice of 
Aufzeichnen: “Writing therefore means: to put the exploded ‘inner-world space,’ the 
tumescent brain, down on paper, rather than have the explosion or tumor treated by the 
appropriate scientific methods” (319). Writing is nothing more than a material process, 
                                                                                                                                       
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990. 
58 See pp. 304-46, “A Simulacrum of Madness.” 
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and literature is the discourse that literalizes its materiality to a delirious extreme.  
Yet, as I show in my discussions of Malte and Rönne, both Rilke and Benn 
were still very much interested in creativity and artistic agency as constitutive 
problems of their work (the ich that, however distorted or problematic, like Bacon’s 
Figures, cannot be abandoned). I insist that the more accurate and productive way to 
approach the “simulacrum of madness” is to examine the dynamic interaction of 
agency and loss/surrender of agency as it is played out in the delirious language of the 
texts, in their words and their style.59 By adopting the agentless and anti-artistic model 
of a discourse network, Kittler forfeits his ability to describe literary language around 
1900 with any specificity. In this sense he belies an important aspect of his 
Foucauldian roots. Consider David Wellbery’s comment in the foreword to the 
English translation of Kittler’s work: 
 [Kittler] practices what Foucault, in an early essay on Maurice 
Blanchot, called the ‘thinking of the outside,’ the thinking of language 
as a domain recalcitrant to internalization. Later in his career, Foucault 
named this domain ‘discourse’ and set out to develop a lexicon of 
exteriority—series, event, discontinuity, materiality—with which to 
describe it. Kittler’s discourse analysis follows the Foucauldian lead in 
that it seeks to delineate the apparatuses of power, storage, 
transmission, training, reproduction, and so forth that make up the 
conditions of factual discursive occurrences. The object of study is not 
what is said or written but the fact—the brute and often brutal fact—
that it is said, that this and not rather something else is inscribed. (xxi)  
I would argue that, for Foucault, it was not simply a matter of renaming the same 
domain and proceeding with the busy-work of discursive description. As we have 
already seen, this was a major shift for Foucault, who insisted on a distinction between 
his earlier “phenomenological” approach (which by 1970 he explicitly rejects) and his 
more properly “discursive” or “archaeological” one. By appropriating only the latter 
Foucault in his work (as Wellbery seems to suggest here), Kittler loses the earlier 
                                                
59 On this point Moritz Baßler has a more compelling reading. See his discussion of “die Aporie des 
setzenden Ichs” in Die Entdeckung der Textur: Unverständlichkeit in der Kurzprosa der emphatischen 
Moderne 1910-1916. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1994. p. 79 and ff.  
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Foucault’s attention to the productivity of literary language and its complex interplay 
with artistic subjectivity, and I argue that it is precisely these aspects of language that 
are essential to reconstructing a literary discourse and to understanding in particular 
the delirium of literature around 1900.  
 Another way in which I would distinguish my approach to Benn and Rilke 
from Kittler’s is through the implicit Lacanianism of his conception of media. Kittler 
writes: 
A writing without the writer, then, records the impossible reality at the 
basis of all media: white noise, primal sound. This is only logical. 
Certainly “it” has been making noise from time immemorial, as long as 
there has been Brownian motion. But for any distinction between noise 
and information to be possible, the real must be able to move through 
technological channels. (316-7, emphasis added JD) 
While it may be a technological fact that the medial transmission of information 
produces a certain amount of friction or noise, Kittler often (and particularly in his 
discussion of “das Große” in Rilke’s Aufzeichnungen) links that background noise to 
the Lacanian real. Consider the juxtaposition of the following two sentences in 
Kittler’s account of Malte’s encounter with the Big Thing: “What appears [i.e., the Big 
Thing] is something real that cannot be spoken in any language because the very act of 
introducing it into language filters it out” and “The law governing delirium and 
hallucination determines that what has not entered the daylight of the symbolic 
appears in the real” (318). The media-theoretical language merges seamlessly with 
Lacanian terminology to imbue all medial transmission with the tinge of a traumatic 
real that resists, but at the same time demands symbolic representation. Hence the 
compulsion of all writers around 1900 to write down the “primal soup of brain 
physiology” since that is the paradoxically immediate experience of their own medial 
constitution and the traumatic kernel of their subjectivity, such as it is. Yet I show that 
the paradox of writing-down an immediate experience is not only a feature of the 
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mediality of transcription, but also an aesthetic and poetic problem. When a discourse 
sets as the goal of literary production not the mediated representation of reality, but 
rather the paradoxical immediacy of an experience or sensation of language in writing 
or reading, then the paradox of that immediacy is more than just the traumatic real that 
lies at the essence of any transcription, of any representation. Rather, that paradox is a 
concrete and historically determined aesthetic problem that constitutes and is 
constituted by the texts which try to solve it. And I argue that, in the discourses in 
which Worringer, Rilke and Benn participate (the discourses of Expressionism, of 
abstraction, of haptic vision and verbal sensation) that the paradox of verbal sensation 
is conceived primarily in a visual sense. The compelling paradox of delirious writing 
is more than just a problem of medial transcription, it is the double problem of 
establishing in literary language a relation to the word that is abstract and haptic, and 
likewise the problem of reading such a relation. 
 Thomas Anz’s 1977 study Literatur der Existenz approaches the problem of a 
delirious literary discourse in the early 20th century through the social and literary 
category of psychopathography.60 He historicizes the existential Angst and alienation 
as the particular Befindlichkeit of Expressionist writers around 1910 (but not during 
the war) and shows how that Befindlichkeit mirrros itself in the literature of the time as 
a whole vocabulary of alienation, fear, and paralysis as well as spatial metaphors of 
enclosure and imprisonment reflecting the isolation of the writer in the modern 
metropolis. He offers an exhaustive catalogue of the Expressionist writers of the 
period, particularly Heym, Stadler, Trakl and von Hoddis, as well as major figures like 
Musil, Thomas Mann, Rilke and Döblin. But what emerges as the central 
methodological idea of Anz’s text is a kind of Verspiegelungstheorie that uses 
                                                
60 See Thomas Anz, Literatur der Existenz: Psychopathographie und ihrer soziale Bedeutung im 
Frühexpressionismus. Stuttgart: Metzler, 1977. 
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existential vocabulary to show how Expressionist literature reflects a concrete social 
reality, an empirical psychological experience. Madness or delirium, in Anz’s text, are 
ultimately only metaphors for a social experience that remains firmly situated outside 
the text and in the historical reality of the time. I am rather interested in how the 
literary text is the delirium that it represents through the experience of reading it. 
Hence my emphasis on verbal sensation as both a category of reading and of literary 
discourse, as opposed to Psychopathographie, which remains on the side of a 
discursive approach. 
 Moritz Baßler, in Die Entdeckung der Textur: Unverständlichkeit in der 
Kurzprosa der emphatischen Moderne 1910-1916, approaches the literature of this 
period from a post- or anti-hermeneutic perspective. However, unlike the post-
hermeneutic approach of Kittler, his focus remains on the experience of the reading 
process rather than the construction of a discursive network. Baßler elaborates a model 
of reading texts from this period on the presupposition that their constitutive stylistic 
feature is illegibility or incomprehensibility (Unverständlichkeit). For Baßler, 
Unverständlichkeit grounds a historical moment in German short prose writing from 
1910-1916 (what he calls “das emphatische Moderne” in contrast to “klassiche 
Moderne”), characterized by texts that block the integration of their parts into a whole 
accessible to hermeneutic understanding. Such a text abandons structure in favor of 
what Baßler calls Textur: there is no longer a summarizable, paraphrasable core to the 
writing, rather only a material/formal texture of language, which both exceeds 
hermeneutic understanding and forces a re-conception of it.61 This gives rise to what 
Baßler, on p. 79 and following, calls “die Aporie des setzenden Ich,” a paradox of 
                                                
61 Bassler defines texture as “Ein Vermeiden von Strukturen“ and relates it to incomprehensibility as 
follows: “ein Blockieren von hermeneutischem Verstehen, paradigmatischer Übertragbarkeit, und 
bildhafter Vorstellbarkeit, führt zur Unverständlichkeit eines Textes, weil es die gewöhnte Lektüre 
unterläuft und die Werkzeuge traditioneller Interpretation nutzlos macht” (15). 
 54 
agency in which the writer must be at once the active producer of language and the 
passive conduit of an irrational, primal reality that speaks through him and inscribes 
itself into his incomprehensible prose. These aporia brings about for Baßler a direct 
contact between writing and madness, which he contrasts specifically to Kittler’s 
notion of the simulacrum of delirium. For Baßler, madness is neither a symptom, nor a 
mimetic (Anz) or simulated (Kittler) style; rather it is the textual principle of the 
writing of precisely such an aporetic subject, as, according to Baßler, so many writers 
of the emphatische Moderne are (including Einstein and Benn).  
My approach could be distinguished from Baßler’s in two ways. First, his 
approach, which he calls anti-hermeneutic, nevertheless still operates according to a 
kind of hermeneutic logic. To explain how a text is understood as an unfolding of 
meaning is in some fundamental ways no different than explaining how is 
misunderstood as an unfolding of meaninglessness. My emphasis on verbal sensation, 
on the visual aspects of a “textured” or delirious text, provides a way of reading such a 
text with some specificity for its particular style and rhythm, rather than subsuming it, 
however implicitly, to a general logic of (mis)understanding. Moreover, my approach 
situates the phenomenon of Textur within the broader aesthetic discourse of 
Expressionism (one that can include Rilke as well), rather than the more narrowly 
circumscribed literary and programmatic discourse of experimental prose writers that 
Baßler has in mind. And my approach encompasses poetry in addition to prose, 
whereas Baßler scrupulously avoids poetry and what he calls the “lyricisms” that can 
sometimes interrupt the proper Textur of prose writing. From my perspective, the 
stylistic phenomenon of delirium that I describe in Rilke and Benn’s prose writing can 
be found in their poetry as well. In Chapter 1, I juxtapose two poems of Rilke and 
Benn in order to begin to read the delirium, for which I have here outlined a 




WORD AS METAPHOR, WORD AS SENSATION: RILKE’S “DER LESENDE” 
AND BENN’S “STAATSBIBLIOTHEK”  
 
Deleuze’s formulation of sensation as a non-cerebral and ambivalent 
experience (as health and sickness, rhythm and chaos, expansion and contraction, 
possibility and risk) speaks to the problem I want to analyze and generates positive 
terms for the analysis. In the chapters that follow, I show how delirium can be read, 
that is, how it becomes part of a logic of sensation, a delirious style, and how that style 
belongs to the larger confrontation of modern movements in art and literature with the 
problem of visual and verbal immediacy. In this chapter, I juxtapose two poems (one 
by Rilke from 1901, one by Benn from 1925) that both describe and perform a certain 
experience of reading. The contrast between the two poems reveals a double shift in 
poetic language (1) away from a temporal unfolding of meaning in and around words 
as reliable figurations of that meaning; and (2) toward a poetics of verbal sensation in 
which words are presented in a haptic syntax to the reader, subverting through the 
immediacy of their expression the referentiality of language and the distinction 
between literary and metaphorical registers. 
 The first poem, Rilke’s “Der Lesende” (1901) stages a scene of delirium, the 
breakdown of the reading process that is also a breakdown of the reading self.62 But 
the language of the poem, through the trope of chiasmus and, implicitly, through the 
affirmation of the stability and meaningfulness of metaphorical language itself, 
                                                
62 “Der Lesende,” from Rilke’s Das Buch der Bilder (Werke 1, 457-8) dates from 1901, during Rilke’s 
stay in Worpswede and Westerwede. My analysis here thus anticipates the discussion of the Worpswede 
monograph (1902) in Chapter 3. 
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reverses and heals the reader’s delirium. As an allegory of reading, or more precisely, 
an allegory of delirium, the text depicts the power of metaphorical language to 
overcome the excessive literalness of delirium, restoring the coherence of the self and 
the totality of the world. The second pole of delirium is represented by Benn’s 
“Staatsbibliothek” (1925), not so much an allegory of reading as an allegory of non-
reading in which the poet both states and performs a new mode of encountering words 
on the page. Benn’s poem explicitly undermines the poetic power of metaphor, 
insisting instead on a new literal or verbal poetics in which the literary text is radically 
closed in on itself: the poem is now a verbal and visual object at once, with its ghostly 
rhyme and rhythm further severing the connection to a real or referential world and 
keeping the reader’s attention focused on the words themselves. There is thus the idea 
of a poetic language that has renounced both the metaphorical and referential function 
altogether and works with words as its only, absolute objects: the primary positing of 
words which capture and release an instant of poetic power. The texts of Rilke and 
Benn (and, mutatis mutandis, of Worringer) that I analyze in chapters 2 through 4 
represent the oscillation or vacillation between these two poles, blending the binaries 
between the literal and metaphorical, the material and the textual, the outer world and 
the inner self into some third thing. This third thing is not exactly beyond or outside 
linguistic expression, but, to say it again with Deleuze and Foucault, presents the 
outside of language, the exteriority of language within language. It is thus a mode of 
writing that is constantly at odds with itself, overcoming and undermining itself in the 
same gesture of writing (the gesture of writing down for Malte, the gesture of pulling 




Part I: Rilke’s Allegory of Delirium: “Der Lesende” (1901) 
Rilke’s poem “Der Lesende” introduces one aspect of the polarity of reading 
delirium. The poem depends, as so many of Rilke’s early poems do, on the figure of 
reversal, of chiasmus.63 The poem narrates how the reading of a text (the gathering of 
meaning from the furrows of writing on the page) is reversed and transformed into the 
scattering of meaning outwards onto the landscape. The balanced totality that the 
reader expects to receive from the book (the union of inside and outside, of self and 
world, of earth and sky) is disrupted by the experience of reading itself, which 
produces only congestion, chaos, and darkness: the literal unraveling of textuality by 
the dim light of the setting sun. But as the reader raises his eyes from the book, he sees 
all around him the signs of the meaningful totality that he expected to find in the book. 
The images of textual obscurity, congestion, and disintegration are now reversed into 
images of clarity, distance and order, into which the reader, through his now-knowing 
glances, is closely interwoven. The poem concludes with a metaphor, an as-if union of 
heaven and earth that brings full resolution to its reversal, suggesting that reading 
itself is only a metaphor for a more profound and utterly non-linguistic insight. 
Der Lesende 
 
Ich las schon lang. Seit dieser Nachmittag,  
mit Regen rauschend, an den Fenstern lag. 
Vom Winde draußen hörte ich nichts mehr: 
mein Buch war schwer. 
Ich sah ihm in die Blätter wie in Mienen,  
die dunkel werden von Nachdenklichkeit,  
und um mein Lesen staute sich die Zeit. – 
                                                
63 Paul de Man discusses chiasmus in Rilke’s poetry in “Tropes (Rilke),” the second chapter of 
Allegories of Reading. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1979. He writes, “The determining figure of 
Rilke’s poetry is that of chiasmus, the crossing that reverses the attributes of words and things. The 
poems are composed of entities, objects and subjects, who themselves behave like words, which “play” 
at language according to the rules of rhetoric as one plays ball according to the rules of the game” (38). 
I discuss further de Man’s argument on the figurality of Rilke’s poetic language in Chapter 3 by placing 
it in the context of his prose writings (Worpswede and Malte), which respectively present and 
undermine an explicit theory of metaphor. The theory of metaphor that emerges from these prose texts 
is, I argue, also central to understanding Rilke’s poetic language, particularly the renunciation of 
referentiality through figurality that de Man reads in Rilke’s poetry.  
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Auf einmal sind die Seiten überschienen,  
und statt der bangen Wortverworrenheit 
steht: Abend, Abend. . . überall auf ihnen.  
Ich schau noch nicht hinaus, und doch zerreißen 
die langen Zeilen, und die Worte rollen 
von ihren Fäden fort, wohin sie wollen. . . 
Da weiß ich es: über den übervollen 
glänzenden Gärten sind die Himmel weit; 
die Sonne hat noch einmal kommen sollen. – 
Und jetzt wird Sommernacht, so weit man sieht: 
zu wenig Gruppen stellt sich das Verstreute,  
dunkel, auf langen Wegen gehn die Leute, 
und seltsam weit, als ob es mehr bedeute,  
hört man das Wenige, das noch geschieht. 
 
Und wenn ich jetzt vom Buch die Augen hebe, 
wird nichts befremdlich sein und alles groß. 
Dort draußen ist, was ich hier drinnen lebe, 
und hier und dort ist alles grenzenlos; 
nur daß ich mich noch mehr damit verwebe, 
wenn meine Blicke an die Dinge passen 
und an die ernste Einfachheit der Massen, - 
da wächst die Erde über sich hinaus.  
Den ganzen Himmel scheint sie zu umfassen: 




I’d long been reading. Since with rush of rain 
this afternoon first dimmed the window-pane. 
The wind outside had passed from my regard: 
my book was hard. 
And, as I turned its pages, I would con them 
like features darkened by reflectiveness; 
time’s flow was stemmed around my studiousness. 
Then of a sudden something overshone them, 
and, ousting anxious verbal maziness, 
stood: Evening, Evening. . . everywhere upon them. 
I do not yet look out, but the long lines 
have split in two, and words from their combining 
threads roll away wherever they’re inclining. . .  
And then I know: above the serpentining,  
                                                
64 Rainer Maria Rilke. Selected Works. Volume II, Poetry. Trans. J. B. Leishman. London: Hogarth 
Press, 1976, p. 136. 
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glittering gardens there’s a spaciousness;  
yes, once again the sun must have been shining.  
Now summer night is all encompassing: 
Small groups are formed by what lay scatteredly, 
people on long walks wander darksomely, 
and strangely far, as though more meaningly, 
is heard the little that’s still happening. 
 
And when I gaze up now from what I’ve read, 
everything’s great and nothing’s unakin.  
Out there exists what I live here within, 
and here and there it’s all unlimited;  
save that I weave myself still more therein 
when on to outward things my glances fly 
and gravely simple masses formed thereby, – 
there far beyond itself the earth’s outswelling.  
It seems to be embracing all the sky, 
and the first star is like the farthest dwelling.]  
The first four lines of the poem set up an opposition between the inside and the 
outside. The inside is the space of reading, of seeing, and of the heavy book (schwer in 
the sense of Schwerkraft, the gravity of the book as a pull inwards toward a center65). 
Temporality (the afternoon), changeability (of the weather), and sound (wind and rain) 
are relegated to the space outside the window. The emphatic monosyllabic sentences 
“Ich las schon lang” and “mein Buch war schwer” (the latter emphatically taking up 
an entire line) bracket the description of the outside space, making an almost visual 
border in the structure of the verse. The outside space is described only insofar as its 
noisy turbulence is sealed off from the plodding, monosyllabic slowness of reading.   
Reading the book is depicted as a kind of looking: the poet looks into the 
book’s pages as into the expression of a dark, pensive face (“ich sah ihm in die Blätter 
wie in Mienen, / die dunkel werden von Nachdenklichkeit”). This is an almost 
specular image: the reader’s face must have grown dark from his thoughtfulness, and 
he reads the book as if looking at his own reflection. Reading is thus both looking and 
                                                
65 See Rilke’s 1924 poem “Schwerkraft” (2: 179). 
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introspection, both of which take place outside of the normal passage of time: “und um 
mein Lesen staute sich die Zeit.-” Since daily time and meteorological transience have 
been placed outside the scene of reading, reading itself is experienced as a congestion 
of time. But time does not simply slow or stop, rather it accumulates in a specifically 
negative sense of the word: not accumulation as growth or construction, but as 
amassing, congestion, the slowing-down of a fluidity that should otherwise remain in 
motion. If reading itself (lesen) is, at least etymologically, a gathering from the page, 
the language of the poem suggests that reading cannot gather from the page, but 
gathers time around the page in the negative sense of a stoppage or clogging that will, 
at some point, have to burst or break.  
That break comes in the form of the word “Abend, Abend” and the sudden 
shift to the present tense: evening, as the irruption of the stalled and exteriorized 
temporality of reading, shines over the pages with its fading light, and instead of the 
narrow, fearful confusion of words (“der bangen Wortverworrenheit”), the reader sees 
time itself as an absence of light. But as he continues to hold his gaze on the pages, 
still awaiting some kind of illumination despite the increasing obscurity, the lines of 
the text tear themselves to pieces, and the words, torn loose from the threads that bind 
them, roll forth wherever they want. The enjambment of these lines verbally depicts 
the textual unraveling as the sentences are torn apart by the end of a verse. The word 
itself zerreißen (the only end-word in the poem without a rhyming counterpart) makes 
a tear in the loose, but consistent rhyming of the poem. The image of rolling words 
works in direct opposition to the heaviness of the book: the book should have its own 
center of gravity, its Schwerpunkt, but if each of these words has begun to roll, then 
each is now turning on its own center of gravity, dispersing the book’s centering 
weight in all directions. The book cannot even be named anymore: that which is first 
named as a book gradually dissolves itself into pages, lines and finally individual 
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words: according to this movement, the parts monstrously usurp the totality of the 
whole. The violence of this language is also a very specifically self-reflexive violence: 
as the text itself unravels, the primal metaphor of text (as weaving) is decomposed: if 
reading is not gathering (but a rhythm of stoppage and dispersion), and if the text is 
not woven (but a chaos of threads and a jumble of words), then language itself is being 
undermined by a new set of images that rewrite its very roots. Moreover, if the book is 
a specular image of the reader, then it is the reader himself who is also somehow 
subjected to this violent dispersing movement, reduced, like his language, to a 
scattering of points (ellipsis), saying nothing except their inability to say: “und die 
Worte rollen / von ihren Fäden fort, wohin sie wollen. . .”66 
This is the moment of delirium in the text. Reading, as a word, a signifier, and 
an activity of visual perception and linguistic understanding is taken to its own outside 
and reconstituted as the scattering of disintegrated, autonomous words that escape the 
gravitational pull of syntax and typography. To read this delirium means to trace and 
question the process that subverts and destabilizes textual meaning and brings the 
language to this point of chaotic collapse, this limit of legibility, in the conventional 
and etymological sense of the word. But in the case of this particular poem, we can 
only read Rilke’s delirium so far. Because for now this delirium can still be turned 
around, restored to a proper form of legibility by a language that lets in an initial 
tremor of delirium only to reassert a firmer grasp. 
Still not having looked up out of the book, the reader imagines the space 
outside, and suddenly knows how distant the heavens are from the overfull, gleaming 
gardens: these two lines introduce two nuances to the system of oppositions that 
                                                
66 Foucault’s essay “The Thought from Outside” describes the simultaneous scattering of language and 
dissolution of the subject (i.e. the movement to the outside of language) with the same undoing of the 
metaphor of textuality: “When language arrives at its own edge, what it finds is not a positivity that 
contradicts it, but the void that will efface it. Into that void it must go, consenting to come undone in the 
rumbling, in the immediate negation of what it says, in a silence that is not the intimacy of a secret but a 
pure outside where words endlessly unravel.” (“Thought” 152 [emphasis added JD]) 
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structure the poem: in addition to inside/outside, the poem now establishes an 
opposition between proximity (‘bangen Wortverworrenheit”) and distance (“über den 
übervollen / glänzenden Gärten sind die Himmel weit” [emphasis added JD]), and 
between the horizontality of the earth (the gardens) and the infinitely receding 
verticality of the heavens. And with that the poem states, in the line that forms the 
exact center of the poem (line 16 of 31): the sun should have come once more. The 
reader is now trapped by a series of oppositions that emerge around his reading, which 
instead of providing a way out, has been broken apart under his reading gaze, leaving 
him without language (the autonomous words, the ellipsis) and in the dark: the sun 
would need to come again, he would need more light and time for reading, if it will be 
of any help to him. 
This line is the pivoting point for the reversal of the poem, which now turns 
outwards from the inner space of reading. Although the reader himself has not yet 
looked up (“so weit man sieht” and not “so weit ich sehe”), we see the summer night: 
“Zu wenig Gruppen stellt sich das Verstreute, / dunkel auf langen Wegen gehn die 
Leute, / und seltsam weit, als ob es mehr bedeute, / hört man das wenige das noch 
geschieht.” In contrast to the book, which is characterized both by claustrophobic 
proximity (“bangen Wortverworrenheit”) and chaotic scattering, the language that 
describes the distance and scattering of the landscape is curiously (seltsam) ordered, 
precisely in its dispersion: there is no enjambment, and the rhymes (Verstreute, Leute, 
bedeute framed within sieht and geschieht) suggest an ordered tableau, not an obscure 
chaos. When the reader finally raises his eyes from the book, nothing will be strange, 
and everything will be grand (groß): it is no longer a question of inside versus the 
outside, but rather of all or nothing, that is, of a totality. Indeed, the next couplet 
explicitly erases the border between inside and outside: “Dort draußen ist, was ich hier 
drinnen lebe, / und hier und dort ist alles grenzenlos.“ Chiasmus appears as a visual 
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crossing of words (dort / hier / hier / dort), transcending the opposition in a borderless 
totality, into which, in the next three lines, the poet weaves himself through his ability 
to make his glances correspond to things. The image of weaving restores the textual 
metaphor that was unraveled by reading, only now the “real” text is the fabric that 
binds the reader to the landscape. At last a proper “reading” as gathering can take 
place, namely an accumulation that is not congestion, but rather growth: “da wächst 
die Erde über sich hinaus.” But in contrast to the first image of monstrous growth (the 
words usurping the wholeness of the text), this image harmoniously resolves that final 
aspects of the poem’s oppositional structure: the earthly/horizontal and the 
heavenly/vertical. “Den ganzen Himmel scheint sie [die Erde] zu umfassen: / der erste 
Stern ist wie das letzte Haus [emphasis added JD].” The overgrowing earth seems to 
embrace the sky, and the celestial and domestic are fused into a single light at the 
horizon: the first star is like the last house.  
The chiastic reversal exchanges the bad totality of reading for the good totality 
of the landscape by inverting the oppositional structure of the poem: in the end, the 
outside is more of a shelter than the inside, the view of the distant horizon is closer 
than the pages of a book, the darkness of the night sky offers more illumination than 
an afternoon of sunlit reading. What is curious about this inversion, however, is that 
terms of the inversion are not transcended by the inversion itself: it is still a poem 
about reading and textuality, and the true inversion happens in the exchange of the 
literal for the metaphorical. As the experience of reading a text becomes too literal, as 
the words become almost tangible objects that spill out of the literally unraveling text, 
the poem has to transform the literal into the metaphorical to keep the threat of 
delirium at bay. What is literally undone in the first half of the poem is restored in the 
second, but metaphorically: the first half suggests that reading and textuality as such 
are a potential trauma, but the second half shows that reading and textuality as 
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metaphors, as principles of comparison, are indispensable for the sanity of the reader, 
for the stability of his place between heaven and earth, order and chaos, light and 
darkness, etc. This is what makes the “wie” of the last lines so significant: it shows 
that the objects of the comparison function like words: “Stern” is a image that 
functions like the word “Haus,” “Stern” means “Haus,” and the poem depicts the 
exchange of one sense of reading for another so that “Stern” can be read to mean 
“Haus.” Words become visual images (Mienen), and visual images function exactly 
like words—we note in passing de Man’s claim that the “entities, objects and 
subjects” of Rilke’s poems “themselves behave like words” (de Man 38)—and the 
tautology of this reversal is disguised by the beauty of the metaphorical language, its 
languid syntax, rhythm and rhyme. That final “wie” is the only sign of the remainder 
of the delirium, the residue left by the moment of delirium as one mode of 
metaphorical/literal imagery is substituted for another that is only seemingly different. 
And that seemingness is the poem’s truth: the fusion (of heaven and earth, outside and 
inside, world and self) that it depicts is never complete, it always bears the traces of its 
undoing, it always whispers that its totality is either metaphorical or nothing.  
Here it is worth remarking that this poem belongs to the work of the “early” 
Rilke, to use a periodization employed by Beda Allemann.67 In Allemann’s terms, the 
poetry of the “late” Rilke (e.g., the Duineser Elegien and the Sonnette an Orpheus) 
realizes another mode of metaphor, namely the figure, a metaphor that does not merely 
reverse spatial and temporal structures, but transcends them. He writes: 
Metapher bedeutet nicht nur “Übertragung” im inhaltlichen Sinn, gar 
auf den ausdrücklinchen wie-Vergleich eingeschränkt. Erst wenn man 
den Begriff der Metapher von der ungerechtfertigten Einschränkung 
auf Inhaltliches befreit und in der “Übertragung” den Gang des 
Gedichtes als solchen erkennt, kommt man zu einer Konzeption der 
Metapher, die dem Gedicht noch wirklich gewachsen ist. [. . .] Dieser 
                                                
67Allemann, Beda. Zeit und Figur beim späten Rilke: ein Beitrag zur Poetik des modernen Gedichtes. 
Pfüllingen: Verlag Günther Neske, 1961.  
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Gang ist der Gang der Verszeile und der Strophen in all seinen 
Aspekten, in die wir das Gedicht gewöhnlich auseinanderlegen, nach 
Inhalt, Form, Gehalt, Gestalt oder Rhythmus. Dieser Gang vollzieht 
sich als Figur, unter der Voraussetzung, daß wir jetzt Figur nicht mehr 
bloß inhaltlich als poetisches “Bild” verstehen, sondern wesentlicher 
als die “vom Dichter gewollte Figur,” die Bewegungskurve des 
Gedichtes in ihrer Einmalighkeit, von der die Sequenz der Inhalte und 
Bilder nur ein besonderer Aspekt ist. (239-40) 
Rather than viewing the metaphor as one of many means of conveying poetic 
meaning, Allemann argues that the metaphor as figure transforms the entire essence of 
the poem into metaphor itself.  
To make an analogy to landscape painting: the “wie-Vergleich” is like the dark 
cypress tree in Van Gogh’s “The Starry Night.”68 We see an extraordinarily luminous 
sky, in which a crescent moon and stars, deeply embedded in a swirl of thick, dense 
brushstrokes, radiate soft, yellow light: the sky and the town below seem part of a 
single, continuous, fluid surface, composed of the same luminous blue, and painted in 
the same short, dense brushstrokes (almost giving the impression of a woodcut), done 
either in a horizontal flow or a concentric swirling pattern. Except there is a huge 
cypress at the left foreground of the painting that rises up in long, vertical 
brushstrokes, dark green, brown and black. To say “foreground” is already an 
exaggeration since the painting’s flattening of perspective suggests only a single, 
distant surface of sky, town and hillside: the tree is somehow in front of or in the way 
of the painting, not exactly a part of it. We cannot see its trunk, so it seems to grow up 
not so much out of the represented earth, as out of the frame or edge of the 
representation itself. The color, length and direction of the brushstrokes contradict the 
motion and color that have been painted into the rest of the image. Our sense of a 
benevolent night sky, of a luminosity that cannot be extinguished even in the night, 
                                                
68 Vincent van Gogh painted “The Starry Night” during his stay at the San Rémy mental hospital. It 
represents a view from the barred window of his “studio” room. See Norbert Wolf’s short introduction 
to the painting in Landschaftsmalerei: Taschen, 2008, p. 72. 
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and of a cosmic swirling pattern joining in an infinite spiral at the center of the canvas: 
these interpretations are all called into question by the massive, unfurling growth of 
the tree that disrupts the symmetry and serenity of the image. As a symbol, the tree 
may represent Van Gogh’s “madness” or just the bars of his hospital window that 
obstructed his view of the sky. In any case, we are forced both to overlook this 
monstrous image as some kind of stain or intrusion into an otherwise closed and 
beautiful representation, and to see this image as the very cost of the representation 
itself. Beautiful light, serenity, cosmic harmony all seem to depend on this dark, 
disfiguring, indecipherable blot that is at once inside and outside the scene of the 
landscape. Rilke’s “wie” in the last line of the poem has a similar function. It is 
something to be disavowed: one reads it and understands its comparing function, and 
yet at the same time one does not read it, but rather indulges in the poetic power of the 
language that would join two things into one.69 It is a transparent connector that both 
softens or eases the comparison of the star to the house and draws attention to its 
futility: one will always be like the other, in a relation engendered by a figurative 
language that is simultaneously self-effacing and self-referential. That is the 
significance of the “wie”: a trace or scar left by figurative language in the moment 
when it asserts its power. Like Van Gogh’s cypress, it both mars and completes the 
image.70 And like the cypress, it is also a mark of a madness or delirium that the artist 
has tried to turn back around into art.  
                                                
69 On Rilke’s use of simile, Patrick Greany writes, “[. . .] the simile assigns characteristics and at the 
same time, emphasizes the estrangement from them with its “like” that separates vehicle and tenor. The 
simile creates more distance between vehicle and tenor even as it asserts their similarity.” (102) in his 
Untimely Beggars: Poverty and Power from Baudelaire to Benjamin. U. of Minnesota Press, 2008. 
Here he relies on a Hegelian schema of metaphor and simile in which metaphor is “to be taken as 
implicitly already a simile, because it expresses the meaning, clear in itself, in a similar and comparable 
phenomenon of concrete reality. But in comparison as such both the sense proper and the image are 
specifically separated from one another, while this cleavage, though present implicitly, is not yet 
posited in metaphor.” G. W. F. Hegel. Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Arts. Trans. T. M. Knox. 
Clarendeon Press: Oxford, 1975, (I: 403 also cited in Greany).  
70 This paradox of disfigured totality recurs often in Rilke’s poetry, especially his famous poem 
“Archäischer Torso Apollos,” from Neue Gedichte (1907), 1: 557.  
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Part II: Delirium as Nursery Rhyme: Benn’s “Staatsbibliothek” (1925) 
At this point we have read a particular scene or figuration of delirium. It 
unfolds in time, approaching and receding from a linguistic and subjective limit. The 
temporal unfolding of the poem is structured by a complex metaphoric (near/far, 
dark/light, inside/outside) which, even if it is profoundly reversed in the course of the 
poem, never loses its structuring function. Thus the literal delirium of the poem is 
transformed merely into a metaphor of delirium. The literal unraveling of words on the 
page becomes the metaphorical reading of the ordered outside world which bears more 
legibility than the pages of any book. The “wie” of the final stanza both conceals and 
reveals that metaphor is the necessary ground of any reading. A word as such, a 
sentence as such, a thing as such, reality as such are all illegible and unintelligible, but 
as a metaphor, as something else, they become meaningful and understandable. As 
Hegel would have it: 
The meaning clearly confronting our minds is illustrated in the shape of 
some cognate external expression, yet so that thereby no problems arise 
which have first to be deciphered; what does arise is a figurative 
expression through which the envisaged meaning shines in perfect 
clarity and at once makes plain what it is. (I: 403) 
Rilke’s poem not only presupposes such a definition of figurative language, it 
thematizes it and performs it. Yet, if only negatively, indirectly, the poem presents a 
kind of fundamental chaos of things as they are: autonomous words rolling across the 
page, inscrutable to the reading eye and indecipherable to the understanding. 
Metaphor, for Rilke, must also be understood as a filter or screen protecting 
language—and its speakers, writers and readers—from its fundamental 
ungroundedness and otherness regarding things as they are. To anticipate my 
argument in Chapter 3, Rilke’s theory of metaphor and his foregrounding of that 
theory in specific poems risk the exposure of their ungroundedness: the more closely 
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Rilke formulates and performs the structuring, sheltering function of metaphor, the 
more he risks collapsing the entire structure around him and exposing himself to the 
chaos of things, life, reality as such, an experience of delirium suffered at the limit of 
what poetic language makes possible. It is the story of this exposure, I argue, that 
Rilke tells in Die Aufzeichnungen des Malte Laurids Brigge. But before that, the poem 
“Der Lesende,” like the Worpswede monograph, both proclaims the harmonious 
totalizing power of poetic language and invokes, at least implicitly, its undermining in 
the same moment.  
 If there is a delirium in Rilke’s poem, I argue that it is to be found precisely in 
the ambiguity of its poetic language, in the precise moment when the mechanism of 
chiasmus sets to work, but before it completely converts the chaos into order. The 
delirium would thus reside in what the poem does not say, its most hermetic passages 
(line 13-6) when the verse trails off in ellipses and the poet gains an obscure insight: 
“Da weiß ich es: über den übervollen / gläzenden Gärten sind die Himmel weit; / die 
Sonne hat noch einmal kommen sollen.-” The certainty of the poet’s knowledge, 
combined with the obscurity and suggestiveness of its content, remains, from the 
perspective of the metaphorical understanding which the poem itself performs, out of 
the furrows. Even though the poet quickly finds his way back to the structuring, 
sheltering furrows of metaphorical understanding, Rilke’s poem suggests that he must 
first stray from them in order to assert them again. Delirium would thus not be a 
deviation from poetic language, but rather its intensification. It belongs to a poetic 
model that views the foregrounding, undermining and (temporary, or disavowed) re-
concealing of the ungroundedness of poetic language as a necessary part of the poetic 
process.  
 It is here that I oppose Benn’s poem “Staatsbibliothek” (1925) because Benn, 
unlike Rilke, does not poeticize delirium in such a quasi-dialectical fashion. Benn’s 
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delirium does not unfold in time, does not move toward and circle back away from 
that limit of language and subjectivity where one finally glimpses what lies beyond the 
furrow, so to speak. Rather than use metaphor to oscillate in and out of delirium, Benn 
posits words and syntax themselves as the primal elements of a delirious poetics.71  
Benn’s poem “Staatsbibliothek” (1925) depicts the moment when reading 
ceases to be a process of cognition or understanding, and the structures of metaphor 
and meaning give way to the primal positing (primäre Setzung) of words as the task of 
the poet.72 Benn comments on this primal positing in his famous 1951 address, 
“Probleme der Lyrik,” contrasting his poetics perhaps harshly, but also respectfully, 
with the poetics of Rilke. As he enumerates a series of “symptoms” by which a 
contemporary poem can be identified as not fully “modern,” he writes: 
Das zweite Symptom ist das WIE. Bitte beachten Sie, wie oft in einem 
Gedicht “wie” vorkommt. Wie, oder wie wenn, oder es ist, als ob, das 
sind Hilfskonstruktionen, meistens Leerlauf. [. . .] Dies Wie ist immer 
ein Bruch in der Vision, es holt heran, es vergleicht, es ist keine 
primäre Setzung. Aber auch hier muß ich einfügen, es gibt großartige 
Gedichte mit WIE. Rilke war ein großer WIE-Dichter. In einem seiner 
schönsten Gedichte “Archäischer Torso Apollos” steht in vier Strophen 
dreimal WIE, und zwar sogar recht banale “Wies”: wie ein Kandelaber, 
wie Raubtierfelle, wie ein Stern – und in seinem Gedicht “Blaue 
Hortensie” finden wir in vier Strophen viermal WIE: Darunter: wie in 
einer Kinderschürze – wie in alten blauen Briefpapieren – nun gut, 
Rilke konnte das, aber als Grundsatz können Sie sich daran halten, daß 
WIE immer ein Einbruch des Erzählerischen, Feuilletonistischen in die 
Lyrik ist, ein Nachlassen der sprachlichen Spannung, eine Schwäche 
der schöpferischen Transformation. (VI: 18) 
                                                
71 If one reflects on the relation between meaning and syntax even in “normal” or non-delirious texts, 
one sees that meaning is always to a certain extent delirious: the meaning of a sentence, for example, is 
not reducible to any of its parts, yet all of its parts taken together constitute meaning. Adding or 
subtracting one word from a sentence can entirely alter the meaning; likewise, the meaning of a 
sentence can rule out (or generate) multiple meanings in a given word. Meaning is both exterior to the 
structure of a sentence, yet also everywhere present in the sentence as the force which both determines 
it and toward which it is directed. Delirium is thus not the opposite of meaning, but rather its 
intensification, the expression of a force that is inherent to language, but at the same time always in 
excess of it. 
72 The concept of “primal positing” is further discussed, especially through the example of another of 
Benn’s meta-poetic texts, “Satzbau” (1950, I: 238) in Chapter 4.  
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For Benn, the WIE is always a break in the primal positing of poetry, an easing or 
yielding of the creative tension of the language, a shift to the discursive, 
conversational or everyday tone: the moment when a poem becomes a poem about 
something instead of a poem in and of itself. Presumably, Benn prefers to write WIE 
in capital letters to emphasize its interruptive function, since WIE (like LIKE in 
English) is a word that is usually overlooked, its “as if” quality too often glossed over. 
Rilke is a great “WIE-Dichter,” whose similes are still capable of some of the most 
startling and powerful transformations in all of poetry, but as a WIE-Dichter, he 
cannot be as modern (as cold, as hard, as absolute, as expressive) as Benn himself.   
To continue this harsh, but respectful comparison, let us look at Benn’s poem 





Satzbordell, Maremme,  
Fieberparadies: 
wenn die Katamomben  
glühn im Wortvibrier, 
und die Hekatomben 
sind ein weißer Stier –  
 
wenn Vergang der Zeiten, 
wenn die Stunden stockt,  
weil im Satz der Seiten 
eine Silbe lockt,  
die den Zweckgewalten, 
reinem Lustgewinn 
rauscht in Sturzgestalten 
löwenhaft den Sinn – : 
 
wenn das Säkulare, 
tausendstimmig Blut 
auferlebt im Aare 
neuer Himmel ruht: 
                                                
73 Benn, I: 85. 
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Opfer, Beil und Wunde, 
Hades, Mutterhort 
für der Schöpfungstunde 
traumbeladenes Wort. 
In contrast to Rilke’s “Der Lesende,“ there is no “ich,“ no scene and no indication of 
time or its unfolding. The only indication of the passage of time (“die Stunde stockt”) 
is embedded within an endless, inverted “if, then” pattern that seems to structure the 
whole poem, but does not seem to give us a definite temporal cue (or any other kind of 
cue for that matter). In Rilke’s poem, when time contracts and then expands, there is a 
kind of rhythm to it that lends the moment of stoppage the structural value of a 
caesura: a planned pause, heavy with meaning, a halt that presupposes the continuance 
of time, rhythm, and the reading process. Benn’s “die Stunde stockt” (the hour stalls, 
lags, sputters) is locked within a tortured conditional clause so that it cannot properly 
be said even to begin to stall. It is rather posited in a subjunctive, hypothetical realm 
unconnected to a definite space and time. The poem does not use the metaphorical 
structure of “like,” nor do its words and images offer anything “like” a narrative or 
allegorical content for our understanding.  
 The first four lines of the poem consist of a sequence of nouns, no 
conjunctions or subordinations, separated (or joined) only by commas. If there is a 
pattern, it would be a two-word line followed by a one-word line, as if the one-word 
line were a kind of logical conclusion or synthesis. In the rhythm and rhyme of this 
pattern, there is an incantatory quality to the language, which suspends grammar and 
syntax and invokes single words in rapid succession. “Staatsbibliothek,” both the title 
and first word, is the only indication of a scene or referent in the poem. Presumably, 
we are in the stacks of the national library Unter den Linden in Berlin.74 “Kaschemme” 
                                                
74 We know from a letter to Joachim Moras dated 24.08.53 of Benn’s old habit of reading in the stacks 
of the national library Unter den Linden: “Einer der ernstesten Gründe meiner Depression ist, daß es in 
West-Berlin keine Bibliothek mehr gibt, die alte große liegt im Ost-Berlin und ist für uns nicht 
zugängig. [. . .] Das wunderschöne Flackern von einem Buch zum andern, das in der alten 
 72 
is derived from a “gypsy” (zigeunerisch) word for brothel (Duden, 2003), and gives 
the suggestion of a sexual charge to the stacks of books. “Resultatverließ” is an 
invented word that would mean something like “dungeon of results,” suggesting a 
place where the efforts of a research, experiment or measurement come to nothing, or 
where calculations are worthless. “Satzbordell,” another neologism, expands upon the 
idea of the brothel as a place for promiscuity in or with language. The sentence 
becomes the site for the coupling of words that is lewd, obscene, illicit, transactional, 
and from which there will be no “resultant:” promiscuity, but not procreation, fusion 
or growth. This develops the unsettling idea that the books themselves are in some 
kind of sexual intercourse with each other, or that the patronage of the national library 
amounts to soliciting prostitution. The atmosphere of these words is suffused with a 
vague, unerotic, but sexual charge that is related more to words than to human 
sexuality and human bodies. “Maremme” seems to stand for the Italian region of 
Maremma in southern Tuscany.75 Finally the word “Fieberparadies” juxtaposes the 
heavenly, redemptive connotations of paradise with the very earthly, bodily condition 
of fever associated not with divine truth, but with delirious hallucination.  
But what does that feverish paradise have to do with the landscape of central 
Italy, with brothels, and the books in the library? After this montage of words that 
concludes with “Fieberparadies,” we see a colon: we expect a kind of conclusion to 
the series of words as if they were the terms of a proposition, as if they would add up 
                                                                                                                                       
Staatsbibliothek Unter den Linden früher möglich war, ist nicht mehr zu erleben.” See the commentary 
on Benn’s “Staatsbibliothek” in his collected works, volume 1.  
75 Maremma is known for its coast, hills, swamps and marshes. It is mentioned in the Divine Comedy 
and was later praised for its beauty in the “Idillio maremmano” (1872) of Giosué Carducci, a famous 
poet of 19th century Italy, who was raised in the region. In a passage from an 1829 book review by 
Mary Shelley, the pools of the Maremma exemplify the reflection of nature that constitutes the essence 
of poetry. In colloquial Italian, the phrase “Maremma maiala” is also a way of invoking the Virgin 
Mary without actually blaspheming, that is, of circumlocuting a linguistic taboo. My thanks to Paola 
Iovene for these references. The associations of “Maremma” could potentially go on forever, but this 
only supports the point I am trying to make about Benn’s use of words as the primal element of poetry.  
Maremma, or Maremme, is an image that exceeds its linguistic context, while at the same fitting neatly, 
without a remainder, into the formal construction of the poem. 
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to something. Instead the next line introduces the convoluted “if/then” structure of the 
poem, or rather the structure of a series of “ifs” and an elusive “then,” if there even is 
one. It is possible that the four lines that begin the poem are already its “logical” 
conclusion, the syntax of the conditional clauses having been reversed. “Wenn die 
Katakomben / glühn im Wortvibrier,” introduces another neologism, the glowing of 
Wortvibrier that creates the image of an audible or tangible vibration of words that 
manifests itself visually (glowing)—the words are vibrating and heating up in a 
spontaneous and sporadic movement that enlivens the dead space of the catacombs, of 
the library that is simultaneously a brothel, a Tuscan swamp and now a network of 
(Roman?) tombs. The images and associations proliferate, and no clear structure of 
oppositions arises. Meanwhile, the (inverted?) syntax of the “if/then” statement pushes 
forward blindly in the expectation of some kind of insight or conclusion. The next line 
introduces the Hekatomben, an ancient Greek word for the religious sacrifice of one 
hundred bulls,76 but it is contracted or condensed to just one white bull: “Und die 
Hekatomben / sind ein weißer Stier –” The Gedankenstrich and breaking-off of the 
stanza function as a pause for drawing breath, or a pause for the reading eye, before 
the series of “if” statements begins again with renewed intensity.  
There are enough ancient Greek and Latin references so far to justify a quick 
look at the poem’s scansion. It consists of alternating lines of three feet and two feet 
(trimeter and dimeter), each trimeter is composed of three trochees (long/short), while 
each dimeter of one trochaic and one cretic foot (long/short/long). (The first line is the 
only exception: a dactyl [long/short/short], followed by two trochees). 77 The specifics 
of the scansion do not matter so much for our purposes as its unswerving regularity: in 
a poem, in which the syntax is disjointed and the images accumulate in such a disarray 
                                                
76 Cf. Benn’s “Die Insel” (III: 67). 
77 For metrical terms, see Paul Fussell, Jr. Poetic Meter and Poetic Form. New York: Randon House, 
1965.  
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of associations, the form of the poem remains utterly regular, its meter and rhyme 
(abab,cdcd etc) flawless and harmonious. The formal euphony of the poem contradicts 
the cacophony of its meaning and syntax, and that contradiction is the condition of 
Benn’s primal positing.78  
The next three lines each begin with “w” (wenn, wenn, weil) and a quick 
succession of alliterations (Stunde stockt; Satz, Seiten, Silbe) enhances the hypnotic, 
incantatory quality of the rigid meter and rhyme. But in radical contrast to the 
temporal precision of the poem’s form, the temporal meaning of the words reflects the 
opposite of precision (i.e., the transience of the ages, the sputtering of the hour). What 
the poem achieves at the level of formal mastery could not contradict its semantic or 
conceptual dimensions more sharply: “wenn Vergang der Zeiten, / wenn die Stunde 
stockt, / weil im Satz der Seiten / eine Silbe lockt.” The images of temporal passage 
(“Vergang der Zeiten”) or temporal sputtering (“die Stunde stockt”) are themselves 
not temporalized, but only conditional clauses that are not actually inserted into a 
causal, temporal sequence. There is a curious intimation that the poem has not yet 
properly begun, but is still merely stating its poetic premises, yet at the same time it 
seems already to have demonstrated its proof in the first four lines.  
The phrase “im Satz der Seiten” evokes the setting of pages for the printing 
press, reminding us that we are somehow still in the library. But the reading process 
(like the printing process) seems to be stalled or sputtering (just like time itself) 
because just one syllable catches, lures, sticks, and this one syllable charges or rushes 
meaning like a lion: “weil im Satz der Seiten, / eine Silbe lockt, die den 
                                                
78 Helmut Lethen’s comment on Benn’s 1913 poem Gesänge” could also serve for “Staatsbibliothek”: 
“Auch Regressionsvorstellungen sind ‘Vokabelmischungen.’ Sobald Benns Rhythmusmaschine sie 
erfasst, das Raster des Metrums und die Echowirkungen der Reime die Sehnsucht in volksliedhafte 
Form bringen, nehmen sie eine abgründige Komik an” (50). Indeed the cryptic-comic effect of 
“Staatsbibliothek” resides in its “promiscuous” effacement between art and kitsch. Benn writes: “Kunst 
ist auch Kitsch, will ja auch wirken, verzaubern, hinreißen” (letter to the Hindemiths dated June 6, 
1932, cited in Lethen, 100). 
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Zweckgewalten, reinem Lustgewinn rauscht in Sturzgestalten / löwenhaft den Sinn – 
:” The syllable, the smallest, most fundamental building block of a word’s phonetic 
composition, overwhelms its semantic meaning like a lion. The word “löwenhaft,” 
another animal reference, reminds one of I. A. Richards famous example of 
functioning of metaphor from Philosophy of Rhetoric (1936): Achilles, the lion. 
Richards shows how the metaphorical statement parses into two terms, the vehicle and 
the tenor. Here Achilles (the tenor) is called a lion (the vehicle) in a statement that 
attributes the fierceness, pride, strength or dominance of the lion to Achilles. For 
Benn, the meaning of that metaphor, the referential vehicle that makes it 
understandable (in this case, the presumed or attributed fierceness, pride, strength or 
dominance of the lion) is poetically insignificant; rather the word itself (say, 
“Achilles” or “leonine”) is already so charged with meaning, so rife with associations 
(what Benn often refers to as Wallungswert79) that the meaning-effect produced by 
metaphor in fact reduces the power of the word. In “Der Geburstag,” one of the Rönne 
texts collected in 1916 unter the title Gehirne, Benn writes, “[V]ielleicht sei schon die 
Metapher ein Fluchtversuch, eine Art Vision, und ein Mangel an Treue” (III: 51). And 
in Epilog und Lyrisches Ich, he suggests that the proper name proves that the power of 
a word is independent of its meaning: “Phäaken, Megalithen, lernäische Gebiete – 
allerdings Namen, allerdings zum Teil von mir sogar gebildet, aber wenn sie sich 
nahen, werden sie mehr“ (III: 132). The “more” that these words become is for Benn 
always an ambiguous amalgamation of Wiedekehr  and Untergang: the power of the 
word (“schwer erklärbare Macht des Wortes, das löst und fügt” [III: 133]) cuts back to 
the primal positing of words unhindered by any conceptual ballast, a phantasm of 
some kind of originary creative gesture that, even if Benn seems to mock it elsewhere 
(e.g., in a poem like “Gesänge” [1913]) retains a seductive power and remains a 
                                                
79 III: 132.  
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productive force through most, if not all, of his writing.80  
In any case, here the word, even the single syllable, in its double-edged power, 
is called upon as a kind of resistance to the Zweckgewalten and Lustgewinn of 
meaning. That resistance takes shape in Sturzgestalten, plunge- or lapse-forms, in 
figures of a fall, another self-contradictory word: a fall, a plummet, a dive, a lurch—
this is a notion that is ambiguously active and passive. The diving or falling object 
may have set itself in motion or may have been forced by some external agent. The 
dive could be an expenditure of its own force (he dove out the door, he threw himself 
into his work, the lion threw itself upon the zebra—all examples of stürzen from the 
Duden), or the exposure of the self to larger, external forces (like gravity). And yet 
that falling-throwing is contained within shapes, Gestalten, contours or figures of a 
movement that disrupts shapes and defies delineation. Stürzen is not the graceful, 
parabolic arc of simple falling, but rather implies a chaotic intensity that cannot be 
described with geometric regularity. Yet the word exists on the page, each of its parts, 
even each of its syllables (the explosive Sturz and the static –stalt) exceeding and 
undoing each other, but at the same time embodying in a single word the “meaning” of 
the whole poem: the maximum of irresolvable, uncontainable conceptual dissonance 
condensed into the minimum of verbo-visual-acoustic form. The dim, contradictory 
allusiveness of the conceptual, associative register of the poem is eerily matched by 
                                                
80 Benn often suggests that the return of the word, its power to restore or evoke that primal fantasm, is 
also the Untergang or Zertrümmerung of bourgeois values, instrumental rationality, capitalist ideology, 
positivism and the Cartesian ego. It would seem that, for Benn, only the true and heroic artist is capable 
of such a destructive and radical exposure of the individual existence to the primal void. Implicit in his 
poetry and quite explicit in prose (especially the essays written during his enthusiasm for fascism in the 
late 1920s and early 30s) is an extreme form of Nietzschean aesthetic nihilism and romantic 
anticapitalism. For a critique of the social and political implications of Benn’s aestheticism, see Peter 
Hohendahl’s “The Loss of Reality: Gottfried Benn’s Early Prose” in Modernity and the Text: Revisions 
of German Modernism. Ed. Andreas Huyssen and David Bathrick. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1989. 81-94. For a Marxist critique of Benn’s aestheticism, see Lukács’ 1934 essay “Größe und 
Verfall des Expressionismus” reprinted in Probleme des Realismus. Berlin: Aufbau Verlag, 1955. 
Lukács argues that Benn’s aesthetic strategy and pseudopolitical position is in fact the epitome of 
bourgeois values, the bourgeois flight from reality, and a worldview whose real, objective radicality 
decreases in proportion to its rhetorically hyperbolic radicalization. 
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the cold, elegant formal precision of its composition. This tension recalls another 
meaning of stürzen: to plough a field, from which is derived the ambiguous word 
Sturzacker (as in English, a fallow field): this refers both to a freshly ploughed field 
ready for sewing and to a field whose soil has been exhausted after multiple harvests 
and so is ploughed over and left to rest for one or more growing seasons. A Sturzacker 
represents both the maximum potential for growth and what remains when growth is 
no longer possible. Benn seems to evoke both aspects of this image: his furrows of 
poetic form are rife with potential and are at the same time barren. 
The last stanza gives another obscure image of condensation and the final 
conditional statement of the poem: “Wenn das Säkulare / tausendstimmig Blut / 
auferlebt im Aare / neuer Himmel ruht” the thousand-voiced blood of an age is 
resurrected as an eagle in new skies, and there follows another colon by which we 
expect the conclusion to the “if” clauses, a final insight into what it all means. Only 
we read another barrage of words which culminates in the “the hour of creation’s 
dream-charged word:” “Opfer, Beil und Wunde / Hades, Mutterhort / für der 
Schöpfungsstunde / traumbeladenes Wort.”  In a word, the poem restates the 
enigmatic truth expressed in all of its words. 
The last stanza remains obscure also for Helmut Lethen, who, in his citation 
and brief discussion of “Staatsbibliothek,” simply omits it. But what interests Lethen 
is the associative quality of Benn’s words, how they are both freed from their 
descriptive function (their referentiality), yet at the same time reverberate through the 
“Archiv des Wissens” of contemporary science, ethnology and psychiatry, i. e., the 
national library (94-5). Benn’s words, then, are not pure, absolute or autonomous; 
rather they presuppose a particular semantic and even scientific function that is 
loosened just so, and, given the trance-like effect of the rhyme and meter of the poem, 
generate free associations that “folgen den Bahnen der Querverweise in 
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Enzyklopädien” (95). The chain of free associations depends upon a pre-existing 
system of concepts and terminology only to dissolve and combine it “promiscuously” 
with any and every register of language that comes to mind (and scans and rhymes 
appropriately). To take Lethen’s commentary a step further, it is only then that the 
words as words approach the “reader” of the text. Benn himself may be describing this 
poem in his “Epilog und lyrisches Ich”:  
Bei der Lektüre eines, nein, zahlloser Bücher durcheinander, 
Verwirrungen von Ären, Pêlemêle von Stoffen und Aspekten, 
Eröffnung weiter typologischer Schichten: entrückter strömender 
Beginn. [. . .] Nun nähern sich vielleicht schon Worte, Worte 
durcheinander, dem Klaren noch nicht bemerkbar, aber die 
Flimmerhaare tasten es heran. (III: 132) 
Reading itself enables the poet’s creative relation to the word. The physical act of 
reading countless books in and out of the other (durcheinander) jumbles the 
discourses, temporalities and subject-matter of so many different eras, worldviews and 
technical terms that the chaos of books dissolves into chaos of words and phrases 
(Worte, worte durcheinander). The reader is exposed to a pre- or pan-historical 
revelation (Eröffnung, also a medical lerm for “lancing”) where words link all times 
and discourses through their proximity to each other and to the reader’s 
Flimmerhaare. We are dealing again with the tactile word, without meaning or 
context, only a pure verbal form creating a semantic and conceptual fog that flattens 
all discursive registers and historical periodizations to one timeless, contourless 
surface of verbal vibration (Wortvibrier). Reading, then, is not a metaphor of the 
process of understanding a poem, nor is it that process itself: reading is the physical 
heaping-together of words upon the non-cerebral brain that produces a delirium in the 
reader (indistinguishable now from the poet), which, precisely because all words are 
potentially equivalent in delirium, the reader-poet approaches and forms into 
surgically precise verses that lose nothing of their verbal frenzy. What Holger Hof 
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says of Benn’s writing techniques in the composition of his essays (his 
“Montagekunst” of gathering and shaping verbal material from other authors) could 
also hold true for a poem like “Staatsbibliothek:”  
Schreibtechnik und Lesewirkung hängen insofern zusammen, als das 
Lesen bereits ein Schreiben ist und somit ein zentraler, produktiver 
Prozeß. [. . .] Produktives Lesen meint, sich den unmittelbaren Reizes 
eines Textes, seien sie optischer, klanglicher, halluzinativ-assoziativer 
oder auch inhalticher Art, auszusetzen. (247)81 
It is precisely the oscillation between reading and writing that brings the poet/reader 
into delirious contact with language, that exposes the immediate sensation of a text in 
its optical, acoustic, hallucinatory and constative dimensions. And as Hof also points 
out, that oscillation emerges through “einerseits die Bewegung beim Blättern der 
Seiten, andererseits die intensive Beschäftigung mit den Sätzen, den Worten bis in die 
Silben hinein” (244). Both in reading a chaos of books one after the other, and yet at 
the same time, dissecting a single word into its constituent syllables, Benn transforms 
the reading of delirium into its writing.82  
Carl Einstein’s hyperbolic, yet precise assessment of Benn’s poetry (written, 
one is almost certain, with such a poem as “Staatsbibliothek” in mind) is perhaps more 
accurate than Lethen seems to admit: 
Hier ist ein Sprachmittel von erheblicher Bedeutung gewiesen, das 
syntaktisch und im Tempo Definitives und Halten gewährt, inhaltlich 
aber ganz im Potentiellen bleibt; oder durch Häufung dieser Worte, ihre 
Kontraste und Verschiedenheit eilen die Gesichte vorbei. Diese 
Substantive wirken wie Elemente; eine komplizierte Seele reagiert in 
einfachen Mitteln ab und verfängt sie nicht in beschreibender Stufung: 
der Leser wirft in diese Brunnen seine eigene Spiegelung und Färbung. 
Dank diesem Aneinanderreihen der halluzinativen Substantive meidet 
                                                
81 Hof, Montagekunst und Sprachmagie: Zur Zitiertechnik in der essayistischen Prosa Gottfried Benns. 
Aachen: Shaker Verlag, 1997. See also my discussion of “aussetzen” in Chapter 3. 
82 Thomas Wegmann also discusses “das Umschlagen von Rezeption in Produktion” in Benn’s 
“Staatsbibliothek” in his argument for the logic of parasitism and contamination in Benn’s aesthetics. 
See “Die Moderne tiefer legen: Gottfried Benns Ästhetik der parasitären Störung” in Gottfried Benns 
Modernität. Ed. Friederike Reents. Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2007, 55-74. Wolfgang Emmerich 
comments on the hallucinatory quality of words in “Staatsbibliothek” in the context of Benn’s transition 
from his “Rauschgedichte” of the 1910s and 1920s to the “statische Gedichte” of his later work. See his 
essay “Benns bacchische Epiphanien und ihr Dementi” in the same collection, pp. 89-106.  
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man die kausale Bindung; die Analogien stehen nackt, direkt 
gegeneinander, dazwischen strömt die lebendige Substanz des Ich als 
tätige und empfindende Einheit. Man meidet das Rationale und 
fragwürdig Teleologische der kausalen Folge, sammelt in fast 
gleichzeitige Vision die Elemente und nennt in diesen Hauptworten die 
verschiedenen Aspekte eines lyrischen Zustandes.83  
The near-simultaneous vision in which the reader gathers (sammelt) the elements of 
the poem is precisely the reading-as-gathering in the haptic space of a delirious text. 
The near-simultaneity of Benn’s words suggests their eruption out of syntax and out of 
temporal unfolding, yet the reading eye nevertheless moves from word to word, 
reading the elements that are both heaped together chaotically and arranged according 
to a tempo and a definite posture. Einstein describes the combination of verbal control 
and sematic explosion, of rational agency and irrational, vital substance that 
constitutes the delirious composition—and, implicitly, the delirious reading—of 
Benn’s poetry. 
There are two passages from texts by Friedrich Nietzsche that function as 
pervasive and specific (if not directly acknowledged) intertexts to the poetic and 
aesthetic discourse that I outline in this chapter and in the Introduction. I cite them 
here as a transition to the next chapter on Worringer because they introduce two 
crucial aspects or motifs of this period that are especially significant for Worringer’s 
thought, which participates in the aesthetic discourse of Expressionism, yet also has 
roots in the overlapping discourse of Lebensphilosophie. Nietzsche’s work already 
embodies the dual discourse of aestheticism and vitalism, as we seen in this first 
passage from Der Fall Wagner (1888), which, in its depiction of a montage of words 
leaping out sentences, seems to have anticipated both Rilke’s “Der Lesende” and 
Benn’s “Staatsbibliothek:” 
Womit kennzeichnet sich jede literarische décadence? Damit, dass das 
Leben nicht mehr im Ganzen wohnt. Das Wort wird souverän und 
                                                
83 Cited as reprinted in Peter Hohendahl’s Benn: Wirkung wider Willen: Dokumente der 
Wirkungsgeschichte Benns. Frankfurt am Main: Athäneum, 1971, p. 124.  
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springt aus dem Satz hinaus, der Satz greift über und verdunkelt den 
Sinn der Seite, die Seite gewinnt Leben auf Unkosten des Ganzen – das 
Ganze ist kein Ganzes mehr. Aber das ist das Gleichnis für jeden Stil 
der décadence: jedes Mal Anarchie der Atome, Disgregation des 
Willens, “Freiheit des Individuums,” moralisch geredet – zu einer 
politischen Theorie erweitert, “gleiche Rechte für alle.” Das Leben, die 
gleiche Lebendigkeit, die Vibration und Exuberanz des Lebens in die 
kleinsten Gebilde zurückgedrängt, der Rest arm an Leben. Überall 
Lähmung, Mühsal, Erstarrung oder Feindschaft und Chaos: beides 
immer mehr in die Augen springend, in je höhere Formen der 
Organisation man aufsteigt. Das Ganze lebt überhaupt nicht mehr; es ist 
zusammengesetzt, berechnet, künstlich, ein Artefact. – 84 (917) 
 
[What is the sign of every literary decadence? That life no longer 
dwells in the whole. The word becomes sovereign and leaps out of the 
sentence, the sentence reaches out and obscures the meaning of the 
page, the page gains life at the expense of the whole—the whole is no 
longer a whole. But this is the simile of every style of decadence: every 
time, the anarchy of atoms, disgregation of the will, “freedom of the 
individual,” to use moral terms—expanded into a political theory, 
“equal rights for all.” Life, equal vitality, the vibration and exuberance 
of life pushed back into the smallest forms; the rest, poor in life. 
Everywhere paralysis, arduousness, torpidity or hostility and chaos: 
both more and more obvious the higher one ascends in forms of 
organization. The whole no longer lives at all: it is composite, 
calculated, artificial, and artifact.— (626)] 85 
What for Nietzsche is a form of decadence and an atrophy of aesthetic life, is turned 
around by the Expressionists into a positive, affirmative creative principle.86 The 
autonomy of the part (the word) comes at the cost of the integrity of the whole. When 
Nietzsche adds the dimension of life to the problem of words in their relation to 
syntax, to the monstrous growth of individual parts at the expense of the whole, to the 
                                                
84 Nietzsche, Kritische Studienausgabe, Band 6. Ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari. Munich, 
Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag de Gruyter, 1988. This is a passage that Georg Lukács cites repeatedly 
in his polemics against Expressionism and modernism in general, though it should be mentioned that 
Lukács omits the phrases about morality, equal rights, and democracy. See Aesthetics and Politics, p. 
44n7. 
85 Nietzsche, The Case of Wagner in Basic Writings of Nietzsche. Ed. and Trans. Walter Kaufmann. 
Intro. Peter Gay. New York: The Modern Library, 2000.  
86 See for a general thematic account of the appropriation of vitalism by the Expressionists (from which 
both Benn and Rilke are however for the most part missing), see Gunter Martens’. Vitalismus und 
Expressionismus: Ein Beitrag zur Genese und Deutung expressionistischer Stilstrukturen und Motive. 
Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1971. 
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proliferation of hybrid forms, composite structures, arte-facts of de-composing 
organization, we begin to catch a glimpse of what Wilhelm Worringer may be 
undertaking in his uncanny synthesis of abstraction and empathy in the name of 
expression. This becomes clearer in the following passage from Nietzsche’s early 
essay “Ueber Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinne” (1873), which 
introduces an architectural metaphoric to the problem of life: 
Wie die Römer und Etrusker sich den Himmel durch starre 
mathematische Linien zerschnitten und in einen solchermaassen 
abgegrenzten Raum als in ein templum einen Gott bannten, so hat jedes 
Volk über sich einen solchen mathematisch zertheilten Begriffshimmel 
und versteht nun unter der Forderung der Wahrheit, dass jeder 
Begriffsgoot nur in seiner Sphäre gesuchte werde. Man darf hier den 
Menschen wohl bewundern als ein gewaltiges Baugenie, dem auf 
beweglichen Fundamenten und gleichsam fliessendem Wasser das 
Aufthürmen eines unendlich complicirten Begriffsdomes gelingt; 
freilich, um auf solchen Fundamenten Halt zu finden, muss es ein Bau, 
wie aus Spinnefäden sein, so zart, um von der Welle mit fortgetragen, 
so fest, um nicht von dem Winde auseinander geblasen zu werden. Als 
Baugenie erhebt sich solcher Maassen der Mensch weit über die Biene: 
diese baut aus Wachs, das sie aus der Natur zusammenholt, er aus dem 
weit zarteren Stoffe der Begriffe, die er erst aus sich fabriciren muss. 
(882)87 
 
[As the Romans and Etruscans carved up the sky into rigid 
mathematical sectors and assigned a god to each delimited space as in a 
temple, so every nation has such a mathematically divided conceptual 
sky above it and understands by the demand for truth that each 
conceptual god must be sought only in his own sphere. In this respect 
man can probably be admired as a mighty architectural genius who 
succeeds in building an infinitely complicated conceptual cathedral on 
foundations that move like flowing water; of course, in order to anchor 
itself to such a foundation, the building must be light as gossamer—
delicate enough to be carried along by the wave, yet strong enough not 
to be blown apart by the wind. As an architectural genius, man excels 
the bee; for it builds out of wax which it collects from nature, while 
man builds out of the much more delicate material of the concepts, 
which he must fabricate out of his own self. (251)]88 
                                                
87 KSA I.  
88 “On Truth and Lying in an Extra-Moral Sense” in Friedrich Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language. 
Ed. Trans. and Intro. Sander L. Gilman, Carole Blair and David J. Parent. Oxford University Press, 
1989. 
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The idea of a conceptual cathedral, built out of human thought and human bodies, 
floating on a metaphorical foundation and towering into imaginary space, prepares the 
way for Worringer’s discussion of Gothic cathedrals and the conceptual and stylistic 
impasses of expression and non-organic life. There begins our reading of delirium in a 
distinct, but not mutually exclusive discursive context (the late 19th / early 20th century 
school of thought called Lebensphilosophie, which tries to build rational, conceptual 
“cathedrals” on an irrational foundation of mystical vitalism) and in terms of a specific 





DELIRIUM OF EXPRESSION IN THE ART HISTORY OF WILHELM 
WORRINGER 
 
Auch dieses Wort ist in seiner Verwendung und Bedeutung höchst elastisch. “Denn 
 eben wo Begriffe fehlen, da stellt ein Wort zur rechten Zeit sich ein.”89 
 
[This word is also highly elastic in its use and meaning. “For just where concepts are 
lacking, a word always turns up at the right moment.”] 
—Wilhelm Worringer (and J. W. v. Goethe) 
 
To say that Wilhelm Worringer’s two most famous books, Abstraktion und 
Einfühlung: Ein Beitrag zur Stilpsychologie (1908) and Formprobleme der Gotik 
(1911) exemplify a “delirious poetics” would not be entirely accurate. These are not 
poetic texts, nor, as prose texts (indeed, academic prose texts: the first a dissertation, 
the second a Habilitationsschrift) are they even remotely as experimental as Rilke’s 
Aufzeichnungen and Benn’s Gehirne. Nevertheless, I argue that Worringer makes an 
analogous intervention in his discursive field (not lyric poetry, not experimental prose, 
but art history) at the level of the individual word. His writing complicates the 
univocality of the relation between a word and a concept: instead of a word referring 
consistently to a precisely defined concept  (which would then be fit into a logical 
sequence of other concepts to produce a rational, intelligible argument), Worringer’s 
art history tacitly exploits the rich, irrational metaphorical basis of concepts that we 
just saw Nietzsche describe in his image of the cathedral and that the Expressionists 
use as a poetic principle.90 Moreover, his theory of art (what he calls in his own words 
                                                
89 Worringer, Abstraktion und Einfühlung: Ein Beitrag zur Stilpsychologie (1908), p. 69; Goethe, Faust 
I, 1995-6.  
90 Besides this stylistic affinity to Expressionism, Worringer was also one of the theoretical 
spokespeople of the artistic movement in Germany. In a 1911 essay in Walden’s journal Der Sturm, 
Worringer was one of the first German critics or artists to use the word “expressionism” in print. 
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“Kunsttheorie” as distinct from “Ästhetik”) is an explicit departure from the 19th 
century aesthetic of beauty and naturalism, and his whole project consists in trying to 
find the right words (and concepts) for an aesthetic experience that, within the 
discourse of classical art history, ceaselessly refuses or confuses categorization.91 
Within the discipline of art history, then, I suggest Worringer’s works represent an 
analogous transitional moment to the texts of Benn and Rilke that I analyze in 
Chapters 3 and 4: it is a writing that craves to push itself out of the furrows of 
traditional aesthetic categories in order to gain access to another form of experience 
and expression, but in doing so suffers from the chaos of that exteriority and the 
contradictory need to order the chaos. Worringer’s writing is thus both a liberation of 
thought from traditional art-historical categories and the paralysis of that thought in 
the chaos of conceptual impasses that lies outside the furrows.  
 In this chapter I trace how Worringer’s concepts lose their distinctness and 
become mixed metaphors, tropes that turn around themselves, pointing nowhere or 
pointing vertiginously. The concepts that compose Worringer’s argument (historical 
and hermeneutic concepts like abstraction, empathy and expression) become instead 
                                                                                                                                       
Through the teens and twenties, he wrote reviews and art criticism on Expressionist exhibitions, in 
addition to his scholarly work on ancient and medieval art (which itself was seen, by Lukács and others, 
as the tacit advocation of Expressionism under the guise of “Gothic expression.”) For the genesis of the 
word “expressionism” across German art media between 1910 and 1914, see the Otto Best’s preface to 
Theorie des Expressionismus (cited in Introduction); pp. 18-21 in Wolf-Dieter Dube’s Expressionism. 
Trans. Mary Whittal. New York, Oxford University Press, 1972; and pp. 75-7 in John Willett’s 
Expressionism (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970).  Willett also makes the useful distinction between 
expressionism (lower case) as a transhistorical, and not necessarily Germanic stylistic phenomenon and 
Expressionism (with a capital “E”) as the uniquely German art movement that flourished in the so-
called Expressionist decade, 1910-1920.  
91 The relevant passages are the section “Kunsttheorie und Aesthetik” in Formproblem der Gotik, pp. 5-
10, especially: “Und es wäre nur ein Zwangsgebot unserer Wortarmut, hinter der sich in diesem Falle 
allerdings auch eine sehr empfindliche Erkenntnisarmut verbirgt, wenn wir von einer Schönheit der 
Gotik sprechen wollten. Diese angebliche Schönheit der Gotik ist ein modernes Missverständnis. Ihre 
wirkliche Grösse hat mit der uns geläufigen Kunstvorstellung, die notwendigerweise in dem Begriff 
‘schön’ gipfeln muss, so wenig zu tun, dass eine Uebernahme dieses Wortes für gotische Werte nur 
Verwirrung stiften kann” (10). [And if we do speak of the beauty of Gothic, it is only because of the 
poverty of our language, which in this instance certainly conceals a very perceptible poverty in 
knowledge as well. The so-called beauty of Gothic is a modern misunderstanding. Its true greatness has 
so little to do with our current conception of art, which of necessity culminates in the idea of “beauty,” 
that an acceptance of the word for Gothic values can only cause confusion.” (11)] 
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words/figures in a “solid” rhetorical structure that is dizzyingly coextensive with its 
incomplete conceptual frame. The conceptual cathedral of Worringer’s argument is 
simultaneously intact and riddled with gaps, hence the delirium of reading 
Worringer’s writing. His key words (e. g., expression and life) continually oscillate 
between their conceptual and metaphorical functions, and the reading experience itself 
oscillates between the text’s florid, hyperbolic rhetorical presentation and the 
conceptual impasses that coincide with it point for point. 
Worringer’s writing is also important for my theory of reading delirium 
because of the way the reading process itself is (at least implicitly) staged in the text. I 
argue that Worringer’s writing has an implicit performative dimension: he is not just 
presenting an art-historical argument about aesthetic drives, he is somehow also 
presenting those drives themselves in his writing. He gives voice, as it were, to his 
own historical and hermeneutic categories (abstraction and empathy) and the echo of 
their discord (Gothic expression). Moreover, according to his theory of style, to 
observe a particular work of art is equivalent to empathizing directly into the psycho-
bio-existential nexus of need and will that determines the style of the work. The 
reading of Worringer’s own text attains a kind of stylistic immediacy in which the 
reader is forcibly “empathized” or “abstracted” into the words/concepts of the text that 
express themselves with an uncanny life of their own (e.g., the Eigenausdruck 
mentioned in the Introduction). The reading is thus driven out of the furrows as much 
as the writing: hence my term reading delirium. 
 
Part I: “Style” and “Presentation” in Worringer’s Abstraktion und 
Einfühlung 
The problematic of Worringer’s texts begins with the relation of concept and 
word: a confused, but necessary relation between the rigor, specificity and depth of 
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concepts on the one hand, and the flexibility, ambiguity and superficiality of words on 
the other. If we examine our epigraph, we can begin to see the problem of this relation. 
The first sentence refers to the word “style,” which Worringer is attempting to define 
and put to work in his writing. Its usage and meaning may be highly elastic, but 
“precisely when concepts are missing, a word turns up at the just the right time.” A 
word, then, can be substituted not just for a concept, but also for a lack of concepts, a 
confusion of concepts, even their failure or impossibility. This substitution is possible 
because, in the wake of Nietzsche’s “Ausser Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen 
Sinne” [“On Truth and Lying in an Extra-Moral Sense”], every concept always is—or 
originally was—just a word;92 and if we find ourselves at a loss for concepts, 
Worringer ironically reminds us that we can simply stick to words for a time, as if they 
were the concepts themselves.  
Reading Worringer we may be compelled by this relation between word and 
concept for two reasons. First, a deeply unsettling epistemological problem is entailed 
because we very quickly become uncertain where a word stops and its corresponding 
concept begins, and vice versa. Moreover it becomes perhaps even harder to know 
when a word is supposed to refer to a rigorous, definite concept and when it refers to a 
vague, fluid or, as Worringer says, “elastic” one. When Worringer writes about style 
(or  life or expression), we read as if we know exactly what he means, while at the 
same time acknowledging that these most crucial concepts are the vaguest ones. We 
are forced to grant such words both argumentative precision and conceptual ambiguity 
if we are to make any sense at all of the text. In this way, the argument takes shape as 
a structure that, as I have suggested, is both intact and incomplete. When words and 
concepts are related to each other in this way (that is, when words both refer and cover 
up conceptual problems), they show the ultimate complicity of epistemological rigor 
                                                
92 See especially I: 878-9. 
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and epistemological uncertainty when it comes to reading: the Erkenntnisarmut that 
underlies Wortarmut, to use Worringer’s own terms. 
Secondly, as much as this relation is a problem, it is also a possibility. The 
impasse of word and concept has a performative dimension. In the citation from Faust, 
the word “stellt sich ein” can signify “it puts itself in place,” “posits,” “sets to work,” 
“adjusts,” “arrives,” “comes” (success, failure), “appears” (consequences, symptoms), 
“begins” (worry, trouble, pain).93 We could even say that a word can make an 
entrance, as if on a stage, and then act, as if it were a concept. Words create 
movements that make a certain kind of thinking possible, even if that thinking is not 
exactly conceivable right away. Indeed, such words appear precisely at the right time; 
they are punctual, necessary, emergent, and they are set to work for the time being for 
the sake of some other need of thinking that demands a certain fluidity or elasticity of 
concepts. The question posed to reading by this performative dimension of various 
Worringerian words is how to detect and evaluate that other task of thinking in the 
delirious excess of the words on the page. 
Abstraktion und Einfühlung proposes an anti-mimetic model of art history: 
rather than tracing the development of the human technical ability to reproduce reality, 
the book emphasizes (1) the dynamic interplay of psychological drives or needs that 
informs aesthetic activity and (2) the formal qualities that correspond to that 
psychological interplay, i.e. style. This relation of cultural psychology to style seems 
to constitute the object of Stilpsychologie, the academic discipline named in 
Worringer’s subtitle.94 As a kind of cultural psychologist, Worringer looks to history 
                                                
93 I owe these semantic associations to Geoff Waite. 
94 For an account of Worringer’s relation to this turn-of-the-century sub-discipline of art history and of 
the relation of Stilpsychologie itself to traditional aesthetics and parallel developments in literary and 
linguistic stylistics, see Karlheinz Barck’s “Worringer’s Stilpsychologie im Kontext der Stilforschung” 
in Hannes Böhringer and Beate Söntgen (Eds.) Wilhelm Worringers Kunstgeschichte (München: Fink, 
2002), 23-34.  
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to identify distinct moments of Kunstwollen95, artistic volition, in which are activated 
the dominant psycho-existential needs of a culture. Likewise he looks to art to identify 
the styles that correspond to a given artistic will, measuring a culture’s psychological 
and existential condition through the art that it in effect wills.  
For Worringer artistic volition is composed of the dynamic confrontation 
(Auseinandersetzung) of two psycho-existential needs: the need for abstraction and the 
need for empathy. The latter is associated with immanence, rationality, the organic, 
life and a “relation of familiarity or trust” (Vertraulichkeitsverhältnis) to the external 
world; the most straight-forward historical example is ancient Greece. The former is 
associated with transcendence, instinct, the inorganic, death, and a “feeling of fear or 
torment in regard to the external world” (ungeheure geistige Raumscheu); here his 
example is ancient Egypt. Summing up the theoretical exposition of these two drives, 
Worringer writes:  
[. . .] Einfühlungsbedürfnis und Abstraktionsbedürfnis fanden wir als 
die zwei Polen menschlichen Kunstempfindens, soweit es rein 
ästhetischer Würdigung zugänglich ist. Es sind Gegensätze, die sich in 
Prinzip ausschließen. In Wirklichkeit aber stellt die Kunstgeschichte 
eine unaufhörliche Auseinandersetzung beider Tendenzen dar. (82) 
 
[For we found the need for empathy and the need for abstraction to be 
the two poles of human artistic experience, in so far as it is accessible 
to purely aesthetic evaluation. They are antitheses which, in principle, 
are mutually exclusive. In actual fact, however, the history of art 
represents an unceasing disputation between the two tendencies. (45)] 
Art history presents the continual coupling and confrontation of these two opposing 
needs, and art historians would be well advised (following Worringer’s own example) 
                                                
95 Worringer borrows and expands this term from Alois Riegl’s Spätrömische Kunstindustrie (1901). 
Worringer repeatedly stresses his interest and intervention in the field of art history only on the question 
of Kunstwollen, not Können: thus he justifies his discussion of style in this very broad cultural and 
psychological sense, without necessary reference to specific artists, works of art, technical innovations, 
historical and political constellations, etc. His circular procedure is to use an a-historical cultural or 
racial type, and to theorize out of that a corresponding style; and vice versa, namely, to posit a 
hypothetical model of style and then to make certain typifying and a-historical claims about a culture or 
race as a whole.  
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to understand style as both the diachronic development and synchronic phenomenon 
of these two psychological needs. The text, then, would seem to proceed from the 
concept of style as an aesthetic manifestation of psychology (of the Kunstwollen and 
Kunstbedürfnisse of a given culture) and then to offer a theory of the history of art as 
the polar dynamism of that stylistic-psychological principle. However, this passage 
becomes more complicated if we put pressure on the word “present” (darstellen) and 
allow for the double meaning of Kunstgeschichte as, on the one hand, the empirical 
history of art and, on the other, the academic discipline of art history. The continual 
confrontation of these two drives is present throughout the empirical history of art, but 
is also that which is (to be) presented by the discipline of art history, by the practice of 
art-historical writing. A relation of correspondence is established between the writing 
of art history and the history of art itself: both present (darstellen) the confrontation of 
two fundamentally opposed drives. When Worringer adds “in Wirklichkeit” to his 
implicit definition of art history/history of art, that reality is simultaneously the 
empirical reality of art history and the textual reality of art historiography, i.e. the 
reading and writing of art history. As readers, we are invited to read this particular 
Kunstgeschichte according to the two levels on which it is apparently written: as a 
theoretical argument about style, and as the rhetorico-performative presentation of 
style itself.  
Whether or not Worringer intends this other dimension to his text (indeed 
whether he is even aware of it) is an open question. We ought not to forget that 
Worringer is writing a dissertation, an academic exercise with a distinct purpose: 
namely that it be accepted by the academy and ensure the possibility of an academic 
career. This is not exactly a genre for experimentation, so why bother to inscribe this 
performative, super-stylistic dimension into the text? On the other hand, if Worringer 
does need to submit a passable dissertation, but at the same time passionately believes 
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in pursuing ideas and problems that might be profoundly unorthodox to the discipline 
of art history, the only way he could develop them would be precisely through such 
implicit or performative style of writing. A third possibility, and perhaps the most 
compelling one, would be that Worringer’s radical stylization of art history is neither 
purely intentional, nor purely something read into the text, but rather a kind of 
impersonal cultural voice that speaks through Worringer without his conscious 
control, but only as a result of his aesthetic and historical-cultural sensibility and 
academic intuition.96 A look at Worringer’s reception seems to favor this possibility: 
often hailed (or condemned) as a fore-runner, ground-layer, spokesperson, theorist, 
high priest and prophet of the Expressionist movement, Worringer’s books on ancient 
and Gothic art and architecture did indeed have a huge resonance—and readership—
among contemporary artists and critics. Even Georg Lukács, who writes the most 
scathing critique of Worringer’s first book, nevertheless sees in him the distilled 
essence of the ideology of the entire Expressionist movement.97 Moreover, the array of 
                                                
96 On Worringer’s relation to contemporary academic trends Barck makes the following remark: “Sah 
Worringer in Riegls Spätrömischer Kunstindustrie ein Werk, das ‘die stärkste Bresche in dieses 
(kunstmaterialistische) System legte,’ so sind seine eigenen stilpsychologischen Applikationen des 
Riegl’schen ‘Kunstwollen’ doch durch noch wenig aufgeklärte implizite Gedanken der 
zeitgenössischen sprachwissentschaftlichen Stilforschung, wie auch durch anthropologische und 
ethnologische (völkerspychologische im Sinne Heymann Steinthals) vermittelt und geprägt worden. 
Dabei handelt es sich nicht um Einflüsse, sondern eher um eine ‘atmosphärische,’ beinahe 
palimpsestartige und darum schwer zu ortende Beziehung im Oeuvre Worringers.” (26-7) Worringer’s 
works make references to only a handful of other scholars, but nevertheless participate in a palimpsest-
like intellectual atmosphere, whereby Worringer may be misusing or plagiarizing other thinkers (e.g. 
Theodor Lipps, Simmel, Dilthey, Nietzsche etc.) without realizing it. For an account of Worringer’s 
(ideologically motivated) misreading of his (implicit and explicit) sources, see again Geoff Waite’s 
article “Worringer’s Abstraction and Empathy: Remarks on its Reception and on the Rhetoric of its 
Criticism” in Invisible Cathedrals (Ed. Donahue). 
97 In his 1934 essay, ‘“Größe und Verfall’ des Expressionismus“ (reprinted in Probleme des Realismus. 
Berlin: Aufbau, 1955) Lukács condemns Worringer and pars pro toto the entire Expressionist 
movement. His method of ideological search-and-destroy depends, unwittingly, on the same tacit or 
implicit voice that I am attempting to draw out in this paper. He writes:  “Wilhelm Worringer, dessen 
tiefe weltanschauliche Verbundenheit mit der expressionistischen Bewegung wir aus seiner ‘Grabrede’ 
[Worringer’s 1921 essay ‘Künstlerische Zeitfragen’] ersehen konnte, spricht das in seinem für die ganze 
Theorie grundlegenden Buch: ‘Abstraktion und Einfühlung’ (München 1909) ganz deutlich aus. Die 
‘Abstraktion’ (also die Kunst des ‘Wesens’) steht hier im scharfen Gegensatz zur Kunst der 
‘Einfühlung,’ unter der – wenn das auch nicht ausgesprochen wird – vor allem die naturalistische-
impressionistische Kunst der unmittelbaren Vergangenheit und Gegenwart zu verstehen ist. Die 
Polemik Worringers ist nur auf der Oberfläche kunstgeschichtlich [. . .]” (159).  Worringer is deeply 
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self-mythologizing prefaces that mark the multiple editions of Worringer’s dissertation 
and habilitation suggest that even Worringer saw himself as a vessel or vehicle of the 
artistic and intellectual forces of his contemporary moment.98 And there is no shortage 
of scholars and critics, from Albert Soergel’s 1925 edition of Dichtung und Dichter 
der Zeit: Im Banne des Expressionismus to Claudia Öhlschläger’s 2005 
Abstraktionsdrang: Wilhelm Worringer und der Geist der Moderne, who see in 
Worringer’s thought a nexus of all the dominant philosophical, aesthetic, 
historiographical, anthropological and sociological discourses of his day.99 What I 
suggest here is the more radical possibility that, beyond the level of influence or 
discursive belonging, the voice that speaks in and through Worringer’s text is the 
voice of the very Kunstbedürfnisse of his contemporary moment displaced onto an art-
historical past, that is, the voice of Kunstwollen itself: the abstract life that is 




                                                                                                                                       
connected to the Expressionist momevent, a connection which, Lukacs claims, is very clearly 
pronounced (spricht sich ganz deutlich aus) in the book that lays the foundation for the entire theory, 
Abstraktion und Einfühlung. But in the very next sentence we read that contemporary artistic trends are 
not addressed directly (nicht ausgeprochen wird) in the text; that its representative capacity for the 
Expressionist movement is only to be tacitly understood (zu verstehen ist); and that its polemic is only 
art-historical on the surface. Lukács’ critique in fact depends upon precisely the kind of textual 
complexity that he wants to reduce away. It is the task of this present chapter to interrogate precisely the 
textual dimensions that Lukács disavows and reduces, even if similar conclusions may be reached in the 
end.  
98 This becomes especially clear in Worringer’s 1948 preface, in which he describes his by now well-
known encounter with Georg Simmel at the Trocadero Museum in Paris. For more on this encounter, 
see first Geoff Waite, “Worringer’s Abstraction and Empathy,” pp. 30-1; Mary Gluck, “Interpreting 
Primitivism, Mass Culture and Modernism: The Making of Wilhelm Worringer’s Abstraction and 
Empathy” NGC, No. 80, Special Issue on the Holocaust. (Spring–Summer, 2000), pp. 149-169; 
Siegfried K. Lang, “Wilhelm Worringers Abstraktion und Einfühlung: Entstehung und Bedeutung” in 
Wilhelm Worrringers Kunstgeschichte. Ed. Hannes Böhringer und Beate Söntgen. München: Wilhelm 
Fink, 2002; and  Claudia Öhlschläger, Abstraktionsdrang: Wilhelm Worringer und der Geist der 
Moderne. München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2005, p. 15 and ff. 
99 See Soergel, pp. 387-91, and Öhlschläger, p. 39 and ff.  
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Part II: “Style,” “Life” and “Expression” from Abstraktion und 
Einfühlung to Formprobleme der Gotik 
We have seen how two keywords, Kunstgeschichte and Darstellung, can 
double, if not treble, the register of Worringer’s writing. They create the possibility 
that this academic treatise in fact allows the invented psychology of a past culture 
(Egyptian, Greek or Gothic) to speak through it, and moreover, that this ghostly voice 
also speaks for the psychological needs of European culture itself at the beginning of 
the 20th century. This polyphony of voices is presented in the text, that is, put “there” 
(da), somewhere in the history/story that Worringer attempts to tell. Having suggested 
how this voice (the fictive voice of Kunstwollen) might be presented in Worringer’s 
text, I want to turn now to the presentation of the artistic volition’s corresponding 
concept: style, and finally to the most extreme form of the conceptual paradox of style, 
which is for him expression. 
  For Worringer the presentation of style (in the double sense of its presentation 
throughout the history of art and in art historiography) is, ultimately and 
fundamentally, non-intelligible: the navel of human experience and culture. The will 
to art and its stylistic effects are mysteriously and permanently separated from 
conscious intention and explanation, originating and operating elsewhere, dimly, 
intuitively, primordially. Worringer speculates that the first artistic abstractions were a 
purely instinctual creation (reine Instinktschöpfung) and that the need for abstraction 
had at first nothing to do with the conscious reproduction of geometric laws of 
composition, but stemmed instead from a much deeper and more mysterious source.  
Dieser Drang mußte seine erste Befriedigung in der reinen 
geometrischen Abstraktion finden, welche, von allem äußeren 
Weltzusammenhang erlöst, eine Beglückung darstellt, die ihre 
geheimnisvolle Erklärung nicht im Intellekt des Betrachtenden, sondern 




[This urge was bound to find its first satisfaction in pure geometric 
abstraction, which, set free from all external connections with the 
world, represents a felicitation whose mysterious transfiguration 
emanates not from the observer’s intellect, but from the deepest roots 
of his somato-psychic constitution. (35)] 
The first geometric abstractions must have presented an aesthetic gratification that 
could only be explained by appealing to the deepest physical and mental constitution 
of the observer. If one follows those physical and mental roots deep enough, one finds 
that they do not even belong to a body or a soul anymore, but rather to inorganic 
nature: static, inexorable, eternal. Worringer thus eradicates not only the role of the 
intellect, but also the notions of life and organism in aesthetic experience: 
Es muß vielmehr auch hier angenommen werden, daß jedes geistige 
Verhältnis seine physische Bedeutung habe, und auf die kommt es hier 
wohl an. Ein überzeugter Evolutionist könnte sie mit aller Vorsicht in 
der schließlichen Verwandschaft der Bildungsgesetze organischer und 
anorganischer Natur suchen. Er würde dann die ideale Forderung 
aufstellen, daß in unserem menschlichen Organismus das 
Bildungsgesetz der anorganischen Natur noch wie eine leise 
Erinnerung nachklinge. Er würde vielleicht auch weiter behaupten, daß 
jede Differenzierung  der organisierten Materie, jede Weiterbildung 
ihrer primitivsten Form von einer Spannung, sozusagen von einer 
Rückwärtssehnsucht nach dieser primitivsten Form begleitet sei und er 
würde zur Bekräftigung auf den entsprechenden Widerstand hinweisen, 
den die Natur gegen jede Differenzierung dadurch äußert, daß mit der 
Höherentwicklung des Organismus die Schmerzen des Gebärens 
wachsen. In der Betrachtung der abstrakten Gesetzmäßigkeit würde 
dann also der Mensch gleichsam von dieser Spannung erlöst und im 
Genusse seiner einfachsten Formel, seines letzten Bildungsgesetz von 
seiner Differenzierung ausruhen. Der Geist wäre dann nur der 
Vermittler dieser höheren Beziehungen. (71-2) 
 
[It must rather be assumed here too that every spiritual attitude has its 
physical significance and that this must be the issue here. A convinced 
evolutionist might, with all circumspection, seek it in the ultimate 
affinity between the morphological laws of organic and inorganic 
nature. He would then erect the ideal postulate that the morphological 
law of inorganic nature still echoes like a dim memory in our human 
organism. He would then perhaps also assert further that every 
differentiation of organised matter, every development of its most 
primitive form, is accompanied by a tension, by a longing to revert to 
this most primitive form so to speak, and in corroboration he would 
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point to the corresponding resistance which nature evinces to all 
differentiation through the fact that the more highly evolved the 
organism the greater are the pains it experiences in parturition. Thus, in 
the contemplation of abstract regularity man would be, as it were, 
delivered from this tension and at rest from his differentiation in the 
enjoyment of his simplest formula, of his ultimate morphological law. 
The spirit would then be merely the instrumental provider of these 
higher relationships. (35-6)] 
Worringer persistently disassociates the intellect (Geist) from artistic activity: intellect 
is only a mediator between the body and the art-work, and only in the body does art 
have its real effect.100 Furthermore, Worringer assumes that there is a fundamental 
affinity between the laws of organic formation and inorganic nature such that the 
organic body (with its mediating intellect) is at best a secondary formation 
(Weiterbildung) or differentiation (Differenzierung) from inorganic nature; and 
abstract art only confirms the primordiality of the inorganic over the organic. 
Abstraction in art is the echo of inorganic nature that reminds us, painfully, that every 
notion of intellectual “progress” and organic “growth” is felt, at this deeper bodily 
level, as pain and longing for the primordial simplicity of inorganic form. Every new 
birth, every human step forward gives rise to a need and a will to step backwards and 
outwards, a need whose gratification is felt by and is present to the body (in its 
deepest, primordial constitution), but never to the intellect.  
All of the subtle ways that Worringer hedges his claims here (e.g., 
foregrounding the assumption, hypothesizing a token evolutionist, excessive use of the 
subjunctive and qualifiers like “vielleicht,” “sozusagen,” and “gleichsam”) indicate 
that this is a tenuous, but crucial part of his argument. This passage also makes use of 
                                                
100 Worringer substantially revises this point in the Gothic book, in which Geist, rather than being a 
relegated to a secondary, mediating role, becomes the unattainable goal of Gothic art: namely the 
transformation of sensuous space into spirit: Vergeistigung des Raumes. Although the terms have 
changed, the structure of the impasse remains the same in both texts: in Abstraktion und Einfühlung it is 
an Auseinandersetzung of organic life and inorganic form, in Formprobleme der Gotik it is spirit pitted 
against space. In both books, as we will see, expression remains the ceaseless, delirious movement of 
overcoming and oscillation of opposites.  
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the explanatory powers of the inexplicable, of the appeal to the inexplicable as the last 
word of every coherent explanation. Precisely because the will to art and its stylistic 
effects present themselves (and are presented) as manifestations of an unintelligible, 
mysterious bio-existential longing, more need not be said. It suffices merely to 
mention the enigma of the inorganic, the inchoate allure of primitive, irrational 
longing.   
If the task of art history is the presentation of such a need (irrational, 
unknowable, inexplicable), then we have to emphasize that presentation itself involves 
the indirect evocation of the ceaseless mystery of art, namely the contradictory relation 
(Auseinandersetzung) between organic human life and non-organic form. Such a 
mystery, although it may be unknowable, is not necessarily unspeakable. To present it, 
to make it seen, felt and heard (but never directly visible, sensible or audible), 
requires, both in art and in art history, style, i.e., the formal qualities that are necessary 
for the limitation and expression of the will that wants to overcome them. Style, thus 
defined, is the conceptual paradox that lurks in the background when Worringer uses 
the word “presentation.” Style is the (un)speakable movement of thought that 
(un)speaks (entspricht) artistic need and artistic will. It is the possibility of an 
impossible voice that one hears in certain Worringerian words that present themselves 
at just the right time. Indeed, the auditory metaphor (of voice, of sound, of music) is 
the echo of the singular success and failure of Worringer’s discourse.  
This success and failure is sounded most clearly in the word “expression,” 
which forms the hidden center of Worringer’s “polar” argument. Let us take a step 
back and examine these two poles. On one side is empathetic art (e.g., Greek art), 
whose task is to reflect the relation of trust and familiarity between man and world 
through the intensification of organic form. On the other side is abstract art (e.g., 
Egyptian), whose task is to dispel the dread of space, the threatening chaos of the outer 
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world, the caprice of organic life: in short to translate the chaos and caprice of space 
into art works of regular geometric form based on inorganic, crystalline laws of 
composition (Bildungsgesetze). But the role of the inorganic in abstract art poses a 
serious problem for the supposed “polar” opposition between Abstraktion und 
Einfühlung, as the following example suggests. In the first section of the “practical 
part” of Abstraktion und Einfühlung, Worringer discusses at length the stylistic 
problem of ornamentation. He attempts to explain how the earliest and most abstract 
styles of ornamentation (pure linear-inorganic) developed into a seemingly organic 
and empathetic style of plant ornamentation. He claims that the organic appearance of 
the plant ornament is not the result of a mimetic process, but rather of the effect of the 
very same drive for abstraction that also produces non-representative, abstract 
ornamental lines. What is presented in the plant ornament is not an organic, natural 
ideal (Naturvorbild), but only the abstract regularity that composes the plant’s outer 
formation (die Gesetzmäßigkeit ihrer äußeren Bildung). Only belatedly, Worringer 
says, does the abstract plant ornament become “naturalized” and speak to the human 
need for empathy. Naturalism and organicism in style are only belated, derivative 
moments of the style of abstraction, just as the very quality of organic life itself would 
seem to be a derivative of a primary, underlying inorganic vitality. He writes: 
Beide Stile, lineare wie vegatabile Ornamentik, stellen also im Grunde 
eine Abstraktion dar und ihre Verschiedenheit ist in diesem Sinne 
eigentlich nur eine graduelle, wie die organische Gesetzmäßigkeit für 
eine monistische Anschauung auch im letzten Grunde nur graduell 
verschieden von der anorganischen-kristallischen ist. Für uns kommt es 
nur auf den Wert an, den diese graduelle Verschiedenheit der Stile in 
bezug auf das Problem Einfühlung oder Abstraktion hat. (97-8) 
 
[Both styles, linear as well as vegetal ornament, thus represent at 
bottom an abstraction, and their diversity is, in this sense, really only 
one of degree; just as, in the eyes of a monist, organic regularity, in the 
last analysis, differs only in degree from that of the inorganic-
crystalline. We are concerned only with the value this difference of 
degree possesses in relation to the problem of empathy or abstraction. 
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(60-1)] 
The organic life represented by the plant ornament is, at the deepest psychological 
level, not life at all, but rather the outward, living appearance of a dead structure. The 
living thing, the disavowed Naturvorbild, is stripped of its organic life, and that “life” 
becomes a kind of visual cipher for the inorganic principle of its form. Paradoxically 
the artwork itself becomes an organism, full or possessed of that same uncanny “life” 
that is only to be distinguished by degree from the regularity of lifeless matter. Thus 
we see a crucial disjunction between what Worringer says with his argument and what 
he does with it. When he insists that the continuity between the organic and the 
inorganic is only of value insofar as it pertains to the problem of empathy and 
abstraction, he both affirms and overlooks the fact that his entire polar or antithetical 
argument rests upon a mysterious, unintelligible continuum of opposites (that navel of 
thought where the conscious life of the mind is knotted together with the unconscious, 
inorganic undeadness of the body), not their polar or antithetical opposition. Because 
he has defined his terms in such a way as to be defended and sustained by their own 
conceptual ambiguity, his bipolar argument can appear quite logically and 
conceptually coherent. However, it is precisely what lurks in that obscure, uncanny 
overlap of opposites that forms the real center of Worringer’s presentation: the word 
expression as it is applied to the art and architecture of the Gothic peoples.  
What Worringer says is how abstraction delivers man from existential pain, 
how existential confusion is clarified into form. The (constative) thesis that he argues 
is that the bio-existential dynamic between abstraction and empathy drives the 
development of style art history. But what he does is to decompose precisely the 
formal, conceptual unity of his argument and release a non-conceptual tertium quid: 
Gothic expression. Just as the plant ornament becomes a visual cipher for non-organic 
life, so does Worringer’s text become a conceptual riddle of non-conceptual thought. 
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Likewise, just as abstraction in style, precisely in flattening the object along the two 
dimensions of length and width, allows an entirely other dimension to be presented; so 
does Worringer’s text need to reduce itself to two antithetical poles (abstraction and 
empathy) for this irrational non-conceptual thinking to emerge out of their 
decomposed elements. Only in his explicit passages on Gothic expression do the text’s 
constative and performative dimensions finally—almost—coincide. 
Although the paradoxical concepts of life and style are unintelligible and 
inconceivable, Worringer argues that Gothic art intuits these concepts as problems and 
cannot get free of them. From the Gothic perspective, the complete release theorized 
as artistic abstraction becomes impossible. Instead abstraction leads only to an 
intensification of the contradiction, not to redemption. Thus the Auseinandersetzung of 
organic need and inorganic form can only be ceaselessly expressed in art, but never 
resolved. Concluding his discussion of ornamentation, he writes: 
Trotz der rein linearen anorganischen Grundlage dieser [gotischen] 
Ornamentik zögern wir, sie eine abstrakte zu nennen. Vielmehr ist in 
diesem Liniengewirr ein unruhiges Leben nicht zu verkennen. Diese 
Unruhe, dieses Suchen hat kein organisches Leben, das uns sanft in 
seine Bewegung mit hineinzieht, aber Leben ist da, ein starkes, 
hasterfülltes, das uns zwingt, glücklos seinen Bewegungen zu folgen. 
Also auf anorganischer Grundlage eine gesteigerte Bewegung, ein 
gesteigerter Ausdruck. (115-6) 
 
[In spite of the purely linear, inorganic basis of this [Gothic] 
ornamental style, we hesitate to term it abstract. Rather it is impossible 
to mistake the restless life contained in this tangle of lines. Thus unrest, 
this seeking, has no organic life that draws us gently into its movement; 
but there is life there, a vigorous, urgent life, that compels us joylessly 
to follow its movements. Thus, on an inorganic fundament, there is 
heightened movement, heightened expression. (76-7)] 
Expression is the name Worringer gives to the stylistic contradiction (neither abstract 
nor empathetic, but the asymptotal escalation of one through the other) that answers to 
the existential contradiction tormenting the Gothic Kunstwollen. Attaining neither the 
immanent and vital fullness of the Greek, nor the transcendental stone-cold abstraction 
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of the Egyptian, yet striving for both, Gothic art expresses the incommensurability 
between the two through a movement of ceaseless oscillation and escalation. Where 
no synthesis is possible, Gothic art strives rather to translate (übertragen) the two, to 
carry one over to the meet the other in a relation of impossible correspondence; to 
breathe life into the rigor mortis of eternal abstraction, to monumentalize the 
transience of the living. The result is expression: a restless movement of energies 
(Kräftebewegung), a stylistic striving that Worringer characterizes as an intensity, 
tumult or striving, and to which he attributes an uncanny, inorganic life. The following 
description of a Gothic cathedral is typical of Worringer’s concept of expression: 
Beim gotischen Dom dagegen lebt die Materie nur von ihren eignen 
mechanischen Gesetzen; diese Gesetze aber sind trotz ihres abstrakten 
Grundcharakters lebendig geworden, d.h. sie haben einen Ausdruck 
bekommen. Der Mensch hat sein Einfühlungsvermögen auf 
mechanische Werte übertragen. Das sind ihm nun keine tote 
Abstraktion mehr, sondern eine lebendige Kräftebewegung. Und nur in 
dieser gesteigerten Kräftebewegung, die in der Intensität des Ausdrucks 
über alle organische Bewegung hisausgeht, vermag der nordische 
Mensch sein durch innere Disharmonie ins Pathetische gesteigertes 
Ausdrucksbedürfnis zu befriedigen. Ergriffen von Taumel dieser aus 
allen Enden hervordringenden, in mächtigem Krescendo gegen Himmel 
strebenden Orchestermusik mechanischer Kräfte fühlt er in seligem 
Schwindel sich kramphaft emporgerissen, sich hoch über sich selbst 
hinaus ins Unendliche gesteigert. (155-6)101 
 
[In the Gothic cathedral, on the contrary, matter lives solely on its own 
mechanical laws; but these laws, despite their fundamentally abstract 
character, have become living, i.e. they have acquired expression. Man 
has transferred his capacity for empathy onto mechanical values. Now 
they are no longer a dead abstraction to him, but a living movement of 
forces. And only in this heightened movement of forces, which in their 
intensity of expression surpass all organic motion, was Northern man 
able to gratify his need for expression, which had been intensified to 
the point of pathos by inner disharmony. Gripped by the frenzy of these 
                                                
101 In addition to reminding us of the Nietzsche passage from the end of the previous chapter, 
Worringer’s descriptions of Gothic cathedrals also recall Goethe’s essays on architecture, particularly 
“Von deutscher Baukunst” (1773) and (1823). See Joseph Masheck, “Abstraction and Empathy: 
Crystalline Form in Expressionism and in the Minimalism of Tony Smith” in Donahue (Ed) Invisible 
Cathedrals, p. 43; and Lang, “Worringers Abstraktion und Einfühlung” in Böhringer/Söntgen (Eds) 
Wilhlem Worringers Kunstgeschichte, p. 110.   
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mechanical forces, that thrust out at all their terminations and aspire 
toward heaven in a mighty crescendo of orchestral music, he feels 
himself convulsively drawn aloft in blissful vertigo, raised high above 
himself into the infinite. (112-3)] 
Here, and in other such passages, it is not the life of an organism that confronts us, but 
rather that of a mechanism: “Nicht das Leben eines Organismus tritt uns entgegen, 
sondern das eines Mechanismus” (158). The mechanical laws of inorganic nature 
express an uncanny vitality and an uncanny pathos upon the viewer. Expression is thus 
itself a kind of life that emerges between the viewer and the work, between the dead 
lines, forces, movements of the work and their vivifying perception by the viewer, a 
perception that is also the uncanny recognition of the same inorganic forces that are 
active and constitutive of the viewer’s own organic life. In expression there is no polar 
opposition between life and matter (nor, by analogy, between abstraction and 
empathy); rather there is only a ceaselessly shifting differential in which life functions 
as the asymptotal limit of matter, and vice versa. Life is the expressive interplay of 
forces between the dead structure of a Gothic cathedral and the equally dead structure 
of its living, organic viewer: life is what animates the geometry and stone of the 
cathedral to the point where it strives to become space, not merely occupy it. Likewise, 
life is what captures and overwhelms the spectator of the cathedral, forcing him to that 
unthinkable, inconceivable point where his intellect crashes up against its inorganic, 
material limit, the limit it shares with the cathedral itself. 
The expressive movement of vivified forces is a movement without direction, 
development, or end: a line of pure intensity, of constant interruption and detour, of 
tumult and vertigo.102 It is barely a line at all, in fact, it is barely visible, but rather only 
a marker of invisible forces: Worringer exhausts this metaphor (just as the Gothic line 
                                                
102 This is the line of Worringer’s work that Gilles Deleuze traces in his book on Francis Bacon: 
sensation happens when one paints or see such a “Gothic line” (see pp. 40-1). The Worringerian Gothic 
line appears in various guises and contexts in Deleuze’s work, most notably as the nomad line and the 
line of flight in A Thousand Plateaus. Co-authored with Félix Guattari. Trans. Brian Massumi. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987.  
 102 
exhausts its own potential precisely when it is at the point of renewing it) and is forced 
to use other metaphors to express the paradoxical nonconceptual power of expression: 
in the above passage it is the powerful crescendo of orchestral music.103 This metaphor 
is repeated in the penultimate paragraph of the book, in which the Gothic style rings 
out its full and final symphonic tones in the gothic-baroque style of drapery 
(Gewandstil), a form characterized by the interplay of (organic) human figure and 
(abstract) ornamentation: 
In jener Entwicklungsphase der Gotik, die wir das gotische Barock 
nennen und deren Vertreter wir hauptsächlich in Süddeutschland 
finden, raffte sich die Musik des Gewandes zu einer letzten 
volltönenden Symphonie zusammen. (164) 
 
[In that phase of the development which we call Gothic Baroque, and 
whose representatives are mainly to be found in South Germany, the 
music of drapery drew together into a last full-toned symphony. (120)] 
But the organic, naturalistic, empathetic style of the Renaissance is already pressing 
in, and once the human figure becomes dominant in this style, the gothic has already 
sung its swan song: 
Der gotische Gewandstil hatte ausgeklungen, und mit ihm war die 
letzte Erinnerung an den Ausgangkspunkt des nordischen 
Kunstschaffens, an jenes System abstrakten und gleichzeitig 
expressiven Lineaments erloschen. Nachdem es sich glücklich und auf 
vielen Umwegen zu organischer Klarheit durchgearbeitet hatte, verlor 
es seine Existenzberechtigung und wurde aus der Entwicklung 
ausgschaltet. (164) 
 
[The last echo of the Gothic drapery style had faded away, and with it 
the last reminiscence of the starting-point of Northern artistic creation, 
of that system of delineation which was at once abstract and expressive, 
was extinguished. Having worked its way, felicitously and along many 
detours, to organic lucidity, it had lost its raison d’être and was 
                                                
103 Claudia Öhlschläger attributes this musical metaphor to the triangular influence of Schopenhauer, 
Wagner and Nietzsche on the modernist (and therefore on Worringer’s) conception of music as the 
abstract-expressive art form par excellence. See p. 83 in her Abstraktionsdrang: Wilhelm Worringer 
und der Geist der Moderne (2005). See also the chapter “Music and Existence” in Walter Sokel’s 
classic study, The Writer in Extremis: Expressionism in Twentieth-Century German Literature. 
Stanford, 1959, where Sokel argues that a fundamentally musical aesthetic grounds modernism’s shift 
away from mimesis to abstraction. Below I show that this musical metaphor also has a particular 
significance for Worringer’s writing.  
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eliminated from the further course of evolution. (120)] 
Somehow the Gothic will-to-art finds its way out of the impasse of expression and 
attains, in the Renaissance style, the transfiguration of organic form. But one cannot 
help but feel a tinge of bitterness underlying the Renaissance’s “happy” attainment of 
organic clarity, and the overall mood of the concluding paragraph is one of elegy for 
what will remain forever lost of this great, uncanny Gothic tradition: 
Wer annähernd empfunden hat, was alles in dieser Unnatürlichkeit [des 
gotischen Stils] liegt, der wird bei aller Freude über die neuen 
Glücksmöglichkeiten, die die Renaissance schuf, sich mit großer 
Trauer dessen bewußt bleiben, was mit diesem Siege des Organischen, 
des Natürlichen an großen durch eine ungeheure Tradition geweihten 
Werten auf immer verloren ging. (164-5)  
 
[Whoever has felt, in some degree, all that is contained in this 
unnaturalness, despite his joy at the new possibilities of felicity created 
by the Renaissance, will remain conscious, with deep regret, of all the 
great values hallowed by an immense tradition that were lost forever 
with this victory of the organic, of the natural. (120-1)] 
The tone of the conclusion lies quite far afield from the sober, academic terrain 
sketched out in the opening paragraphs of the text. Although Worringer’s point of 
departure is a polar model of aesthetic sensibility that drives the history of art, the 
unfolding of his text suggests that it is not the polar model itself that he is compelled 
to explore, but rather that uncanny moment of contradiction between the two poles 
which in fact destroys the entire model. However the text may represent itself (as an 
art-historical treatise, a work of psychological aesthetics etc), what it presents is a 
sustained struggle with a certain impasse of thought and language, of word and 
concept, of living organism and dead matter. It is a theory of aesthetic perception that 
is simultaneously an implicit theory of language and conceptuality. It is also 
necessarily the practice or presentation of that theory, and its results are a radically 
unstable figuration of thought and sensation (Gothic expression) and a concept of non-




Part III: A Dead End and a Way Out 
At the end of Worringer’s first book, Gothic expression has exhausted itself. 
From the perspective of our reading (which proceeded from the problematic interplay 
of word and concept) we have uncovered a shifting, self-consuming metaphoric of 
polarity that turns inevitably toward the figure of expression. But we are repeating our 
problem if we think we can simply “name” the central figure of this text. If the whole 
shifting ground of this reading is the ambiguous relation between concept and word, 
then the real figure that operates in our text (and in Worringer’s) is catachresis, the 
term for rhetorical abuse: mixed metaphors and inappropriate, inadequate or 
inconsistent usage. When Worringer says that the structure of a Gothic cathedral is 
striving towards heaven, he is using a metaphor. When he says the cathedral is 
orchestral music striving towards heaven, he is mixing metaphors and creating a 
special kind of catachresis: that which he mis-expresses could not be expressed in any 
other way. Worringer’s catachresis is the necessarily inadequate use of language to 
express a conceptual problem which seems to foreclose adequate expression in its 
essence.  
Where can one go with a concept like expression? It seems to be a historical 
dead-end, just as it is a figural one. As soon as Worringer exhausts the mis-metaphor 
of expression, his book comes to a close. However, in Form in Gothic, which is the 
supplementary re-working (ergänzende Überarbeitung) of the material of Abstraktion 
und Einfühlung, we have the chance to see how the dead-end of expression might be 
reconnected to the conceptual and disciplinary frames which give rise to it.  
The aural metaphor plays an even more substantial role in the Gothic book. 
Style is always pronounced in this text (sich aussprechen), and it corresponds 
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(entsprechen) to artistic will. Art itself is a Liniensprache that one listens to as much 
as looks at. The musical metaphors grow even richer and more specific: visual works 
possess rhythm and harmony, fermatas, accents, crescendos; Gothic lines are 
described as an infinite melody, as a visual echo, as “das Fortissimo der Raummusik.” 
Indeed, the central problem of the Gothic book is, explicitly, catachresis: the failure of 
the Gothic line (in the double sense) to find adequate expression in visual or spatial 
form is figured by the turn to aural metaphors. That which constitutes and frustrates 
Gothic style is form, matter, life itself, all of which Worringer opposes to spirit 
(Geist). Gothic architecture strives to transcend matter and become pure spirit, pure 
space, pure inorganic regularity. Matter is de-materlialized, lines are de-geometrified; 
but the transcendence is never completed, it is from the outset the impossible horizon 
of the Gothic will that must nevertheless remain bound to bodies and material. As a 
result, the Gothic will rages and rages against its own inner limit, from which it draws 
both its initially vital, expressive power and its ultimately cold, dead impotence. Its 
transcendence is only to be achieved indirectly, to be evoked, to be presented in the 
sense that Worringer himself presents “style” in Abstraktion und Einfühlung. The 
excessive, unnamable element of the text, the conceptual dimension that remains 
necessarily inconceiveable, but nevertheless bound to the words eventually transforms 
itself into aural metaphors. If the transcendent vision cannot be seen, it will have to be 
heard. “Wenn wir nach der Betrachtung nordischer Ornamentik die Augen schliessen, 
bleibt nur der nachklingende Eindruck einer körperlosen unendlichen Bewegtheit“ 
(37) [If, after contemplating Northern ornament, we close our eyes, all that remains to 
us is a lingering [echoing] impression of a formless, ceaseless activity” (56)]. Hence, 
the music, voices and echoes as the central mixed metaphoric of the text, the echo of 
catachresis itself as the Gothic line, forever denied freedom, searches ceaselessly for a 
way out.  
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As Worringer elaborates certain aspects of his dissertation in the book on the 
Gothic, we see that principle new term to characterize Gothic art is Eigenausdruck, by 
which Worringer means the violent subjection of the spectator before the expressive 
power (Ausdrucksmacht) of the Gothic line. The radical inverse of empathy (in which 
the spectator externalizes himself into the work of art), the radical self-expression of 
Gothic art that imposes itself violently on the viewer. He writes: 
Der Ausdruck der nordischen Ornamentik ist dagegen nicht unmittelbar 
von uns abhängig, wir begegnen vielmehr einem Leben, das 
unabhängig von uns zu sein scheint, das mit Forderungen an uns 
herantritt und uns zu einer Bewegtheit zwingt, der wir uns nur 
widerwillig unterwerfen. Kurz: die nordische Linie lebt nicht von 
einem Eindruck, den wir ihr willig geben, sondern sie scheint einen 
Eigenausdruck zu haben, der stärker ist als unser Leben. (32) 
 
[On the other hand, the expression of Northern ornament does not 
directly depend upon us; we are met rather by a vitality which appears 
to be independent of us, which challenges us, forcing upon us an 
activity to which we submit only against our will. In short, the Northern 
line does not get its life from any impress which we willingly give it, 
but appears to have an expression of its own, which is stronger than our 
life. (41)] 
The Nordic line only appears to have its “auto-expression,” but since expression 
exceeds the relation of subject and object, then the “subjective” appearence of the 
monstrous life of the “object” is precisely that life. Here might we not speculate that, 
mutatis mutandis, the voice of the Gothic volition itself speaks through Worringer’s 
writing? That a disembodied, undead Kunstwollen achieves its “auto-expression” in 
and through Worringer’s writing, intensifying the relation between author and text, 
reader and text, past and present, historical and literary presentation? That Worringer, 
the art historian, merely creates the conditions by which his writing will be 
overpowered by the artistic will itself, and it is precisely his historical task to 
ventriloquize that voice out of past? At least this is the possibility—however uncanny, 
solipsistic or preposterous it may be—that is suggested by the duplicity of Worringer’s 
writing.  
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Worringer employs a “banal experience from everyday life” to illustrate the 
not-at-all-banal way in which this Eigenausdruck can be seen to function in his own 
writing. He asks the reader to imagine picking up a pencil and sketching out a series of 
beautiful curved lines. In doing this we seem to experience a feeling of pleasure from 
the free, uninterrupted movement of our wrist, and this pleasure is translated 
(übertragen) onto the line as its Ausdruck, its expression, which corresponds 
(entspricht) to the feeling of pleasure experienced in the act of drawing the line in the 
first place (32-3). Even should we encounter such a beautiful or organic line that we 
ourselves did not draw, we would nevertheless feel as if we ourselves had drawn it and 
we would re-experience the feeling of pleasure that is expressed in the line. 
“Begegnen wir einer solchen Linie in einer anderen Darstellung, so ist unser Eindruck 
derselbe, als ob wir sie selbst gezeichnet hätten. Denn sobald wir überhaupt eine Linie 
in unser Bewußtsein aufnehmen, fühlen wir innerlich unwillkürlich den Vorgang ihrer 
Entstehung nach.“ (33) [“If we meet such a line in another composition, we experience 
the same impression as if we ourselves had drawn it. For directly we admit a line to 
our consciousness at all, we unconsciously feel inwardly the process of its formation.” 
(42)]. Expression in this “banal” sense is the sensuously perceivable reconstruction of 
a mental state, the sensible trace of a spiritual condition with which we cannot help but 
identify, whether the trace is left by us, or by another. In the moment of perception, we 
become the author of every line we see, and we feel, compulsively, the same forces 
that created and were created by that line. And if, Worringer adds, in a state of inner 
excitement that can only be expressed on paper, we again take a pencil in our hand, 
then “wird eine starre, eckige, immer wieder unterbrochene, zackige Linie von 
stärkster Ausdruckswucht entstehen” (33) [“there will be a hard, angular, ceaselessly 
interrupted, jagged line, of the most powerful vehemence of expression” (42)]. And 
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the perception of that line immediately forces upon us the turbulent mental state that 
gave rise to it: 
Denn auch hier schreiben wir die bei der Apperzeption der Linie 
nachgefühlten Entstehungsvorgänge ihr als Ausdruck zu. Und da die 
Linie uns ihren Ausdruck aufzudrängen scheint, empfinden wir ihn als 
etwas Selbständiges, von uns Unabhängiges und sprechen deshalb von 
einem Eigenausdruck der Linie. (34) 
 
[For here, too, we ascribe to the line as expression the sensation of the 
process of its execution felt afterwards at the moment of its 
apperception. And as the line appears to impose its expression upon us, 
we perceive it as something absolute, independent of us, and therefore 
we speak of a specific expression [auto-expression] of the line. (43)] 
Thus, looking approximates drawing in Worringer just as reading approximates 
writing for Benn. The perception of such a line only recapitulates the urgency of its 
drawing. There is no room for interpretation or analysis of such lines: they possess (or 
are possessed by) an uncanny immediacy. “Ins Unheimliche, Phantastische ist alles 
gewandelt. Hinter der Sichtbarkeit der Dinge lauert ihr Zerrbild, hinter der 
Leblosigkeit der Dinge ein unheimliches, gespenstisches Leben, und alles Wirkliche 
wird zum Grotesken“ (53) [“Everything becomes weird and fantastic. Behind the 
visible appearance of a thing lurks its caricature, behind the lifelessness of a thing an 
uncanny, ghostly life, and so all actual things become grotesque” (81-2)]. This is the 
point (the non-point, the point that is everywhere—and nowhere—in such a line) 
where the hermeneutic circle of Worringer’s writing closes in on itself. Instead of a 
Kunstwollen that gives rise to a certain style, or a style that sheds light on its 
corresponding will (the circular method that ostensibly drives these two texts), the will 
and the style are in fact interchangeable according to the life that they share: the same 
life that is “in” the work itself, in its genesis and in its author, in its perception and in 
its perceiver. The auto-expression of the line is its cause and effect, its past and its 
present, its subject and its object. And since Worringer’s text consists of nothing more 
than the tracing of such lines, then we have to assert the tautology that: the Gothic line 
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that Worringer describes in his texts is the Gothic line that Worringer describes in his 
texts.  
Das Wesentliche dieses Eigenausdrucks der Linie ist, dass er nicht 
sinnlich-organiche Werte repräsentiert, sondern Werte unsinnlicher, 
d.h. geistiger Art. Nicht organische Willenstätigkeit spricht sich in ihm 
aus, sondern eine psychisch-geistige Willenstätigkeit, die noch fern von 
aller Verbindung und Versöhnung mit organischen 
Empfindungskomplexen ist. (34)  
 
[The essence of this specific expression [auto-expression] of the line is, 
that it does not represent sensuous, organic values, but values of a non-
sensuous, that is to say, a spiritual kind. It does not express organic 
activity of will, but a psychical, spiritual activity of will, far removed 
from any connection or conformity with the complexes of organic 
sensation. (43)] 
Only now the expression does not resonate with our own organic being and capacity 
for empathy, but with inorganic being and non-sensuous desire. It is the voice, the 
compulsion, the power of matter that is speaks out here, a speaking-out that is 
absolutely continuous with Worringer’s writing, and with our reading of it. Ultimately 
Worringer’s creates a trap for conceptual and historical thinking, a mise-en-abîme 
from which, as we already saw in the Introduction, we can find no point of entry or 
point of departure: “Wir finden keinen Punkt, wo wir einsetzen, keinen Punkt wo wir 
haltmachen könnten. Jeder Punkt ist innerhalb dieser unendlichen Bewegtheit 
gleichwertig, und alle zusammen sind sie gegenüber der durch sie reproduzierten 
Bewegtheit wertlos” (37) [“We find no point of entrance, no point of rest. Every point 
in this endless movement is of equal value and all of them combined are without value 
compared with the agitation they produce” (56)]. We are dealing with a line that is not 
composed of any points (a contradiction that anticipates what Deleuze, via Artaud, 
will call the body without organs104). This is the inverted image of the part that usurps 
the whole, namely, a whole with no parts. But this inversion is just another version of 
                                                
104 See Joseph Vogl, “Anorganismus: Worringer und Deleuze” in Wilhelm Worringers Kunstgeschichte. 
Ed. Hannes Böhringer, Beate Söntgen. München: Wilhelm Fink, 2002, p. 188. 
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the delirious movement out of the furrows that ceaselessly reforms itself into a 
movement that returns to the furrows, that converts and reconverts the inside and the 
outside in a single gesture that is both a visual line in space and a written/read line of 
text. Whether the part usurps the whole or the whole has no parts, whether expression 
is contained by or explodes its matter and its form: none of this is as relevant as the 
unity of all these alternatives as a constant variation which, in looking at it or 
producing it, writing (about) it or reading it, leads to delirium.  
In Chapter 3 we will see how the unstoppable variation of inside and outside, 
of part and whole, of visual and written, and literal and metaphorical leads to the 




WRITING VERSUS VERSES: DELIRIOUS WRITING IN RILKE’S 
AUFZEICHNUNGEN 
 
Aut homo insanit, aut versus facit.  
[The man’s delirious – or composing poetry !] 
—Horace, Satires II, 7 
(trans. Niall Rudd, Penguin Press, 1973) 
In this chapter, I argue that Rilke’s use of metaphorical language both protects 
him from and exposes him to a delirious experience of the outside of language. As I 
mention in Chapter 1, metaphor for Rilke must always be understood as a filter or 
screen protecting language—and its speakers, writers and readers—from its 
fundamental ungroundedness and otherness regarding things as they are. In reading 
Rilke’s work, we face the paradox that the more closely he formulates and performs 
the structuring, sheltering function of metaphor, the more he risks collapsing the entire 
structure around him and exposing himself to the chaos of things, life, reality as such, 
an experience of delirium suffered at the limit of what poetic language makes possible. 
In the Aufzeichnungen, the protagonist Malte is perhaps farthest from the 
Weltinnenraum of Rilke’s later work than any other figure or voice in Rilke’s work.105 
Here I trace that exposure of Rilke’s protagonist by placing the Aufzeichnungen in the 
context of Rilke’s earlier engagements with the visual arts. Malte fails to attain in 
poetry the same painterly ideals that Rilke saw in the Worpswede artists and in 
Cézanne, yet I argue that his writing is of singular importance for Rilke’s later work 
and for the understanding of delirium as a decisive stylistic and discursive problem 
that traverses the art history, aesthetic theory, poetry and prose of the period in 
                                                
105 The paradigmatic explication of Weltinnenraum as transcendental spatial and temporal figuration in 
Rilke’s poetry is Beda Allemann’s study, Zeit und Figur beim späten Rilke, especially pp. 13-24.  
 112 
question.  
In Part I, I read Rilke’s monograph on landscape painting, Worpswede (1903) 
as both precursor and antithesis to the Aufzeichnungen. I argue that Rilke’s reflections 
on landscape painting function implicitly as the aesthetic ideal that the protagonist 
Malte fails to attain. The visual arts (via landscape painting) do not so much lay the 
groundwork for understanding Rilke’s Aufzeichnungen as impose an impossible 
artistic task that Rilke simultaneously embraces and disavows. That task could be 
summarized as follows: all of the arts are sustained by the inherent productivity and 
meaningfulness of comparing incommensurabilities; oppositions like inside/outside, 
self/world, human/nature, proximity/distance, fullness/vastness are, in principle, open 
to an artistic resolution that would unify disparate terms through comparison or 
substitution, in a word, through metaphor. In the Aufzeichnungen, however, the 
productive energy that an artist should be able to use in order to unify opposed spheres 
and overcome contradictions of every kind is somehow out of reach or out of control. 
The artist cannot unify oppositions, but only drown in excesses of either/or, e.g. a 
bottomless, broken interiority or else a crushing, overwhelming exteriority, with no 
balancing, mediating movement in between. Through the contrast between these two 
texts, we can see how Malte tries to apply the same metaphorical principle of art as 
would the idealized artist of the Worpswede monograph, only now that metaphorical 
bridging of opposites is revealed to be exactly that: just a metaphor that cannot resolve 
the reality of Malte’s urban experience in a stable poetic form. The metaphorical 
power of art is reduced; his would-be poetry becomes merely writing, cut off from the 
chain of metaphors and substitutions that would weave his words into a vast, 
harmonious interchange. In the Aufzeichnungen, that metaphorical chain is broken, 
and the mere writing, or writing-down, traces instead the unstable contours of the 
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figure of delirium.106 
In Part II, I describe how this figure functions in the Aufzeichnungen, both in 
terms of what it makes possible and impossible. Evoking a primal metaphor of writing 
(as writing in furrows) and a primal metaphor of madness (as straying from the 
furrows),107 I show how the figure of delirium develops a stylistic and conceptual 
oscillation. Oppositions do not generate a structuring, balancing principle (as they do 
in the Worpswede monograph); rather it is the oscillation between terms that creates 
the style of the text, the unfurrowed line of writing and madness, without inside or 
outside, content or form, fantasy or reality. The delirious line of Malte’s writing is, to 
a certain extent, liberating as a possibility or gesture insofar as it frees the artist from 
the totalizing harmonization of oppositions and serves as a buffer against the horror 
and alienation of urban life, a short-term refuge from the refuse, as it were. But the 
buffering or protecting effect of delirious writing is transitory at best, and I show how 
the style of the text turns itself inside out, exposing the interiority of the writer (both 
figuratively and literally). Unlike in the Worpswede text, the Aufzeichnungen refuse to 
resolve the contradictions of perception and artistic expression through metaphor: 
rather Malte must learn to see every object and to experience every state of mind as 
such, not as a pretext for a pre-given metaphorical resolution.  
In Part III, I describe Malte’s efforts to learn to see (and to write down) reality 
as such in terms of the various delirious figures that this reality belatedly assumes in 
his writing (e.g., “das Versäumte,” “das zähe Leben” and “das Große”). I conclude in 
Part IV by showing how this delirious writing can and cannot be assimilated to Rilke’s 
later work.  
                                                
106 To the best of my knowledge, none of the vast critical literature on the Aufzeichnungen has explicitly 
emphasized the disjunction between the aesthetics of the Worpswede-ian landscape and the poetics of 
Malte’s urban crisis. 
107 See Introduction.  
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Part I: Worpswede and the Art of Metaphor 
Rilke’s monograph Worpswede, written during his stay at the art colony in 
1901-1902, focuses on five of the colony’s resident painters (Fritz Mackensen, Otto 
Modersohn, Fritz Overbeck, Hans am Ende and Heinrich Vogeler). In his hushed and 
reverential description of these painters’ work (and, through them, of the figure of the 
artist in general), Rilke unfolds a sustained reflection of the artist’s relation to nature: 
in a word, nature is that which is most radically other to humans, and the artist (whose 
qualities are loneliness, uniqueness and inwardness) is the sort of human who, 
precisely because of that radical alterity, can use nature as the means of expression of 
his most unique essence or personality. The history of art is the history of the human’s 
increasing proximity to nature and of the individual artist’s ability both to come closer 
to nature (as that which is most foreign to him) and to recede from it and see himself 
mirrored in its image. Individual works of art depict this process as a riddle in which 
self and image, inner content and outer form, stand in a constantly revealing-
concealing balance with one another.  
Rilke’s introduction to the monograph suggests that the history of landscape 
painting is the history of the human’s relation to nature as such. The point of departure 
is an impassive, threatening otherness that fills the human with an almost 
Worringerian dread and agoraphobia: 
Wer [. . .] die Geschichte der Landschaft zu schreiben hätte, befände 
sich zunächst hilflos preisgegeben dem Fremden, dem Unverwandten, 
dem Unfassbaren. [. . .] Wir pflegen, bei dem Menschen, vieles aus 
ihren Händen zu schließen und alles aus ihrem Gesicht, in welchem, 
wie auf einem Zifferblatt, die Stunden sichtbar sind, die ihre Seele 
tragen und wiegen. Die Landschaft aber steht ohne Hände da und hat 
kein Gesicht, – oder aber sie ist ganz Gesicht und wirkt durch die 
Größe und Unübersehbarkeit ihrer Züge furchtbar und niederdrückend 
auf den Menschen [. . .]. (5: 10) 
Landscape is illegible to the human; it has no hands and is thus incapable of gesture, 
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of intended action (Willensakte) and, in a strange reversal, the fact that nature has no 
hands means that we cannot grasp it. Rilke later writes dismissively of human 
“Verkehr” with nature, of its human-scaled nominalism: 
Aber immer und immer wieder in Jahrtausenden schütteln die Kräfte 
[der Natur] ihre Namen ab und erheben sich, wie ein underdrückter 
Stand gegen ihre kleinen Herren, ja nicht einmal gegen sie, – sie stehen 
einfach auf, und die Kulturen fallen von den Schultern der Erde, die 
wieder groß ist und weit und allein mit ihren Meeren, Bäumen und 
Sternen. (5: 12) 
Technical proximity to nature is, for Rilke, one-sided: man works on nature and 
assigns names to it, but nature does not give anything of itself back. It remains, to use 
two adjectives that recur again and again in this text, teilnahmslos and gleichgültig. 
Precisely in “knowing” nature in a technico-nominal way lies the human’s total 
ignorance of nature. And in failing to see the radical alterity of nature as that which is 
most foreign, unrelated and incomprehensible, technical man fails to see the specular 
quality of nature as well, hence failing to see himself. For as we have just read, Rilke 
claims that nature either has no face, or is all face (Gesicht, which also means 
“vision”); extreme lack and plenitude of face/vision amount to the same thing: a 
surface onto which human qualities can be projected or recognized, an unknown and 
unknowable object of sensation which paradoxically becomes the very means of 
human self-knowledge and its expression. 
 The process toward that knowledge and expression is, for Rilke, the task of the 
artist, a regression and conscious naiveté in which the artist learns to see as if he were 
a child again, thereby being able to connect himself to nature through artistic work, 
rather than merely working on nature in an alienated, technical way.  
Der gewöhnliche Mensch, der mit den Menschen lebt und die Natur nur 
so weit sieht, als sie sich auf ihn bezieht, wird dieses rätselhaften und 
unheimlichen Verhältnisses selten gewahr. Er sieht die Oberfläche der 
Dinge, die er und seinesgleichen seit Jahrhunderten geschaffen haben, 
und glaubt gerne, die ganze Erde nehme an ihm Teil, weil man ein Feld 
bebauen, einen Wald lichten und einen Fluß schiffbar machen kann. 
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Sein Auge, welches fast nur auf Menschen eingestellt ist, sieht die 
Natur nebenbei mit, als ein Selbstverständliches und Vorhandenes, das 
soviel als möglich ausgenutzt werden muß. Anders schon sehen Kinder 
die Natur [. . .]. (5: 13) 
The typical human’s only relation to nature is one of blindly instrumental rationality. 
Nature is self-evident, ready-to-hand, raw material. But for Rilke, self-evidence is a 
learned obliviousness, the result of a certain falling-away from nature that comes with 
growing up. As Rilke suggests above, children already see the world differently, living 
in nature “ähnlich den kleinen Tieren, ganz hingegeben an die Ereignisse des Waldes 
und des Himmels und in einem unschuldigen, scheinbaren Einklang mit ihnen“ (5: 
13). The onset of puberty throws this apparent harmony out of tune, initiating a slow 
and difficult process in which growing up amounts to growing away from nature.108 
Artists are those who, at the end of the process of maturation and alienation from 
nature, try to return to it and restore that lost harmony, those who: 
 [der Natur] nachgehen und nun versuchen, bewußt und mit 
Aufwendung eines gesammelten Willens, ihr wieder so nahe zu 
kommen wie sie ihr, ohne es recht zu wissen, in der Kindheit waren. 
Man begreift, daß diese Letzteren Künstler sind: Dichter oder Maler, 
Tondichter oder Baumeister, Einsame im Grunde, die, indem sie sich 
der Natur zuwenden, das Ewige dem Vergänglichen, das im Tiefsten 
Gesetzmäßige dem vorübergehend Begründeten vorziehen, und die, da 
sie die Natur nicht überreden können, an ihnen teilnehmen, ihre 
Aufgabe darin sehen, die Natur zu erfassen, um sich selbst irgendwo in 
ihre großen Zusammenhänge einzufügen. (5: 14) 
Nature remains in essence impassive, contingent, other, but the artist is the one who 
tries to fit himself precisely into the context or background that refuses him. What is 
crucial in this artistic theory is that the artist’s restoration of his relation to nature is a 
fiction, a fantasy, the disavowal and dangerous truth of a metaphysics of art. Rilke 
writes that art “das Medium ist, in welchem Mensch und Landschaft, Gestalt und Welt 
                                                
108 On the bioexistential discord of puberty, see Worringer’s Abstraktion und Einfühlung, in which the 
turbulent condition of the Gothic Kunstwollen is equated to the puberty of (European) humanity as 
whole. “War nicht die Gotik mit ihrer kranken Differenziertheit, mit ihren Extremen und mit ihrer 
Unruhe die Pubertätszeit des europäischen Menschen?” (158) [Was not Gothic, with its morbid 
differentiation, with its extremes and with its unrest, the age of puberty of European man?” (115)]. 
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sich begegnen und finden“ (15 emphasis added), but the mediality of that encounter is 
never to be overcome. For he continues: 
In Wirklichkeit leben sie [d.h., die Menschheit und die Natur] 
nebeneinander, kaum von einander wissend, und im Bilde, im 
Bauwerk, in der Symphonie, mit einem Worte in der Kunst, scheinen 
sie sich, wie in einer höheren prophetischen Wahrheit, 
zusammenzuschließen, aufeinander zu berufen, und es ist, als 
ergänzten sie einander zu jener vollkommenen Einheit, die das Wesen 
des Kunstwerkes ausmacht. (5: 15 emphasis added JD) 
Humanity and nature seem to join themselves as if in a higher prophetic truth, as if 
they were supplementing each other toward the perfect unity of the artwork. But as 
lofty as Rilke’s language is on this point, one cannot overlook the hypothetical, 
fictional, imaginary quality of what he says: art is not the joining of man and nature, 
but the image of that joining, the metaphorical union of the two spheres which, in 
reality, in Wirklichkeit, remain forever separate.109 Metaphor (as simile, substitution, 
comparison) becomes the ideal end of art. In the examples Rilke proceeds to 
enumerate, the face is like a landscape, the roaring of the symphony is like the rushing 
of the blood, the building is like the forest. But reality as such, nature as such, even the 
work of art as such remain forever hidden under a veil of metaphors that renders them 
intelligible and unknowable at the same time.110  
The most powerful feature of Rilke’s theory of art in the Worpswede 
monograph is the harmonious interchangeability and generativity of the metaphorical 
relation itself. In art, the human is like nature, nature is like the human, and moreover, 
                                                
109 I emphasize the same point through my reading of the last line of Rilke’s “Der Lesende” in Chapter 
1. 
110 Although Paul de Man reads only Rilke’s poetry in his discussion of Rilke in Allegories of Reading, 
he identifies precisely the same functioning of metaphor, of figural language: all of the images in the 
poetry, he argues, are subservient to the power of metaphor itself, which they ultimately depict. Rilke’s 
poetry as a whole depends, in varying degrees of explicitness, upon a pre-established totality of figural 
language which gradually strips its objects of their referentiality, their reality. The paradox of Rilke’s 
language (and, indeed, of all literary language, according to de Man) is that it forfeits its claim to the 
truth and understanding of the extra-textual, referential world precisely when it attains the total formal 
self-mastery that allows it to make such a claim. It is a version of this paradox that, I argue, also 
remains hidden in Worpswede and comes to the surface in the Aufzeichnungen. 
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the human and nature are like that very likeness. The metaphor (the “wie,” the “als 
ob,” the “scheinbar”) is the A and the B and the “=” of the equation A = B. The poetic 
relation “man is like nature” (and all its reversals and permutations) is totalizing and 
complete. The following citation shows the full extent of this similitive view of art in 
which every entity is understood as something else, but never as itself: 
Und ein Bildnis machen, heißt das nicht, einen Menschen wie eine 
Landschaft sehen, und giebt es eine Landschaft ohne Figuren, welche 
nicht ganz erfüllt ist davon, von dem zu erzählen, der sie gesehen hat? 
Wunderliche Beziehungen ergeben sich da. Manchmal sind sie in 
reichem, fruchtbaren Kontrast nebeneinandergesetzt, manchmal scheint 
der Mensch aus der Landschaft, ein andres Mal die Landschaft aus dem 
Menschen hervorzugehen, und dann wieder haben sie sich ebenbürtig 
und geschwisterlich vertragen. Die Natur scheint sich für Augenblicke 
zu nähern, indem die sogar den Städten einen Schein von Landschaft 
giebt, und mit Centauren, Seefrauen und Meergreisen aus 
Böcklinischem Blute nähert sich die Menschheit der Natur: immer aber 
kommt es auf dieses Verhältnis an, nicht zuletzt in der Dichtung, die 
gerade dann am meisten von der Seele zu sagen weiß, wenn sie 
Landschaft giebt, und die verzweifeln müßte, das Tiefste von ihm zu 
sagen, stünde der Mensch in jenem uferlosen und leeren Raume, in 
welchen ihn Goya gerne versetzt hat. (5: 15-6) 
The most marvelous relations yield themselves at the point where a face becomes a 
landscape, or a landscape gains the same expressivity as a human face. The contact 
between these two radical opposites, the human figure and the landscape, is either a 
rich and fruitful one, or is altogether dissolved in their seeming proximity. The relation 
itself is so powerful as to make even a city look like a landscape, or to fuse human 
figures with the natural world, as in the reference to Böcklin. But in spite of himself, 
Rilke gestures toward the undoing of the fullness of his vision of art, of its chain of 
meaningfulness, when he mentions poetry. Although nearly all of Rilke’s examples in 
the text focus on visual and plastic arts, poetry must also have its place along this of 
chain of metaphorical relations. Poetry knows how to say the most of this relation 
because, presumably, its essence consists of nothing but metaphors. It can say the 
most about the human soul, but it also know the deepest despair because, as the artistic 
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model of the monograph implies, there is no immediacy it can hide behind. In the 
model of poetry that emerges in Worpswede, there is no concrete seeing or hearing, 
concrete in the sense that the work and the observer grow together in a shared physical 
presence. Poetry cannot attain this co-presence, hence its metaphors are the purest, but 
also the emptiest. Poetic art would not be the joining of two opposed spheres 
(self/work, man/nature, inner world/ outer expression), but rather the metaphorical 
disavowal of their incommensurability that is both closest and farthest from the 
essence of all the arts.  
 In Worpswede we see how the artist transforms nature from something 
frightful into something fruitful (to use Rilke’s own words, the furchtbar is 
transformed into the fruchtbar). That transformation constitutes the metaphor (as 
simile, comparison, substitution) that lies at the essence of art. Rilke thus describes art 
in metaphors and as a metaphor, the joining of two opposed spheres (human/nature; 
landscape/expression; inside/outside) through their translation: seeing, perceiving or 
making one like the other, as if it were the other. I have suggested that this artistic 
joining or merging of oppositions through metaphor depends on the disavowal of its 
impossibility, that the unifying power of art is a kind of fantasy or hypothesis that 
Rilke needs without perhaps entirely being aware of it. Larson Powell has argued that 
Rilke’s poetry from the Worpswede period and into the years of the Neue Gedichte is 
characterized by an unconscious supplementation of the illusory plenitude of nature 
through poetic figuration.111 I would suggest that one need not necessarily resort to the 
vocabulary of psychoanalysis to understand this structure of disavowal. Even a classic 
study like Beda Allemann’s Zeit und Figur beim späten Rilke (1961) contains the 
                                                
111 See the chapter “Rilke’s Unnatural Things: From the End of Landscape to the Dinggedicht,” which 
makes an explicitly psychoanalytic use of disavowal (Verleugnung) to account for Rilke’s subsequent 
poetic strategy of transforming Worpswedian nature into a Thing (in the particular psychoanalytic sense 
of the term) in The Technological Unconscious in German Modernist Literature: Nature in Rilke, Benn, 
Brecht, and Döblin. Rochester: Camden House, 2008. pp. 66-96.  
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conceptual and literary-analytical equipment for deducing the unknowing striving for 
a complete poetic/metaphoric figure that I describe here. Citing a famous line from the 
Sonetten an Orpheus (“Sei—und wisse zugleich des Nicht-Seins Bedingung,” II, 13), 
Allemann writes: 
Das Wissen der Figur ist nicht möglich ohne das Wissen um des Nicht-
Seins Bedingung, welche der imaginäre, transformierte, unsichtbare 
Raum ist. Das Wissen der Figur ist die Art und Weise wie das 
Unsichtbare in die sichtbare Gestalt, der Abschied in die Begegnung 
einbezogen wird. (292) 
What in the “later” Rilke appears as the known figure, or the knowing of the figure,  
appears here at this “early” statge as the disavowal of a poetic (and existential) task 
that the poet has not yet carried to completion. This poetic metaphor defers and 
deflects the reality that the “gewusste Figur” will later transcend.  
But as we turn now to the Aufzeichnungen, we see presently how fragile and 
tentative the apparent unities and harmonies of the Worpswedian metaphor are. And 
in the hardly accidental references (from the above citation) to the city, the mutated 
human body and the Goya-esque112 void, we anticipate the delirium of the 
Aufzeichnungen. For it is precisely the monstrous images of the city, the body and the 
void that recur “as such” in this later text and show that the artistic process is not 
always generative of a totality of wunderliche Beziehungen, but rather of a 
fragmentation of self and world that, in the sheer proliferation and inassimilability of 
its objects, disfigures the very process that engenders it. 
 
Part II: Malte’s Delirium: from Versäumen to Aufschreiben 
In the first pages of the Aufzeichnungen we encounter the same naïve artist of 
the Worpswede monograph, only now uprooted from the vast northern plain and left to 
wander the streets of an urban hell that threatens him with the deadly undoing of all 
                                                
112 A reference either to Goya’s series of paintings dating from 1793-4 entitled “Fantasy and Invention” 
or to the late etchings entitled “The Disasters of War” (1810-15).   
 121 
the patterns, relations and ideas that structured the life and art of the landscape. Instead 
of trees, clouds and people all charmed before the mysterious, but benevolent Mona-
Lisa smile of nature, the artist now sees only hospitals, poor-houses, disembodied 
faces and hands (never entire people, only parts and impressions of people that cannot 
be subsumed to a whole); there is only stench, noise, sickness and death: a vast urban 
palimpsest of decay and abjection in which human beings, animals, abandoned 
buildings, garbage and pollution all mingle and rot indistinguishably in utter 
dilapidation.  Even worse, this horror is not laid out on some vast, enigmatic plain 
where the potential for some kind of harmonious poetic distancing would still obtain, 
but rather on a map (“Ich suchte auf meinen Plan” 6: 709 [“I located it on my map” 
(3)]) that gives a precise name and location for every structure, an inexorable flat 
surface without destination or exit. Growth and becoming, the vital, driving forces of 
the naïve artist,113 are replaced with death, but in a perversely active form of cancerous 
growth, the positive undoing of life. Death, in the example of Malte’s grandfather, 
makes demands, dwells, sits, and lays waste (6: 715-20); death grows in a person like 
the core of a fruit (6: 715); and even a pregnant woman, says Malte, gives birth to two 
fruits: a child and a death (6: 721). But the authentic Nordic death of Malte’s 
grandfather, as horrible and dreadful as it is, is no longer possible in the city-scape of 
turn-of-the-century Paris. The terrifying reversal of growth as growing death finds its 
most extreme expression in the anonymous, industrial death of the cities (“So, also 
hierher kommen die Leute, um zu leben, ich würde eher meinen, es stürbe sich hier” 
(6: 709) [This, then, is where people come to live; I’d have thought it more of a place 
to die” (3)]), death as a perverse function of a service economy: “Voilà votre mort, 
monsieur” (714); death as a industrial product of hospitals-turned-factories: “Jetzt 
                                                
113 “Die Ebene ist das Gefühl, an welchem wir wachsen. [. . .] In einer solchen Ebene leben jene Maler, 
von denen zu reden sein wird. Ihr danken sie, was sie geworden sind und noch viel mehr: ihrer 
Unerschöpflichkeit und Größe danken sie, daß sie immer noch werden” (5: 26-7). 
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wird in 559 Betten gestorben. Natürlich fabrikmäßig” (6: 713) [Now they die in five 
hundred and fifty-nine [beds]. It is a factory production line, of course” (6)].   
Immersed in such a cityscape, it is no surprise that Malte must first learn to 
see. In Worpswede, nature is a dictionary, and landscape is the language of all the arts. 
On this point, Rilke cites Delacroix, ‘“La nature est pour nous un dictionnaire, nous y 
cherchons des mots’” (5: 66); and he adds, “Der Künstler von heute empfängt von der 
Landschaft die Sprache für seine Geständnisse und nicht der Maler allein. Es ließe 
sich genau nachweisen, daß alle Künste jetzt aus dem Landschaftlichen leben“ (5: 68). 
To contemplate nature is already to see the words that will be used to describe it, and 
to describe the self, too, which is but nature’s mirror image. The artistic task lies in 
choosing the right combination of words that already lie in plain view. But in the 
Aufzeichnungen the problem of vision radically interposes itself between self and 
world at the outset of the artistic process. Seeing is no longer woven into a fabric of 
meaningful connection between outside and inside, but is rather a kind of garbage 
shute from the outside world that deposits “raw” visual impressions into some inner 
space, of which the poet knows very little:  
Ich lerne sehen. Ich weiß nicht, woran es liegt, es geht alles tiefer in 
mich ein und bleibt nicht an der Stelle stehen, wo es sonst immer zu 
Ende war. Ich habe ein Inneres, von dem ich nicht wußte. Alles geht 
jetzt dorthin. Ich weiß nicht, was dort geschieht. (6: 710-1) 
 
[I am learning to see. Why, I cannot say, but all things enter more 
deeply into me; nor do the impressions remain at the level where they 
used to cease. There is a place within me of which I knew nothing. 
Now all things tend that way. I do not know what happens there. (6)] 
The inside has no relation to the outside, not even one of distance and strangeness 
(which were precisely the most productive of forces in Worpswede). Seeing is now a 
one-way street and the spectator’s “inside” is a blind end. As we will see, that new 
“inside” is also a source of fear. These two factors precipitate a reshuffling of the 
concept of artistic production, of poetics. The new task, Malte’s task, must answer the 
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question: how to write given the new mode of seeing and given the fear it generates or 
uncovers? 
 In the opening scenes of the text, Malte’s thoughts quickly turn from his 
impressions of the city to writing verse. He describes in rich detail an ars poetica in 
which writing is organically linked to the writer’s personal experience and inner 
development, indeed even to the writer’s body; but there is an ironic or elegiac edge to 
the language, suggesting that he does not believe a word he’s saying: 
Man sollte warten [auf Versen] und Sinn und Süßigkeit sammeln ein 
ganzes Leben lang und ein langes womöglich, und dann, ganz zum 
Schluß, vielleicht könnte man dann zehn Zeilen schreiben, die gut sind. 
Denn Verse sind nicht, wie die Leute meinen, Gefühle (die hat man 
früh genug), – es sind Erfahrungen. [. . .] Und es genügt auch noch 
nicht, daß man Erinnerungen hat. Man muß sie vergessen können, 
wenn es viele sind, und man muß die große Geduld haben, zu warten, 
daß sie wiederkommen. Denn die Erinnerungen selbst sind es noch 
nicht. Erst wenn sie Blut werden in uns, Blick und Gebärde, namenlos 
und nicht mehr zu unterscheiden von uns selbst, erst dann kann es 
geschehen, daß in einer sehr seltenen Stunde das erste Wort eines 
Verses aufsteht in ihrer Mitte und aus ihnen ausgeht. (6: 724-5) 
 
[One should wait, and gather meaning and sweetness a whole life long, 
a long life if possible, and then, at the very end, one might perhaps be 
able to write ten good lines. For verses are not feelings, as people 
imagine – those one has early enough; they are experiences. [. . .] And 
it is not yet enough to have memories. One has to be able to forget 
them, if there are a great many, and one must have great patience, to 
wait for their return. For it is not the memories in themselves that are of 
consequence. Only when they are become the very blood within us, our 
every look and gesture, nameless and no longer distinguishable from 
our inmost self, only then, in the rarest of hours, can the first word of a 
poem arise in their midst and go out from among them. (13-4)] 
The organic model of artistic creation from Worpswede seems to be still intact: 
language, body, and experience would stand in an interrelation, a unity of ceaseless 
dynamism and productivity, and the principal virtues of the artist would still be the 
patience and naïve trust needed to return to and re-express the clarity of that unity. 
Abruptly at the beginning of the next paragraph, however, Malte writes, “Alle meine 
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Verse aber sind anders entstanden, also sind es keine. –” (725) [All of my poems, 
however, originated in a different manner, and so they are not poems. –” (14)]. This 
line crystallizes the irony of the preceding passage into a new and difficult thought: 
the artist now stands outside the creative process, not simply distanced, but radically 
divided from it. And not only is the poet cut off from the ability to write verse, but that 
inability also amounts to a deprivation of memory, experience and even the body 
itself. If writing verse requires the incorporation (literal or metaphorical) of 
experience, memory and feeling into the texture and action of the body (followed by 
the re-transformation of body into word), then the poet who cannot write such a verse 
can lay no claim to his past, his emotions, or his very body.114 It is the problem of 
being placed outside oneself, exposed (the German word “ausgesetzt” has a particular 
resonance), that Malte must now devote “his” energies.  
 In this loss of self there lies also a kind of possibility, at least initially, and the 
failure of one poetic model, in turn, makes possible a new kind of writing. 
Immediately following this reflection on his literary failure, Malte writes: 
Es ist lächerlich. Ich sitze hier in meiner kleinen Stube, ich, Brigge, der 
achtundzwanzig Jahre alt geworden ist und von dem niemand weiß. Ich 
sitze hier und bin nichts. Und dennoch, dieses Nichts fängt an zu 
denken und denkt, fünf Treppen hoch, an einem grauen Pariser 
Nachmittag diesen Gedanken. (6: 726) 
 
[It is ridiculous. Here I sit in my little room, I, Brigge, twenty-eight 
years old now and known to no one. Here I sit, and I am nothing. And 
yet, this nothing begins to think, and five flights up, on a grey Paris 
afternoon, thinks this: (14)] 
The loss of self here becomes a kind of absurd joke, suggested by the precise spatial 
and temporal coordinates of the 28-year old “nothing” that, according to some twisted 
                                                
114 On the significance of incorporation for Rilke’s poetics, see Anette Schwarz’s “The Colors of Prose: 
Rilke’s Program of Sachliches Sagen.” The Germanic Review; Summer 1996, 71, 3: 195-210. Schwarz 
shows how Rilke’s visually-inflected poetics of “sachliches Sagen” (derived not from his experience at 
Worspwede, but from his letters on Cézanne, which I discuss below) depends on a failed metaphoric of 
incorporation whereby, in Malte’s case, the body does not produce art out of what it interiorizes, but is 
rather contaminated by those interiorizations which compulsively burst forth as verbal waste.  
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Cartesian logic (nihil sum, ergo cogito) begins to think. And his thoughts take the 
form of a series of questions115 that pose the possibility of a radical misunderstanding 
of the entirety of human life and history.  
Ist es möglich, denkt es [d.h., dieses Nichts], daß man noch nichts 
Wirkliches und Wichtiges gesehen, erkannt und gesagt hat? Ist es 
möglich, daß man Jahrtausende Zeit habt hat, zu schauen, 
nachzudenken und aufzuzeichnen, und daß man die Jahrtausende hat 
vergehen lassen wie eine Schulpause, in der man sein Butterbrot ißt 
und einen Apfel? 
Ja, es ist möglich. [. . .] 
Ist es möglich, daß die ganze Weltgeschichte mißverstanden worden 
ist? [. . .] 
Ist es möglich, daß all diese Menschen eine Vergangenheit, die nie 
gewesen ist, ganz genau kennen? Ist es möglich, dass alle 
Wirklichkeiten nichts sind für sie; daß ihr Leben abläuft, mit nichts 
verknüpft, wie eine Uhr in einem leeren Zimmer –? (6: 726-7).  
 
[Is it possible, it thinks, that we have neither seen nor perceived nor 
said anything real or of any importance yet? Is it possible that we have 
had thousands of years to look, ponder and record, and that we have let 
those thousands of years pass like a break at school, when one eats a 
sandwich and an apple? 
Yes it is possible. [. . .] 
Is it possible that the entire history of the world has been 
misunderstood? [. . .] 
Is it possible that all these people have an exact knowledge of a past 
that never happened? Is it possible that all realities are nothing to them; 
that their life is winding down, connected to nothing at all, like a clock 
in an empty room –? (15-6)] 
Malte imagines a humanity as trivial, absurd and careless as he, and that image is a 
perverse consolation to him. If he has been divided from his own body and past, and if 
the rest of humanity, equally deprived, has neglected or failed to perceive what is most 
important, then someone must begin to make reparations, to set things right. Precisely 
because the task is so immense, vague and ultimately impossible, it might just as well 
be undertaken by a 28-year old Danish nothing, sitting in a 6th floor room on a gray 
                                                
115 See the discussion of these so-called “große Fragen” in Manfred Engel’s afterword to the Reclam 
edition, p. 332.  
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afternoon in Paris. 
Der Nächstbeste, der, welcher diesen beunruhigenden Gedanken gehabt 
hat, muß anfangen etwas von dem Versäumten zu tun; wenn es auch 
nur irgend einer ist, durchaus nicht der Geeignetste: es ist eben kein 
anderer da. Dieser junge, belanglose Ausländer, Brigge, wird sich fünf 
Treppen hoch hinsetzen müssen und schreiben, Tag und Nacht: ja er 
wird schreiben müssen, das wird das Ende sein.  (6: 728) 
 
[Anyone – anyone who has had these disquieting thoughts – must make 
a start on some of the things that we have omitted to do; anyone at all, 
no matter if he is not the aptest to the task: the fact is, there is no one 
else. This young foreigner of no consequence, Brigge, will have to sit 
himself down, five flights up, and write, day and night: yes, that is what 
it will come to – he will have to write. (16-7)] 
Malte is obsessed with “das Versäumte,” with all that has been omitted, neglected, 
missed, failed. But as someone who finally perceives that neglect, who is learning to 
see what everyone else has ignored or overlooked, he is entitled to write about it. He 
may not be the most qualified or appropriate person (der Geeignetste) for the task, but 
he is the only one there to do it, and so he must (“ja er wird schreiben müssen” 
emphasis added JD). 
Malte wants to make amends for das Versäumte, to redress all the failures, 
omissions and lapses of human experience. However, as we have seen, he cannot 
sustain a coherent poetic project and does not have a strategy for aesthetic redemption. 
But if he cannot restore and redeem what has been thrown away, he can at least record 
it, hence his compulsion to write, to the writing-down that becomes the terrible 
accumulation in word and feeling of what has been cast out in reality. As the 
Aufzeichnungen accumulate, Malte’s body becomes a kind of storage facility for the 
wasted life of the city (not a landscape, but a landfill), and it is only a matter of time 
before the contaminants burst forth. The writing that should protect him from the 
refuse of the human world becomes the very danger of a terrible proximity that should 
have remained at a safe distance. For example, what Malte finds most disturbing about 
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the outcast (die Fortgeworfenen) of Paris is not their abject poverty (although he 
describes them with such vehemence as if to exorcise them from his consciousness116), 
but the fact that he belongs to them: “Die sehen mich an und wissen es. Die wissen, 
daß ich eigentlich zu ihnen gehöre [. . .]” (6: 742) [“They give me one look and they 
know. They know that really I am one of them [. . .]” (26)]. What most terrifies Malte 
in the image of a demolished apartment building, with only one internal wall left 
standing, is not the uncanny, non-organic “life” of the building’s skeleton117, but rather 
that mere fact that he recognizes it:.  
[A]ber ich will einen Eid geben dafür, daß ich zu laufen begann, sobald 
ich die Mauer erkannt hatte. Denn das ist das Schreckliche, daß ich sie 
erkannt habe. Ich erkenne das alles hier, und darum geht es so ohne 
weiteres in mich ein: es ist zu Hause in mir. (6: 751) 
 
[I swear I broke into a run the moment I recognized that wall. For that 
is the terrible thing: I recognized it. I recognize everything here, and 
that is why it enters into me so readily: it is at home in me. (31)] 
Just as the outcast seem to be giving subtle signs that only he can recognize, the 
                                                
116“Denn das ist mir klar, daß das die Fortgeworfenen sind, nicht nur Bettler; nein, es sind eigentlich 
keine Bettler, man muß Unterschiede machen. Es sind Abfälle, Schalen von Menschen, die das 
Schicksal ausgespieen hat. Feucht vom Speichel des Schicksals kleben sie an einer Mauer, an einer 
Laterne, an einer Plakatsäule, oder sie rinnen langsam die Gasse herunter mit einer dunklen, 
schmutzigen Spur hinter sich her.” (6: 743) [“For it is clear to me that untouchables is what they are, not 
mere beggars; no, they really are not beggars, one must make distinctions. They are human refuse, the 
husks of men, spat out by fate, they cling to a wall, a lamp-post, a Morris column, or they dribble 
slowly down the street, leaving a dark, dirty trail behind them.” (26)] 
117 This is what he calls “das zähe Leben dieser Zimmer,” and it reminds one of the etymology of 
“leben” as slime, sludge, residue, related to the verbs “bleiben” and “kleben,” the latter of which Malte 
uses both in his description of the outcast and of this exposed apartment wall. The description is full of 
grotesque detail, intensely visual, and at the same time unvisualizable. What Malte sees is stench, he 
sees a history of malodorous, rotten, reeking residues of human excreta and cooking fumes and cigarette 
smoke as they still cling to the exposed wall: “das zähe Leben dieser Zimmer” (6: 750) The image is a 
sustained synaesthesia, the impossible seeing of a smell, a substitution of a concrete, synchronous 
image for a diachronous history of odors and fumes and stench that is so powerfully present as to be a 
hallucination. There is a sense of disgust at the life of these dilapidated objects, but, at the same time, as 
his passage on the leper from Briefe an Cézanne suggests, an urgency or necessity to record what no 
one else can or wants to see. The idea of “das zähe Leben” reappears (in the entry “Die Existenz des 
Entsetzlichen…”) as “zähe Unvergänglichkeit“ (6: 776). It is a distillate or residue of human suffering 
and fear. “Die Menschen möchten vieles davon vergessen dürgen; ihr Schlaf feilt sanft über solche 
Furchen im Gehirn, aber Träume drängen ihn ab und ziehen die Zeichnungen nach” (776) [“People 
would prefer to be able to forget much of it; sleep files away gently at the grooves in the brain, but 
dreams drive it away and chase the lines anew” (48)]. These metaphorical furrows in the brain are 
discussed further in Chapter 4.  
 128 
demolished building offers an image of life-as-residue that only he can perceive. The 
confidence of the lone 28-year-old nothing to rewrite all of human history very 
quickly becomes a paranoid hallucination. It is no accident that as he runs away from 
the exposed building, Malte is pursued by a double and overcome by agoraphobia and 
hallucinations of bodily eruption (the famous scene at the crémerie). However, just as 
the panic becomes overwhelming, a new paragraph tries to impose some distance. 
Malte switches to the present tense and describes his desk, his chair, the cheap oven 
and coal that spoil the air in his room. But his thoughts move inexorably back to the 
scene of panic: the crémerie where he sees a passing stranger, a Doppelgänger whose 
face mirrors Malte’s inner collapse:  
Ja, er wußte, daß er sich jetzt von allem entfernte: nicht nur von den 
Menschen. Ein Augenblick noch, und alles wird seinen Sinn verloren 
haben, und dieser Tisch und die Tasse und der Stuhl, an den er sich 
klammert, alles Tägliche und Nächste wird unverständlich geworden 
sein, fremd und schwer. So saß er da und wartete, bis es geschehen sein 
würde. Und wehrte sich nicht mehr. (6: 755) 
 
[Yes, he knew he was now making his withdrawal from everything: not 
only from humankind. One moment more and all of it would have lost 
its meaning, and this table and the cup and the chair he clung hold of, 
all the everyday things, the familiar things, would have become 
incomprehensible, strange to him, and difficult. And so he sat, waiting 
for it to have happened, no longer offering any resistance. (33-4)] 
The fact that Malte can sit in his room, thinking and writing, does not provide any 
sheltering distance or shape to his experience. In fact, distance and unrecognizability 
now emerge as precisely what are most terrifying in his experiences: “[D]och habe ich 
jenen Mann nur begreifen können, weil auch in mir etwas vor sich geht, das anfängt, 
mich von allem zu entfernen und abzutrennen. Wie graute mir immer, wenn ich von 
einem Sterbenden sagen hörte: er konnte schon niemanden mehr erkennen” (6: 755) 
[And yet I was only able to understand that man because something is happening 
within me as well, something that is starting to withdraw me and part me from 
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everything. How horrified I always used to be when people said that somebody dying 
could no longer recognize anyone” (34)]. The paradox of Malte’s condition of self-
exposure is that the total recognition of inner self in the outer world and the total lack 
of recognition of inner self in the outer world amount to the same delirious state. His 
fear turns itself inside out, shuttling back and forth between these two terrible 
alternatives that are nevertheless fundamentally the same condition of self-exposure, 
in which the ex-posure of the self (as vulnerability, homelessness, fragmentation, 
solitude) is just as alienating as the recognition of the self in all the broken-down 
people and broken-down buildings. To be “exposed” as one of the outcast, to be outted 
and claimed by the outcast, is as devastating an experience of non-belonging as the 
disinheritance and destitution of a friendless foreigner alone in the metropolis.118 
Malte wants to reclaim the refuse of human experience, including his own. 
Likewise, he wants to do something against the fear that he experiences, but cannot 
yet transform into verse. Although poetry has become impossible, Malte can still 
simply write: “Ich habe etwas getan gegen die Furcht. Ich habe die ganze Nacht 
gesessen und geschrieben [. . .]” (6: 721) [“I have been doing something to ward off 
fear. I have sat up all night writing [. . .]” (11)]. If he cannot restore and redeem what 
has been thrown away, cannot incorporate and transform his experience into verse, he 
can at least record the vast entropy and debris of the city and his life, hence his 
compulsion to write, to the writing-down that threatens to becomes the delirious 
accumulation in word and feeling of what has been exposed and outcast in 
reality.119As Malte sits and thinks and writes, he moves back and forth between the 
                                                
118 For an analysis of Malte’s exposure in existential terms that revises both Sokel’s notion of 
“Entichung” and Huyssen’s notion of the fragmented body, see chapter 6 of Patrick Greaney’s Untimely 
Beggars: Poverty and Power from Baudelaire to Benjamin. U. of Minnesota Press, 2008. Greaney 
argues that Rilke’s encounter with the outcast leads to a rejection of all forms of propriety and identity 
in literary language, but a rejection that is still open to a more fundamental, if undefined sense of 
community.  
119 See the Introduction for my discussion of writing-down (Aufschreiben, Aufzeichnen) in the context 
of Friedrich Kittler’s reading of Rilke (and Benn) in Discourse Networks 1800/1900. 
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present of his writing and the past of his experience. That back-and-forth movement 
(in German auf und ab) could be applied literally to Malte’s writing as an oscillation 
between aufschreiben and abschreiben, each pole of writing intensifying itself to the 
point of its own undoing and reversal into its opposite. For example, the process of 
writing down also harbors a threat to the body and the self, the threat of being written: 
Noch eine Weile kann ich das alles aufschreiben und sagen. Aber es 
wird ein Tag kommen, da meine Hand weit von mir sein wird, und 
wenn ich sie schreiben heißen werde, wird sie Worte schreiben, die ich 
nicht meine. Die Zeit der anderen Auslegung wird anbrechen, und es 
wird kein Wort auf dem anderen bleiben, und jeder Sinn wird wie 
Wolken sich auflösen und wie Wasser niedergehen. Bei aller Furcht bin 
ich schließlich doch wie einer, der vor etwas Großem steht, und ich 
erinnere mich, daß es früher oft ähnlich in mir war, eh ich zu schreiben 
begann. Aber diesmal wird ich geschrieben werden. Ich bein der 
Eindruck, der sich verwandeln wird. (6: 756, emphasis added JD) 
 
[For some time yet, I shall still be able to write all of these things down 
or say them. But a day will come when my hand will be far away from 
me, and, when I command it to write, the words it writes will be ones I 
do not intend. The time of that other interpretation will come, and not 
one word will be left upon another, and all the meanings will dissolve 
like clouds and fall like rain. Though I am full of fear, I am yet like a 
man in the presence of greatness, and I recall that I often used to have 
this sensation within me before I began to write. But this time it is I 
who shall be written. I am the impression that will be transformed. (34-
5) 
Writing-down is the constant deferral of the immediate present, the displacing of the 
daily strangeness, loneliness and ugliness of the city onto some future time when it 
will all have a meaning, a form, when it will belong to a writer who forms his 
experiences rather than just noting them down. But in this passage, the coming 
interpretation (die neue Auslegung) threatens Malte with the radical transformation of 
his self and his writing, which, although they have no unity or essence that could be 
subject to transformation in the first place, Malte clings to as if they had. The neue 
Auslegung exposes the meaning(lessness) of writing-down. We could think of it as the 
moment when Malte would actually sit down and read his notebooks, when he would 
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interrupt the perpetuum mobile of writing-down and pose the hitherto deferred 
question of what these writings mean, of what their unity or essence might be. But it is 
precisely the suppression or suspension of that question that constitutes his delirious 
writing in the first place. Should he come too close to it, he would have to turn back to 
other pole of the oscillation that structures his writing and thought, Abschreiben: 
Ich habe immer noch geglaubt, es könnte eine Hülfe kommen. Da liegt 
es vor mir in meiner eigenen Schrift, was ich gebetet habe, Abend für 
Abend. Ich habe es mir aus den Büchern, in denen ich es fand, 
abgeschrieben, damit es mir ganz nahe wäre und aus meiner Hand 
entsprungenen wie Eigenes. Und ich will es jetzt noch einmal 
schreiben, hier vor meinem Tisch knieend will ich es schreiben; denn 
so habe ich es länger, als wenn ich es lese, und jedes Wort dauert und 
hat Zeit zu verhallen. (6: 756-7, emphasis added JD) 
 
[I did still suppose that help might be to hand. There they are before 
me, in my own hand, the words I have prayed, every evening that came. 
I copied them from the books in which I found them, that they might be 
very near to me, issued from my hand as if they were my own. And I 
shall write them out once again now, kneeling here at my table I want 
to write them down; if I do this, I have them for longer than if I read 
them, and every word lasts and has time to die away. (35)] 
Abschreiben is the transcription of other texts (in this case Malte copies out a prose-
poem by Baudelaire and a passage from the book of Job), by which Malte tries to 
convince himself that “die Zeit der anderen Auslegung” has not yet come and that he 
still lives “unter den Bedeutungen [. . . die ihm] so lieb geworden sind” (6: 756) 
[“among the meanings [he] has grown so fond of” (34)]. The problem here is that the 
copied-out words have no meaning for Malte beyond the materiality of their 
transcription. During Abschreiben each word has time “zu verhallen,” to die away as a 
sound dies away, leaving no trace of its meaning behind. Abschreiben as a physical 
process supplants reading and excludes the possibility of the meaning of a literary text: 
in order to avoid reading a text and gathering a meaning out of the words on the page, 
Malte merely copies out texts word for word, as if that were the same as understanding 
them. Indeed, one theme developed later in the Aufzeichnungen is the reluctance, even 
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fear of reading.120 There is thus similar logic of protection/exposure to Abschreiben, 
again in terms of the question of meaning, and Malte can only keep that overwhelming 
question at bay by circling back toward Aufschreiben. 
 
Part III: Das Große 
 Here we might return to Malte’s theory of poetry as the literal/metaphorical 
incorporation of memory and experience and the retransformation of embodied 
experience into lines of verse: “Erst wenn sie [d.h., Erinnerungnen] Blut werden in 
uns, Blick und Gebärde, namenlos und nicht mehr zu unterscheiden von uns selbst, 
erst dann kann es geschehen, daß in einer sehr seltenen Stunde das erste Wort eines 
Verses aufsteht in ihrer Mitte und aus ihnen ausgeht” (6: 725) [“Only when they are 
become the very blood within us, our every look and gesture, nameless and no longer 
distinguishable from our inmost self, only then, in the rarest of hours, can the first 
word of a poem arise in their midst and go out from among them” (14)]. When Malte 
decided he was incapable of such writing, he brought about—or fell victim to—a split 
between his inside and the outside world, a world which he could only learn to see (a 
pure perception that would remain untouched by subjectivity), but never transform 
into poetry. The lifting of the burden of writing poetry was initially also a kind of 
creative and indeed existential liberation for the poet. It allowed new possibilities of 
thinking and writing that made a place after all for Malte in the chaos of the city and 
                                                
120 See the entry “Man tut gut, gewisse Dinge” in which Malte confesses that he has never been a proper 
reader. The reading of one single book conjures up for him the totality of all the world’s unread books 
which bear down on Malte in an “aussichtsloser Überzahl” and compel him to read all books: “Was ich 
später so oft empfunden habe, das ahnte ich damals irgendwie voraus: daß man nicht das Recht hatte, 
ein Buch aufzuschlagen, wenn man sich nicht verpflichtete, alle zu lesen. Mit jeder Zeile brach man die 
Welt an. Vor den Büchern war sie heil und vielleicht wieder ganz dahinter.“ (6: 893) If each line of a 
book is a piece of the world, then all the unread books amount to a wasting or neglect of the world: “ich 
konnte nicht begreifen, wie man es über sich brachte, so viel Welt zu versäumen” (6: 894). The problem 
of reading as both the deferral of an impossible task and the immanent experience of that impossibility 
is contained in the word “versäumen” which implies the undone-ness of doing (i.e., for Malte, all that 
remains unwritten when one writes, all that remains unread when one reads). 
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of literary history. But as the gulf widened between a blind and broken inner self, and 
an outside that threatens to obliterate that “inner” self completely (and paradoxically 
so, because there’s nothing “in there” anyway) with its terrible significance, or its 
equally terrible meaninglessness and incomprehensibility, Malte’s writing traced this 
delirious path, moving back and forth between sets of contradictions and paradoxes 
that were constantly undoing, inverting and reforming themselves.121 The scene at the 
Salpetrière hospital is the site of the literalization of the metaphor of delirium. The 
accumulated impressions, these notations and jottings, the refuse of his own life and 
body, turn on him, return to him as a monstrous force of growing-death, das Große, 
the negativity of refuse and abjection given positive 
literal/metaphorical/hallucinatory/real form as a tumor that blinds and silences, 
swarms out of his body as Malte himself is pushed out of the furrows, the double 
metaphor of delirium (a form of madness and an unform of writing) having become an 
awful fact. 
 It is not entirely clear why Malte has been referred to the Salpetrière hospital. 
Presumably he has seen a physician for panic or insomnia or any of the host of 
psychical and physical disturbances he has been enduring (and writing about) in the 
city. He writes, “Der Arzt hat mich nicht verstanden. Nichts. Es war ja auch schwer zu 
erzählen. Man wollte einen Versuch machen mit dem Elektisieren. Gut. Ich bekam 
einen Zettel: ich sollte um ein Uhr in der Salpêtrière sein. Ich war dort” (6: 758) [“The 
doctor did not understand me. Not a thing. True, it was difficult to describe. They 
                                                
121 Ulrich Fülleborn has already described this formal aspect of Rilke’s text as a 
Komplementaritätsgesetz, “ein bebendes Gleichgewichtsspiel, ein dauerndes Umschlagen” that exceeds 
any of the particular polarities or oppositions that Malte grapples with at a given moment. See his 
“Form und Sinn der Aufzeichnungen des Malte Laurids Brigge: Rilkes Prosabuch und der moderne 
Roman” Materialien zu Rainer Maria Rilke Die Aufzeichnungen des Malte Laurids Brigge. Ed. Hartmut 
Engelhardt. Frankfurt am Main: Surkamp, 1974. 175-98. 
This balancing movement of Malte’s text has as its goal “das Denken mit einer Wirklichkeit zu 
konfrontieren, für die es keinerlei Denk- und Anschauungsformen a priori gibt – mit einer absolut 
nackten Wirklichkeit” (194). I understand the notion of an absolutely naked reality as a kind of analogy 
to the Foucauldian “experience of the outside” that can only be written down and read deliriously.  
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proposed to try electrotherapy. Very well. I was given a note of my appointment: one 
o’clock at the Salpêtrière. I was there” (36)]. His language here is uncharacteristically 
straightforward, the sentences brisk and to the point, yet somehow also dwelling on 
these details as if reluctant to say anything more. As if to foreshadow the literalization 
of delirious writing, Malte’s movements through the hospital assume the same back-
and-forth style of his writing. “Ich begann auf und ab zu gehen” (6: 758) [“I started to 
pace to and fro” (36)]. Rather than take his place in the waiting room with the other 
outcast, Malte paces up and down. Catching only glimpses at each turn (a woman’s 
rotten gums, a bandaged and grotesquely swollen leg, etc), his constant motion keeps 
him from completely observing the horror around him. “Ich ging auf und ab und gab 
mir Mühe, ruhig zu sein“ (6: 760) [“I paced to and fro and tried hard to stay calm” 
(37)]. An hour passes, but he hardly notices. “Ich sah nach der Uhr; ich war eine 
Stunde auf und ab gegangen. [. . . E]s verging wieder eine Stunde. Ich kann mich nicht 
erinnern, womit ich sie verbrachte. Sie verging” (6: 760) [“I checked the clock; I had 
been pacing to and fro for an hour. [. . . A]nother hour went by. I cannot remember 
how I passed it. It went by” (37)]. After being called to consult with the doctors, he 
returns to the horrible waiting room and to his pacing: “Ich kehrte also in meinem 
Gang zurück, in dem die Luft viel lastender geworden war, und fing wieder an, hin 
und her zu gehen, obwohl ich mich todmüde fühlte” (6: 761) [“So I returned to my 
passageway, where the air was now far more oppressive, and began to pace to and fro 
again, although I felt dead tired” (38)]. When a nurse yells at him for opening the door 
to let in fresh air, he decides yet again to resume pacing: “Ich beschloß, das 
Aufundabgehen wieder aufzunehmen, weil es schließlich eine Art Betäubung war und 
niemanden kränkte“ (6: 762) [“I decided to go back to pacing to and fro, since it did 
have a calming effect, after all, and hurt no one” (38)]. As long as Malte can keep 
moving back and forth, he can keep the reality of the scene at bay. He moves back and 
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forth as if his entire body were a writing instrument, tracing furrows across the room, 
and by doing so, he tries to record the horror around him instead of actually seeing it 
(in the sense of “Ich lerne sehen”). When the nurse finally orders him to sit, he must 
give up “writing” and face the reality which he knew all along he could not avoid. Of 
his sitting down, he writes, “Ich betrachtete das alles mit Aufmerksamkeit, und es fiel 
mir ein, daß dies also der Platz sei, der für mich bestimmt gewesen war, denn ich 
glaubte nun endlich an diejenige Stelle meines Lebens gekommen zu sein, an der ich 
bleiben würde. Ja, das Schicksal geht wunderbare Wege” (6: 763) [“I observed all of 
this attentively, and it came to me that this must be the place I was destined for; this at 
last was the place in my life in which I would remain, or so I believed. Fate does 
indeed move in mysterious ways” (39)].  
 The back and forth movement of Malte’s pacing (and of his writing, of which 
the numerous references to pacing are a figuration) follows a trajectory that terminates 
in his own brain. Despite the impasse of inside/outside, of learning to see, the brain 
remains at least the physiological or literal “inside” of vision, and its metaphorical 
furrows represent both the inscription of external impressions on the surface of the 
brain and the writing-down of Malte’s Aufzeichnungen. And this brain, then, as the 
site of the impossible convergence of inside and outside, explodes. Das Große, the 
tumor that swells out of Malte’s body and wraps around his face, is the delirious, 
uncontrollable outgrowth of his own brain:  
Jetzt war es da. Jetzt wuchs es aus mir heraus wie eine Geschwulst, wie 
ein zweiter Kopf, und war ein Teil von mir, obwohl es doch gar nicht 
zu mir gehören konnte, weil es so groß war. Es war da, wie ein großes 
totes Tier, das einmal, als es noch lebte, meine Hand gewesen war, oder 
mein Arm. Und mein Blut ging durch mich und durch es, wie durch 
einen und denselben Körper. Und mein Herz mußte sich sehr 
anstrengen, um das Blut in das Große zu treiben: es war fast nicht 
genug Blut da. Und das Blut trat ungern ein in das Große und kam 
krank und schlecht zurück. Aber das Große schwoll an und wuchs mir 
vor das Gesicht wie eine warme bläuliche Beule und wuchs mir vor 
dem Mund, und über meinem letzten Auge war schon der Schatten von 
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seinem Rande. (6: 765) 
 
[Now it was there. Now it was growing from within me like a tumour, 
like a second head, and it was a part of me, though it surely could not 
be mine, since it was so big. There it was, like a big dead animal that 
had once been my hand when it was still alive, or my arm. And my 
blood was flowing through me, and through it, as if through one and 
the same body. And my heart was having to make a great effort to 
pump the blood into the big thing: there was very nearly not enough 
blood. And the blood was loth to pass in, and emerged sick and tainted. 
But the big thing swelled and grew before my face, like a warm, bluish 
boil, and grew before my mouth, and already its margins cast a shadow 
on my remaining eye. (40)] 
The paradox of das Große is that it is both deeply a part of Malte, his own flesh and 
blood as it were, and yet at the same time could not possibly be a part of his body 
because it is also somehow larger than him, and a part should not exceed the size of 
the whole. Das Große is also a return, a surfacing of something that had been there 
once before and has perhaps been lurking all along. Although it is alive, growing or 
swelling out of Malte’s body, it is at the same time dead (“wie ein großes totes Tier”), 
like a dead animal that once was Malte’s arm or hand (turning the part of the human 
body that controls writing into a speechless animal). Nevertheless his blood circulates 
through this thing that both is and is not a part of him, dead and alive, animal and 
human. Just as language circulated in Worpswede as the connective element that 
joined all oppositions, yet maintained their integrity (a paradox that was necessarily 
also the disavowal of a paradox), so does Malte’s blood circulate on either side of the 
oppositions self/other, life/death, human/animal, part/whole, only as the undeniable 
return of the disavowed paradox (“Jetzt war es wieder da”). The lack of Malte’s blood 
to nourish das Große contrasts with the sheer excess of the big thing that is absorbing 
and polluting his blood, and though it seems to have exhausted Malte, drained him of 
everything it can take, it nevertheless continues to grow and grow. Its growth, having 
already killed his hand and arm, now covers his face, rendering him just like a 
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Worpswedian landscape in its real or true aspect (“Die Landschaft steht aber ohne 
Hände da und hat kein Gesicht, - oder aber sie ist ganz Gesicht und wirkt durch die 
Größe und Unübersehbarkeit ihrer Züge furchtbar und niederdrückend auf den 
Menschen” (5: 10). Rather than seeing his mirror image in the faceless landscape, 
Malte becomes the landscape itself through a figural defacement and dismemberment 
that transform him into the terrified human observer and the immense, faceless gaze of 
the landscape that crushes against him. It is the same opposition of man and nature 
from landscape painting, only the “fruchtbar” has become “furchtbar” again: the 
distancing vision of the landscape artist becomes the engulfing proximity of das 
Große, which cannot be seen or spoken of (since it blinds and silences as it defaces), 
but rather only felt by the body to which it is ultimately and paradoxically identical. 
 In an effort to escape, Malte turns the delusion of this figural delirium (i.e. his 
oscillations “auf und ab” in the waiting room) into a literal one by rushing out and 
running deliriously up and down the streets of Paris: 
Ich kann mich nicht erinnern, wie ich durch die vielen Höfe 
hinausgekommen war. Es war Abend, und ich verirrte mich in der 
fremden Gegend und ging Boulevards mit endlosen Mauern in einer 
Richtung hinauf und, wenn dann kein Ende da war, in der 
entgegengesetzten Richtung zurück bis an irgendeinem Platz. Dort 
begann ich eine Straße zu gehen, und es kamen andere Straßen, die ich 
nie gesehen hatte, und wieder andere. Elektrische Bahnen rasten 
manchmal überhell und mit hartem, klopfendem Geläute heran und 
vorbei. Aber auf ihren Tafeln standen Namen, die ich nicht kannte. Ich 
wußte nicht, in welcher Stadt ich war und ob ich hier irgendwo eine 
Wohnung hatte und was ich tun mußte, um nicht mehr gehen zu 
müssen. (6: 765) 
 
[I cannot remember how I made my way out through the many 
courtyards. Evening had fallen and, losing my way in a neighborhood 
that was unfamiliar to me, I walked up boulevards with never-ending 
walls and, having taken one direction and found there was no end to it, 
went back the opposite way till I came to some other square or other. 
Then I started down one street, and passed others I had never seen 
before, and still more. At times trams raced towards me and passed me, 
glaringly lit, their bells hard and clanging. But the names on their 
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direction boards were names I did not know. I did not know what city I 
was in, or whether I had a dwelling-place somewhere thereabouts, or 
what I had to do so that I would not have to go on walking. (40-1)] 
The endless streets of the nameless city become (un)furrows, the tracks of a madman. 
Outside the path of reason and writing, Malte loses himself (“ich verirrte mich”) in an 
infinite proliferation of dead-ends that are somehow also endless (“wenn dann kein 
Ende da war”), where no auf und ab is possible because there are too many ways, too 
many streets (“es kamen andere Straßen, die ich nie gesehen hatte, und wieder 
andere”). The delirium of the streets is, in keeping with its etymology, illegible since 
Malte cannot read the names on the street cars that move past him (“auf ihren Tafeln 
standen Namen, die ich nicht kannte”). The way out of this labyrinth (which, in its 
networks of pathways traversed by electrical currents, is analogous to the neural 
pathways in his own brain) is paradoxically also the way in: writing. When Malte 
says, “ich wußte nicht was ich tun mußte, um nicht mehr gehen zu müssen,“ it 
becomes clear that the way to put an end to his delirious wandering (whether it is 
through an anonymous city or through his own brain, as his most concrete, material 
“interiority,” grotesquely exteriorized in this delusion) is to sit down and write down. 
The escape from the labyrinth of his own brain becomes, all over again, the entrance 
to the Salpêtrière, this time entered through writing. His literal delirium stops where 
the figural one beings, and vice versa.   
 
Part IV: The Risk of Exposure: Cézanne, Rilke and Heidegger 
This episode is exemplary of the delirious writing that, I argue, characterizes 
the entire text. It depicts the literal exposure of the writer’s interiority, a pure inside 
without an outside that becomes, paradoxically, external, even tangible, to itself. The 
experience of exposure (aussetzen) is essential to the figure of delirium that I describe 
above. To conclude this chapter, I reflect on the difference between the exposure of 
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the Aufzeichnungen (which both concludes and cancels an entire phase of Rilke’s 
development), and the sense of exposure in the poem “Ausgesetzt auf den Bergen des 
Herzens” (1914), which suggests the significance of the Aufzeichnungen for Rilke’s 
later writings. 
We have already described how Malte’s poetics of delirium begins at the point 
where he is ex-posed, put outside the artistic process. When his incorporative model of 
writing verse no longer holds, Malte is deprived of his memories, his consciousness 
and even his own body.122 But this exposure also has a productive sense in that it 
inaugurates for Malte a new mode of writing both beyond the fixed form of mere 
Verse as the expression of pure verse, that is, of turns and tropes: delirium. Delirious 
writing could be thought of as the formal undoing of form, the form that seeks to 
suspend form at least for a moment, for the sake (of a phantasm) of total seeing. The 
German “aussetzen” can also help us to designate this suspension of form. Among its 
other meanings (to expose, to abandon, to put up for display), “aussetzen” can signify 
suspension or temporary interruption. To say that delirious writing “setzt die Form 
aus” suggests a whole dialectical range of meanings: this kind of writing suspends 
form insofar as it both abandons form altogether and reveals or exposes it as such.  
 “Aussetzen” is also linked to “der Aussätzige,”  (the leper, i.e., he who has 
been cast out by society, whose skin is exposed to violent eruptions of disease), a 
figure which Malte relates to his new poetics of das Versäumte.123 This entry in the 
                                                
122 For Walter Sokel, in his essay essay “Zwischen Existenz und Weltinnenraum: Zum Prozeß der Ent-
Ichung im Malte Laurids Brigge“ (in Rilke Heute: Beziehungen und Wirkungen. Ed. Ingeborg H. 
Solbrig and Joachim W. Storck. Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1975.  pp. 105-129) this exposure 
contains the paradox that Malte ultimately overcomes: “Das ‘eigene Leben’ Maltes, das er in 
reichlichem Ausmaß hat, liegt gerade in dem, was er von den Leuten zu verbergen sucht, in seinem 
Elend, seinem Ausgesetztsein, seiner Angst. Seine Negativität ist sein Positives“ (120 emphasis added 
JD). Malte’s journey toward authenticity, toward the destruction of his inauthentic “ich” necessarily 
moves through the negative experience of exposure toward a more properly existential expression. 
123 Anette Schwarz emphasizes the connection between leprosy and Rilke’s/Malte’s poetics in her 
essay, pp. 203-4. The passage appears in section 22 of the Aufzeichnungen (“Ich versuche es, Dir zu 
schreiben…”), pp. 774-6. 
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Aufzeichnungen is in fact an almost literal transposition from Rilke’s letters to Clara 
Rilke of October 1907 (the so-called Briefe an Cézanne), and it is worth discussing 
this complex intertextual moment in some detail here.124 The original passage from the 
Rilke’s letter reads: 
Erst mußte das künstlerische Anschauen sich so weit überwunden 
haben, auch im Schrecklichen und scheinbar nur Widerwärtigem das 
Seiende zu sehen, das, mit allem anderen Seienden, gilt. Sowenig eine 
Auswahl zugelassen ist, ebensowenig ist eine Abwendung von 
irgendwelcher Existenz dem Schaffenden erlaubt [. . .]. Dies sich zu 
dem Aussätzigen-Legen und alle eigene Wärme bis zu der Herzwärme 
der Liebesnächte, mit ihm teilen: dies muß irgendwann im Dasein eines 
Künstlers gewesen sein, als Überwindung zu seiner neuen Seligkeit. (2: 
393-4) 
 
[The vision of the artist had to steel itself so far as to see in terrible and 
apparently only repulsive things the Existing which, in common with 
all other being, has value. As little as any selection is permissible to 
him, so little is it permitted to the creator to turn away from any form of 
existence whatever [. . .] This lying-down with the leper and sharing 
with him all one’s warmth, even to the heart’s warmth of love-nights – 
this must have existed at some time or other in the artist’s being as the 
tribulation attendant on his new serenity. (157)]  
The leper as “der Aussätzige“ is to be recuperated by an overcoming of conventional 
aesthetic vision (Anschauen) that no longer sees and judges the outward forms of 
objects as beautiful (or disgusting), but sees the objects of its vision as beings. A being 
as such, even if its appearance is repulsive, is valid, has value (gilt), and an artist can 
make no selections, can turn away from not a single detail of what he sees, no matter 
how difficult or unpleasant.125 This ontological seeing, which here Rilke calls the 
“laying-oneself-close-to-the-one-who-has-been-ex-posed” (i.e., the leper), redeems all 
the objects of artistic vision as beings, and redeems the artist himself as well: it is the 
                                                
124 The letters have been published separately as Briefe an Cézanne. Ed. Clara Rilke. Afterword Hans 
Weigand Petzet. Frankfurt am Main: Insel Verlag, 1952. I will cite according to Rilke’s Briefe aus den 
Jahren 1902-1921. Vol. 2. Eds. Ruth Sieber-Rilke and Carl Sieber. Leizig: Insel Verlag, 1930; and in 
English, Selected Letters of Rainer Maria Rilke 1902-1926. Trans. R. F. C. Hull. London: Macmillan & 
Co., 1947.  
125 Another important intertext for this passage (both in the Briefe and the Aufzeichnungen) is 
Baudelaire’s “Une Charogne” from the Fleurs du Mal  (1857). 
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way to a “neuen Seligkeit.” But there is clearly a gap that arises between the clarity of 
this insight and the opacity of Malte’s experiences (and their writing-down). The gap, 
which is a variation of the same gap we have already seen disavowed in the 
Worpswede monograph, foreshadows the delirium of the Aufzeichnungen in Rilke’s 
own words, and makes explicit the problem of vision for this model of delirious 
writing  
Rilke studied the paintings of Cézanne in October of 1907 (squarely in the 
middle of the six-year period during which he also worked on the Aufzeichnugen), and 
it served, like the Worpswede and Rodin monographs, as an occasion to reflect on the 
task of the artist in general through the figure of the visual artist in particular. We have 
already seen how, in the Worpswede monograph, the gap between the painter and the 
poet is resolved through the endless interchangeability of metaphor. In the Briefe, 
Rilke does not disavow the gap, but rather confronts it as such, implying the 
possibility that the writing that responds to visual imperatives will run up against some 
limit that will expose it to delirium.  
Rilke endows Cézanne’s painting with ontological depth: Cézanne does not 
merely paint objects (in his portraits, still-lifes and landscapes), rather he makes things 
which, born out of endless artistic work and sublimated love, attain a more profound 
being than the “real” objects they represent. One thinks of (Rilke’s description of) 
Cézanne’s coffee cup or his portrait of the woman in the red chair: these are not just 
things or objects, but beings (Seiendes) endowed with existence (Vorhandensein) that 
are not merely to be looked at, but rather need to be experienced and confirmed as a 
Tatsache (see 389-95). Rilke writes, “Nicht der (endlich muß ich es doch einsehen), 
der aus so privatem Gesichtspünkte Bilder begreift, ist berechtigt, über [Cézannes 
Bilder] zu schreiben; wer sie ruhig in ihrem Vorhandensein zu bestätigen wüßte, ohne 
an ihnen mehr und anderes als Tatsachen zu erleben, würde ihnen sicher am 
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gerechtesten sein” (2: 390) [“Nobody (I realize this at last) who apprehends pictures 
from such a private standpoint is justified in writing about them; only a person able to 
acknowledge them in their actuality, quietly, without experiencing them otherwise 
than as plain facts, only such a person, surely, could do them justice” (2: 155)]. The 
neutral, sober experience of things as they are and the artistic work, guided by 
patience and love, that stays relentlessly true to this experience, constitute the task of 
sachliches Sagen, which Cézanne has already realized in painting and which Rilke 
wishes to attain in writing, beginning first of all with these very letters.  
But, in the Briefe, putting this into writing presents a tension which, in contrast 
to Worpswede, Rilke is not willing to overlook. Rilke points out the difficulties 
Cézanne himself had in writing about his painting. Cézanne, via Rilke, insisted that his 
strength as a painter lay in the unconsciousness of his artistic process:  
Der Maler dürfte nicht zum Bewußtsein seiner Einsichten kommen 
(wie der Künstler überhaupt): ohne den Umweg durch seine Reflexion 
zu nehmen, müssen seine Fortschritte, ihm selber rätselhaft, so rasch in 
die Arbeit eintreten, daß er sie in dem Moment ihres Übertritts nicht zu 
erkennen vermag. (2: 401) 
 
[The painter ought not to become conscious of his knowledge (and this 
goes for the artist in general): without taking the roundabout road of his 
own reflection – each step forward, enigmatic even to himself, must 
enter so quickly into his work that he is unable to recognize its moment 
of transition. (158)] 
Artistic insights should make no detour through conscious reflection, but rather should 
manifest themselves directly in the work itself. Thus what impresses Rilke most in 
Cézanne’s painting is his ability to see simply and to paint with a clear conscience, 
unburdened by self-consciousness or the guilt of Versäumen. In a conversation with a 
friend (Mathilde Vollmoeller), who he one day invited to the Cezanne exhibition, 
Rilke reports: 
‘Hier,’ sagte sie, auf eine Stelle zeigend, ‘dieses hat er gewußt, und nun 
sagt er es (eine Stelle an einem Apfel); nebenan ist es noch frei, weil er 
das noch nicht gewußt hat. Er machte nur, was er wußte, nichts 
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anderes.’ ‘Was muß er für ein gutes Gewissen gehabt haben,’ sagte ich. 
‚O ja: glücklich war er, ganz innen irgendwo. . .’ (2: 375)  
 
[‘Here,’ she said, pointing to the spot, ‘he knew what he wanted and 
said it (part of an apple); but there it is still open, because he didn’t yet 
know. He only did what he knew, nothing else. ‘What a good 
conscience he must have had,’ I said. ‘Oh yes, he was happy 
somewhere right inside him. . . . (150)] 
On another visit, Rilke adds: 
Als ob diese Farben einem die Unentschlossenheit abnähmen ein für 
allemal. Das gute Gewissen dieser Rots, dieser Blaus, ihre einfache 
Wahrhaftigkeit erzieht einen; und stellt man sich so bereit als möglich 
unter sie, so ist es, als täten sie etwas für einen. (2: 378) 
 
[It is as if these colors took away all your indecisions for ever and ever. 
The good conscience of these reds, these blues – their simple 
truthfulness teaches you; and if you place yourself among them as 
receptively as you can they seem to be doing something for you. (151-
2)] 
Cézanne’s conscience is so clear not necessarily in moral terms (though Rilke 
consistently describes artistic work as a moral or religious duty, and indeed seems to 
experience his own idleness and indecision as something sinful or to be expiated), but 
because he has a conscience in the sense of conscientia, Mit-wissen, a kind of 
automatic co-knowing or intuition that guides his artistic process. Rilke even goes so 
far as to equate this intuition with an animal perception and way of being. In one of 
Cezanne’s self-portraits, Rilke sees “eine animalische Aufmerksamkeit [. . .], die in 
den, durch keinen Liderschlag unterbrochenen Augen eine Ausdauernde, sachliche 
Wachheit unterhält” (2: 408) [“an animal attentiveness which maintains a continuing, 
objective vigilance in the unwinking eyes” (163)]; elsewhere he imagines how 
Cézanne “sitzt im Garten wie ein alter Hund, der Hund dieser Arbeit, die ihn wieder 
ruft und ihn schlägt und hungern läßt” (2: 369) [“sits in the garden like an old dog, the 
dog of this work which calls him again and beats him and lets him go hungry” (148)]; 
and his friend Vollmoeller says, ‘“Wie ein Hund hat er davorgesessen und einfach 
geschaut, ohne alle Nervosität und Nebenabsicht’” (2: 375) [“‘Like a dog he sat in 
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front of it and simply looked, without any nervousness or irrelevant speculation” 
(150)]. In this animal perception, Cézanne remains almost impossibly close to nature, 
and his work, as pure conscience devoid of consciousness, as perception without 
recognition (erkennen), simply is his natural way of being.126  
 That Cézanne would write about his painting is a contradiction, if not an 
impossibility. But Rilke dwells on this contradiction, describing Cézanne’s attempts, 
in his personal letters to reflect on his work:  
Ein schreibender Maler, einer also, der keiner war, hat auch Cézanne 
durch seine Briefe veranlaßt, malerische Angelegenheiten antwortend 
auszusprechen; aber wie sehr ist es, wenn man die paar Briefe des 
Alten [d. h., Cézannes] sieht, bei einem unbeholfenen, ihm selber 
äußert widerwärtigen Ansatz zur Aussprache geblieben. Fast nichts 
konnte er sagen. Die Sätze, in denen er es versuchte, werden lang, 
verwickeln sich, sträuben sich, bekommen Knoten, und er läßt sie 
schließlich liegen, außer sich vor Wut. (402) 
 
[A literary painter, a painter, therefore, who was no painter at all, by 
reason of his letters once caused Cézanne to expatiate in his replies on 
matters relative to painting; but, when you see the old man’s few 
letters, you realise how absolutely jammed he was in the helpless 
beginnings, distasteful even to himself, of articulate speech! He could 
say practically nothing. The sentences in which he makes the attempt 
grow longer and longer, complicate themselves, refuse to go on, tie 
themselves up in knots, and finally he leaves them, beside himself with 
rage. (159)] 
Cézanne’s language, via Rilke, becomes complicated and knotty, bristles like an 
animal (sträuben sich), and he ends up enraged, beside himself, ex-posed, reeling in a 
delirium that results from the introduction of a verbal horizon to a purely painterly 
aesthetic.  
 Indeed, in certain passages from these letters that Rilke describes, Cézanne 
speaks explicitly to the dangers and limits of the literary in painting: “[The painter] 
                                                
126 In the terms of the eighth Duino elegy, Cézanne is a creature, more animal than human, existing in 
an immediate, unconscious proximity to nature, being, das Offene. And in terms of the Aufzeichnungen, 
where Malte proclaims, “alles ist überall, und man müßte in allem sein, um nichts zu versäumen“ (895), 
Cézanne is in everything, in everywhere. 
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must beware of the literary spirit which so often causes painting to deviate from its 
true path – the concrete study of nature – to lose itself all too long in intangible 
speculations” (19); and “Literature expresses itself by abstractions, whereas painting, 
by means of drawing and color, gives concrete shape to sensations and perceptions” 
(20).127 That literature must remain abstract and can never attain the sensory, 
perceptual Sachlichkeit of painting stands precisely in the way of the literary program 
of sachliches Sagen. But this insight is not lost on Rilke, who, in the very same series 
of letters on Cézanne, characterizes the still incomplete draft of the Aufzeichnungen as 
the very illustration of this paradox:  
Und mit einem Mal (und zum ersten) begreife ich das Schicksal des 
Malte Laurids. Ist es nicht das, daß diese Prüfung ihn überstieg, daß er 
sie am Wirklichen nicht bestand, obwohl er in der Idee von ihrer 
Notwendigkeit überzeugt war, so sehr, daß er sie so lange instinktiv 
aufsuchte, bis sie sich an ihn hängte und ihn nicht mehr verließ? Das 
Buch von Malte Laurids, wenn es einmal geschrieben sein wird, wird 
nichts als das Buch dieser Einsicht sein, erwiesen an einem, für den sie 
zu ungeheuer war. Vielleicht bestand er ja auch: denn er schrieb den 
Tod des Kammerherrn; aber wie ein Raskolnikov blieb er, von seiner 
Tat aufgebraucht, zurück, nicht weiterhandelnd im Moment, wo das 
Handeln erst beginnen mußte, so daß die neue errunge Freiheit sich 
gegen ihn wandte und ihn, den Wehrlosen, zerriß. (2: 394-5) 
 
[And all at once (and for the first time) I understand the fate of Malte. 
Is it not that this ordeal was too much for him, that he could not pass it 
in reality although he was convinced ideally of its necessity, so much 
so that he instinctively sought it and sought it until it clung to him and 
no longer left him? The book of Malte, once it is written, will be 
nothing but the book of this knowledge, exemplified in one for whom it 
was too tremendous. Possibly he did triumph after all: for he wrote the 
death of the Chamberlain; but, like a Raskolnikov, he remained behind, 
consumed by his deed, ceasing to act at the very moment when action 
had to begin, so that his newly acquired freedom turned against him 
and destroyed him, the weaponless. (157-8)] 
The test that Malte fails, the Seligkeit that he does not attain, is defined as: “das 
einfache Leben einer Liebe, die bestanden hat, die ohne sich dessen zu rühmen, zu 
                                                
127 From Theories of Modern Art: A Source Book by Artists and Critics, ed Herschel Chipp. UCLA 
Press, 1969.  
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allem tritt, unbegleitet, unauffällig, wortlos“ (394). It is not clear to what extent Rilke 
is aware that this failure is a verbal-visual impasse, for how could Malte, a poet, seek 
out and approach reality in a way that is so neutral and self-effacing as to be wortlos? 
In any case, Rilke’s insight into his work-in-progress, the Aufzeichnugnen, is that its 
protagonist is not capable of the sachliches Sagen described in the letters, and the 
book, if it is to be completed, will have to be the inscription of precisely that failure.  
 Yet the Aufzeichnungen also predict an new mode a writing (die andere 
Auslegung) when Malte’s suffering—and the suffering he registers in the outcast and 
as “das zähe Leben”—will in turn be redeemed: “Oh, es fehlt nur ein kleines, und ich 
könnte das alles begreifen und gutheißen. Nur ein Schritt, und mein tiefes Elend würde 
Seligkeit sein.” (6: 756). Since Malte’s suffering (and his inscription of that suffering 
into his text) consists in his exposure, we can follow the word itself into one of Rilke’s 
later poems to see perhaps the beginning of that “andere Auslegung.” The poem, 
untitled, from September 1914, reads as follows: 
Ausgesetzt auf den Bergen des Herzens. Siehe, wie klein dort, 
siehe: die letzte Ortschaft der Worte, und höher, 
aber wie klein auch, noch ein letztes 
Gehöft von Gefühl. Erkennst du’s? 
Ausgesetzt auf den Bergen des Herzens. Steingrund 
unter den Händen. Hier blüht wohl 
einiges auf; aus stummen Absturz 
blüht ein unwissendes Kraut singend hervor. 
Aber der Wissende? Ach, der zu wissen begann 
und schweigt nun, ausgesetzt auf den Bergen des Herzens. 
Da geht wohl, heilen Bewußtseins, 
manches umher, manches gesicherte Bergtier,  
wechselt und weilt.Und der große geborgene Vogel 
kreist um der Gipfel reine Verweigerung. – Aber 
ungeborgen, hier auf den Bergen des Herzens . . . . 
 
[Exposed on the heart’s mountains. Look, how small there! 
look, the last hamlet of words, and, higher,  
(but still how small!) yet one remaining 
farmhouse of feeling: d’you see it? 
Exposed on the heart’s mountains. Virgin rock 
under the hands. Though even here 
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something blooms: from the dumb precipice 
an unknowing plant blooms singing into the air.  
But what of the knower? Ah, he began to know 
and holds his peace, exposed on the heart’s mountains.  
While, with undivided mind, 
many, maybe, many well-assured mountain beasts, 
pass there and pause. And the mighty sheltered bird 
circles the summits’ pure refusal. – But oh, 
no longer sheltered, here on the heart’s mountains. . .]128  
Is there some fundamental difference between the exposure of these two texts? What 
has Rilke learned by 1914 that he didn’t know in 1910, when he published the 
Aufzeichnungen?129 In this poem, one sees the result of a certain transcending or 
renouncing of language, expression and creativity. The poet has abandoned both the 
Worpswedian landscape and the cityscape for a kind of inward, absolute landscape: 
the mountains of the heart, inhabited by words, feelings, and animals, where the 
human (der Wissende) is exposed, neither here (where the animals linger, in their 
blissfully full and pure consciousness), nor there (where words and emotions reach 
their final limit). The poem is neither a lament at the foreclosure of human feeling and 
expression nor a joyous approximation to the fullness of animal being. The poet rather 
seems to be waiting, standing still, between these two worlds, accepting “the pure 
refusal of the peaks” and his unshelteredness, or, if not accepting, then, more 
ambiguously, remaining silent (“Aber der Wissende? Ach, der zu wissen begann / und 
schweigt nun, ausgesetzt auf den Bergen des Herzens”). The trailing-off of the final 
lines (“Aber / ungeborgen, hier auf den Bergen des Herzens. . . .”) speaks the 
suggestive non-speech of silence, an utterance itself neither here nor there, neither 
                                                
128 Rainer Maria Rilke. Selected Works. Volume II, Poetry. Trans. J. B. Leishman. London: Hogarth 
Press, 1976, pp. 313-4. 
129 Insofar as all Rilke’s poetry tends toward the poetry of the “late Rilke,” I follow Beda Allemann here 
in noting that in 1914 Rilke also writes the poem “Es winkt zu Fühlung fast aus allen Dingen” in which 
he first uses the term “Weltinnenraum” to refer to the transcendence of inside and outside. And in 1913 
Rilke writes of the “Erlebnis” in which he encounters “die andere Seite der Natur,” a poetic precursor to 
Weltinnenraum. Rilke’s reading of Hölderlin (see the poem “An Hölderlin” also written in 1914) must 
play a role as well in Rilke’s shift away from or beyond the delirium of the Aufzeichnungen, particularly 
in their constant reversal of interiority and exteriority and temporal suspension. 
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saying nor not saying. However that silence is to be interpreted, it is a fundamentally 
different gesture or position than the one found in the Aufzeichnungen, where exposure 
had to be met not with silence or renunciation, but with as much (written) language as 
possible. Malte’s being-neither-here-nor-there leads him into a delirium of writing, in 
which he tries to restore himself, through writing, to the inside, to being once again at 
home in his body, in his past, in the city, in the world. But the words he writes assume 
the very profusion and excess of the visual impressions and thoughts that drove him 
outside, out of the furrows, in the first place. Malte’s being-neither-here-nor-there is 
therefore a delirious oscillation, the involuntary undoing and redoing of self through 
language. The being-neither-here-nor-there of this later poem, however, suggests a 
conscious choice, some kind of willed resolution or resignation simply to stand 
between the two extremes where Malte could not keep still.  
 Martin Heidegger’s 1946 text on Rilke, “Wozu Dichter?” may illuminate 
precisely this distinction.130 Weighing Rilke against Hölderlin on the scales of the 
titular poeto-ontological question, Heidegger shows how Rilke’s poetry risks itself in 
an experience of radical exposure (Ungeschutzsein) that would reach down into the 
modern abyss of godlessness and ontological oblivion and trace a human path back to 
Being. Heidegger shows how the word “risk” (Wagnis) is linked etymologically to 
“scale” (die Wage), hence also to the back-and-forth movement (bewegen) of the 
objects on the scale. But that which is at risk—weighed, exposed to a back-and-forth 
movement, the outcome or resolution of which is as yet unknown—that which is 
risked and exposed in this way is ultimately also protected and secured. “Damit ist das 
                                                
130 Though the language of poetry was the art form that Heidgger valorized most, Otto Pöggeler has 
traced some of the connections between modern painting and Heidegger’s later thought, particularly 
between Van Gogh, Cézanne and the Worpswede colony. It seems that Heiddegger’s late reflections on 
Cézanne (which even include a poem entitled “Cézanne”) were greatly influenced through his reading 
of Rilke’s letters on the painter. However, Heidegger’s interest in Worpswede had less to do with the 
poet’s monograph than with the most famous painter that Rilke neglected (versäumt) to mention there, 
namely Paula Modersohn-Becker. See Pöggeler, Bild und Technik: Heidegger, Klee und die moderne 
Kunst. Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2002, especially pp. 159-94.  
 149 
Gewagte zwar ungeschützt, aber, weil es auf der Wage liegt, ist es vom Wagnis 
einbehalten. Es ist getragen. Es bleibt von seinem Grund her in diesem geborgen. [. . .] 
Das Ungeschützsein des Gewagten schließt ein Sichersein in seinem Grunde nicht nur 
nicht aus, sondern notwendig ein” (281) [“Thereby what is risked is indeed 
unsheltered, but since it lies on the balance, it is retained by the risk. It is sustained. It 
continues to be saved by its ground in its ground. [. . .] What is risked is unsheltered; 
but not only does this not exlude a safebeing in its ground, it necessarily implies it” 
(210)].131 To be truly at risk is to be already always guaranteed by the risk itself, 
which carries and sustains what is exposed to risk, protects the “Schutzlos” from 
annihilation (Vernichtung). Outside the risk of being at risk, of being weighed and 
subjected to an oscillation without certainty, there is the still greater danger of 
annihilation. For Heidegger, the power of Rilke’s poetry lies in its exposing itself to a  
risk, willing a risk, that is at the same time the protection from annihilation.132  
The poem of Rilke’s that informs Heidegger’s etymological understanding of 
risk and gives him the necessary Grundworte for his questioning of Rilke’s poetry is 
an untitled poem (first line “Wie die Natur die Wesen überläßt”) dating from 1924. 
Rilke calls it an improvised verse and notes in a letter to Clara Rilke that he inscribed 
it in an edition of the Aufzeichnungen that he was giving to a friend (276). It is 
certainly no accident that Rilke wanted to inscribe precisely such a poem (on the 
sheltering powers of risk and of the ultimate affirmation of an exposed life) in the 
opening pages of the Aufzeichnungen, where the risk is precisely not guaranteed, 
where the oscillation knows no center, rather only a delirious turning-itself-inside-out. 
It is as if Rilke’s belated epigraph should redeem what was versäumt in the 
                                                
131 Heidegger, Holzwege. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1951; Off the Beaten Track. Ed. 
and Trans. Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.  
132 There is a similar logic to the distinction between “problem” and “aporia” in the passages I cite from 
Derrida’s Aporias in the Introduction.  
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Aufzeichnungen.   
Before the sheltering exposure of the silence of “Ausgesetzt auf den Bergen 
des Herzens,” Rilke depicts a different “exposure” in the Aufzeichnungen: Malte is 
both deprived of his body by an endlessly proliferating language that he cannot control 
(i.e., the verses that he cannot write), and also deprived of language by the 
monstrously proliferating outgrowth and fragmentation of a body (i.e., das Große) that 
is equally out of his control. Delirious writing, I suggest, could be thought as the 
language of that deprivation, the verbal expression that tries and fails to reverse the 
entropy of a neglected world (das Versäumte). Malte is thus engaged in the permanent 
task of learning to see and writing-down that ceaselessly avoids the form that would 
pin it down, localize it (as on a map, in an apartment building, in a clinic) and kill it, in 
which case the writing would be versäumt, left unfinished alongside the entropic mass 
of human experience that has never been seen and written down as it needed to be 
written down.  
Rönne—the protagonist of Benn’s 1914 story “Gehirne,” which I discuss in the 
next chapter—shows a similar preoccupation with “das Versäumte” – with what has 
gone unnoticed, disappeared, with what had once belonged to a person, time or place 
and has now faded without a trace. There is a vast imperative in both texts (Malte and 
“Gehirne”) to write down and record a certain fragility or preciousness of experience 
that would be crushed by any particular form, but that deserves or needs some kind of 
expression nevertheless. That imperative is also, I argue, issued primarily in visual 
terms, presupposing that the fundamental impasse that these two writers face (and, 
mutatis mutandis, Worringer faces as well) lies between a model of vision and a 
corresponding style of writing. We will see how Benn’s response is stylistically closer 
to Malte’s “other interpretation,” how Benn approaches the realization of what Malte 
may have meant when he wrote: “es wird kein Wort auf dem anderen bleiben, und 
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jeder Sinn wird wie Wolken sich auflösen und wie Wasser niedergehen” (6: 756) [“not 
one word will be left upon another, and all the meanings will dissolve like clouds and 





FORM ON THE BRAIN: HAPTIC VISION AND DELIRIOUS WRITING IN 
BENN’S “GEHIRNE” 
 
Was ist es denn mit den Gehirnen? 
—Benn, “Gehirne” 
Benn wrote the short prose piece “Gehirne” in the summer of 1914 while 
stationed as a military physician in occupied Belgium.133 It was published one year 
later in the expressionist journal Die weißen Blätter, and again in 1916 as the title text 
in a collection five of Benn’s Rönne “Novellen.” Peter Hohendahl situates this text 
within the Expressionist canon, but also shows the limitations of such a periodizing 
approach.134 Rather than explaining the significance of this text for this movement, 
which to my mind amounts to a kind of explaining-away, I try read it closely and 
interpret it on its own terms, even if those terms are a certain kind 
incomprehensibility, literalness or lack of hermeneutic depth. Three ideas emerge out 
of this reading: a theory of haptic vision,  an elaboration of delirious writing, and the 
problem of reading a text that does not so much perform its unreadability, as it simply 
and inexorable states it. 
Delirious writing, defined in the previous chapter as the textual manifestation 
of a failed resolution of interiority vs. exteriority or experience vs. expression, appears 
again in Benn’s text. In Rilke’s case, the failure is the culmination of years of study 
                                                
133 For an account of Benn’s activities while stationed in occupied Belgium (which weaves in analysis 
of Benn’s literary and autobiographical writing from and/or about this period), see pp. 239-71 in Hubert 
Roland’s Die deutsche literarische “Kriegskolonie” in Belgien, 1914-1918. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte 
der deutsch-belgischen Literaturbeziehungen 1900-1920. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Verlag, 1999. 
134 Simply applying the word “Expressionist” to a text and pointing out its subversion of traditional 
categories of narrative realism still raises question, for Hohendahl, about the nature of modernism vs. 
the avant-garde and the relation of the aesthetic to the political. In a similar way, I wish to conceive the 
difficulties of reading this text as a point of departure, not a conclusion. See “The Loss of Reality: 
Gottfried Benn’s Early Prose” in Modernity and the Text: Revisions of German Modernism. Ed. 
Bathrick / Huyssen. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989.  
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and work in poetry and on the visual arts; in Benn’s case, I argue that this “failure” 
serves as a starting point. Benn, in his Morgue poems (1912), had already begun his 
literary career with a kind of eulogy for realist/naturalist representation and for verses 
(in Malte’s initial sense of the word); he sought thereafter for a kind of pure or abstract 
form of poetic expression that would neither refer to the reality of the external, 
empirical world, nor express the inner world or authentic existence of an ich. His 
delirium, then, is the search for the abstract, poetic word, whose radical aesthetic 
power is not susceptible to ich-bound intentionality, nor can it be captured in concrete, 
textual form. Nevertheless, this word needs an ich and a form to speak through, 
however fleetingly. Benn’s delirium, having given up the ich that Malte, however 
ambiguously, still holds on to, moves further toward the expression of the force of 
exteriority that is not entirely outside expression, but rather the outside of expression. 
I regard Benn primarily as a poet, hence my emphasis on the problem of poetic 
expression. But I do not mean to overlook his later prose works, essays and 
autobiographical writing. Benn himself effaces the distinction between poetry and 
critical writing in his speech “Probleme der Lyrik,” and I likewise presume that 
Benn’s prose is always poetic and that his poetry always expresses the critical 
“absoluteness” that he aspires to in his prose writing. “Gehirne” already anticipates 
both: the incomprehensibility and autonomy of the sentence that characterizes a later 
text like Roman des Phänotyp (1944) and the montage of words that we have already 
seen in “Staatsbibliothek.” 
As a point of departure for my reading of Benn’s “Gehirne,” I want to cite a 
particularly enigmatic passage from De Man’s chapter on Rilke in Allegories of 
Reading (1979). On the possibility of a poetics of pure “figure,” he writes: 
The figure stripped of any seduction besides that of its rhetorical 
elasticity can form, together with other figures, constellations of figures 
that are inaccessible to meaning and to the senses, located far beyond 
any concern for life or for death in the hollow space of an unreal sky. 
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(48) 
Exploiting the ambiguity of “figure” (both as rhetorical trope and visual shape), I want 
to ask what a language of figures without meaning or sensuousness would be, beyond 
life and human concern, and I want to ask whether Benn gives us such a language. 
This entails a kind of haptic reading in which the reader must literally hang on the 
writer’s every word. 
 
Part I: “Brains” and Hands 
In the poem “Satzbau” (1950), Benn develops the concept of primal positing as 
the basis of poetic creation. Eschewing the traditional thematics of lyric poetry (for 
him, Himmel, Liebe und Grab), he writes, “Was aber neu ist, ist die Frage nach dem 
Satzbau / und die ist dringend: / Warum drücken wir etwas aus?”135 One possible 
answer to the question of Satzbau, of building sentences, of syntax (which overlaps 
with the question of expression in general) is: “ein Antrieb in der Hand, / 
ferngesteuert, eine Gehirnlage.” Poetic creation seems to be a physical and 
physiological act for Benn, it is always writing, an act comprised of the motorized 
gesture of the hand in conjunction with a particular brain state. The “moods” or 
“feelings” that we might imagine Benn experienced while writing poetry are thus 
refused any elevation to the ethereal or transcendental. Such “feelings” are reduced to 
a particular, indeed, random concatenation of neurochemicals and synaptic rhythms in 
the brain, indeed a brain with a particular genealogy. According to Benn’s theory of 
the “Zeitalter der Genealogie,” (from the autobiographical Doppelleben of 1949) we 
see how the late 19th century organic, positivist models that shape the natural sciences 
and the understanding of culture and history are turned inward for Benn: the whole 
system of “anthropometrischen Messungen [. . .] ist [. . .] eine seelische Welt 
                                                
135 I: 238.  
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geworden, tief erregend und das Innere gestaltend.”136  If the structures of knowledge 
of the outside world are turned inward, then the brain becomes a kind of de-
mythicized origin of self, personality, creativity, but an origin that also radically calls 
into question the concepts of self, personality, and creativity. Helmut Lethen has 
argued that Benn’s Rönne-persona reflects not only his deep immersion in 19th century 
positivist thought, particularly in the context of Hirnforschung, but also his inability to 
reconcile himself to the fundamental presuppositions of that scientific world-view, 
namely the total fragmentation of the self.137 Rönne’s scientific background thus 
initiates a nervous break-down that, in his case, needs to be resolved aesthetically. In 
Lethen’s view, Rönne does not attain that aesthetic resolution, hence his constant 
oscillation between psychic disintegration and attempts to fulfill the very social and 
professional role (that of physician) that engenders that disintegration. Unlike Rönne’s 
colleagues, Rönne cannot function socially not because he questions the scientific 
world-view of his colleagues, but because he adheres to it to closely: 
[Benn] zeigt die Rituale und den begrenzten Handlungsraum der Ärzte 
und erschließt mit Rönne vorbewusste Regionen der Seele. Er setzt die 
Figur des Außenseiters auf die schiefe Ebene seines Textes, auf der 
sich alle Kollegen halten können und nur Rönne abgleitet, über den 
Rand kippt, in Trance versinkt, in der er nicht mehr Herr seiner selbst 
ist, sondern Spielball willkürlicher ‘Wallungen.’ (73) 
The “Wallungen” that Lethen refers to here suggest the famous “Wallungswert” of the 
poetic word that Benn refers to in “Epilog und lyrisches Ich.” It is the aesthetic 
alternative to the age of genealogy that seeks to understand the soul in terms of brain 
physiology. Creativity itself would be a fleeting, sporadic necessity, somewhere 
between biology and logos, endowed with metaphysical force and always on the edge 
of trance, vertigo, delirium.138 
                                                
136 IV: 154. 
137 See chapters 2 (“Der böse Rönne“) and 3 (“Schulen der Wahrnehmung”) of Helmut Lethen’s recent 
biography of Benn, Der Sound der Väter. Rowohlt: Berlin, 2006.  
138 Lethen suggests that Benn’s attempts to heal aesthetically the disintegration of his personality are 
more successful in poetry than in prose: “Wenn Rönne mit seiner Flucht aus der ‘Hirnkultur’ einen 
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But Gottfried Benn’s early prose piece “Gehirne” is saturated primarily not 
with the images of brains, but rather with the images of hands. The brains named in 
the title only appear in the last paragraph of the text, whereas we see the word “hands” 
at least once on every page. In trying to get a handle on this difficult, experimental 
text, to get a grip on it, that is, to read it closely, we might begin our reading with the 
question “What is it then with hands?” before we can answer the question raised in the 
epigraph, though a few preliminary answers are already ready-to-hand. Hands touch 
what is tangible, concrete, graspable. In German, “to grasp” is only one degree of 
abstraction, one monosyllabic prefix away from “to conceive”: greifen, begreifen. The 
grasp of a hand isolates an object from its context, pulls it away from its background, 
ab-stracts it quite literally, thus turning a thing into a concept. Hands are the 
intersection of the concrete and the abstract, where the ground of the lofty realm of 
concepts is to be grasped materially, where the material and the physical are to be 
conceived abstractly. In German, hands also handle (handeln); they act, make, 
practice, they are the means by which the thinking ich takes hold of the outside word. 
In a theory of haptic vision, hands are even organs of sight, the originary ground on 
which perception and space are organized, the true vision for which optic or ocular 
vision is but a substitute. The hand is also the source of behandeln, treatment in the 
medical sense. The physician treats the sick by a laying-on of hands—the diagnosis 
and treatment of symptoms consist of their readability and tangibility by medical 
instruments that are, in the last or most literal analysis, extensions of the human hand. 
Finally, the hand also writes, the hand holds the stylus, it is the source or motor of 
style in a literal sense. In Benn’s short text, the image of hands draws together this 
array of associations (the relation between the abstract-conceptual and the concrete-
                                                                                                                                       
Ausweg gefunden hat, wieso hat Benn sie ihn dann endlos wiederholen lassen? Trotz der scheinbar 
gelungenen ‘Entformung,’ bleibt der Satisfaktionstyp [hier typisch wilhelminisch gebildeter Mitglieder 
des Mittelstandes] an Rönne haften. Dieses Band kann Benn nur in der Lyrik durchschneiden” (49). 
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tangible; the relation between the inner self and outer world; the structuring of the 
visual world; and the production of style, of writing) to help reveal the connections 
between close reading, haptic vision, and delirious writing.   
In the first paragraph we meet the protagonist Rönne, a young physician, who, 
before his transfer to the rural hospital where he serves as acting director and where 
the “story” of Gehirne is set, had performed autopsies for two years at a pathological 
institute:  
[E]r war zwei Jahre lang an einem pathologischen Institut angestellt 
gewesen, das bedeutet, es waren ungefähr zweitausend Leichen ohne 
Besinnen durch seine Hände gegangen, und das hatte ihn in einer 
merkwürdigen und ungeklärten Weise erschöpft. (III: 29) 
Over two thousand corpses had passed without reflection through Rönne’s hands 
during this time, and this had exhausted him in a curious and inexplicable way. The 
narrator mentions only hands and corpses in this passage, adding the phrase “ohne 
Besinnen” as if to emphasize, needlessly, that neither hands nor corpses are capable of 
reflection. The phrase “das bedeutet” introduces a flicker of possibility for a higher 
level of meaning, a conclusion or induction, a movement from the external facts of 
Rönne’s life to their inward significance for his character or psychology. But this is 
merely a feint; the sentence remains at this blankly literal level, registering only a 
statistical number of bodies, the disembodied hands, and the curious exhaustion that 
cannot exactly be attributed to a person.  
This impersonality or depersonalization continues into the second paragraph, 
which shatters to pieces the “person” of grammatical voice: 
Jetzt saß er auf einem Eckplatz und sah in die Fahrt: es geht also durch 
Weinland, besprach er sich, ziemlich flaches, vorbei an 
Scharlachfeldern, die rauchen von Mohn. Es ist nicht allzu heiß; ein 
Blau flutet durch den Himmel, feucht und aufgeweht von Ufern; an 
Rosen ist jedes Haus gelehnt, und manches ganz versunken. Ich will 
mir ein Buch kaufen und einen Stift; ich will mir jetzt möglichst vieles 
aufschreiben, damit nicht alles so herunterfließt. So viele Jahre lebte 
ich, und alles ist versunken. Als ich anfing, blieb es bei mir? Ich weiß 
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es nicht mehr. (III, 29) 
First we have a third-person narrator who describes Rönne, the protagonist, from the 
outside. (“Jetzt saß er auf einem Eckplatz und sah in die Fahrt”). Then the narrator 
begins reporting Rönne’s thoughts indirectly (“besprach er sich”), and presenting them 
in a kind of free, indirect style, indicating a shift inwards either to a third-person 
focalized voice, or else an inner monologue: “es geht also durch Weinland, besprach 
er sich, ziemlich flaches, vorbei an Scharlachfeldern, die rauchen von Mohn.” We 
notice the inversion (metalepsis) of the sensation of the poppies – the line “should” 
read as Wolfgang Emmerich has pointed out: scarlet-colored poppy fields (48).139 The 
smell of poppy here is an impossible sensation, prefiguring the collapse of inside and 
outside as structuring principles of perception and personality. Rönne probably could 
not distinguish the smell of these scarlet fields from a passing train. He associates the 
smell of poppy with the color of the flowers he sees, and thus hallucinates the 
fragrance of poppies within the train compartment. In the afterword to the Reclam 
edition of Gehirne, Jürgen Fackert suggests that Benn translates (through the stylistic 
device of erlebte Rede) an impressionistic model of visuality common to paintings of 
Monet and Renoir.140 But I would argue that Benn takes the impressionistic model one 
step further: rather than using literary language to “paint” the fleeting, subjective 
impression of a landscape, Benn shows how literary language most radically calls the 
subjectivity of that impression into question. Rönne’s impression of this landscape 
penetrates inwards from the outside, at the same emanating outwards from the inside: 
it is thus a composite of memory, fantasy, hallucination and perception that Rönne 
sometimes experiences as his own, sometimes as belonging to someone or something 
else. As a disintegration of the moments of synthetic perception, this is more in line 
with a Deleuzian logic of sensation than a mere visual impressionism.  The visual 
                                                
139 See Wolfgang Emmerich, Gottfried Benn. Reinbeck: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 2006.  
140 See p. 56 in Gehirne. Ed. Jürgen Fackert. Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1974. 
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Figure of a Bacon painting is represented here through the literary figure of Rönne, an 
“ich” whose distortion by “invisible forces” happens by means of verbal images. The 
images that fill or pass through Rönne’s consciousness are sometimes filled with an 
overwhelming poetic intensity (“ein Blau flutet durch den Himmel, feucht und 
aufgeweht von Ufern”), sometimes the dullest everyday banality (“es ist nicht allzu 
heiß), sometimes utter sterility (“so viele Jahre lebte ich, und alles ist versunken”). But 
in any case, they disrupt the unity of his self in much the same way that the bodies of 
Bacon’s figures are disrupted. If there are “painterly” moments in this short text, they 
would be the montage of neologisms at the end of the text (see below), in which 
syntax dissolves into the juxtaposition of words, invented words that are pictorial or 
painterly both as signifiers (a never-before-uttered-or-read word has an immediate, 
material impact as a sound and as a pattern of letters on a page), and as signified (in 
terms of rich, impossibly contradictory range of associations they words bring with 
them—their Wallungswert.) The reading of these montage sequences is a kind of 
haptic reading in which the eye clings to the defamiliarized printed word.  
As we read further, we can no longer be certain if this is the narrator’s voice or 
Rönne’s narrated monologue: “Es ist nicht allzu heiß; ein Blau flutet durch den 
Himmel, feucht und aufgeweht von Ufern.” The abrupt shift in tone (an everyday 
comment on the weather juxtaposed to a poetic image of blue flooding the sky, blown 
up from the banks) only increases our uncertainty. Finally, we encounter perhaps the 
most violent shift of all into the first person (“Ich will mir ein Buch kaufen und einen 
Stift; ich will mir jetzt möglichst vieles aufschreiben, damit nicht alles so 
herunterfließt”), which completes the “progression” of the passage, bringing the 
relation of narrator to protagonist from the greatest possible distance (third-person 
external) to the closest proximity (first-person internal). But the movement inwards 
toward a presumed inner “depth” is only illusory. It is in fact a movement towards an 
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inner flatness that reflects the outside (“ziemlich flaches”)—Rönne’s inside is as flat, 
crooked and sunken as the landscape and houses he glimpses from the train. This ich 
has no internal coherence: the interior is constantly penetrated by the exterior or else 
the exterior is perceived only according to the figures that shape Rönne’s self-image. 
Images of sunkenness and receding flux are to be found on either side of the 
inside/outside border, and so the narrative move “inwards” to the first person does not 
necessarily bring the reader any closer to the subject of this writing. 
Another way to formulate this problem would be to distinguish linguistically 
between two kinds of subjects: the subject of the enunciation and the subject of the 
statement. In this paragraph and throughout the text, there is a disassociation of these 
two subjects. The subject of the statement remains Rönne throughout, i.e. the 
“content” of what is said refers predominantly to him or emanates from his brain. The 
text is “about” him insofar as he is the subject of the statements that compose the text. 
However, the subject of the enunciation, i.e. the voice that “speaks” the statements in 
the text, is constantly shifting perspective. The “ich” might as well be an “er” or even 
a “du”. This is a significant narrative innovation at the level of the statement because 
the reader is refused a stable epistemological point from which to understand Rönne, 
just as Rönne is refused a stable point of self-understanding. But grammatically it is 
only also the simple shifting of gears from first to third, passing through neutral along 
the way. In this way the text activates grammar itself as a source of meaning. The 
explosion of grammatical person goes hand in hand with the explosion of Rönne’s 
person-ality. 
The ich has no consistent relation to the outside, nor any consistent relation to 
itself – it wants to write down as much as possible to keep everything from flowing 
away, to grab hold of something through writing and keep it with itself (“bei mir”). 
Grammatically, as if by coincidence, the ich uses a series of indirect pronouns that 
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echo grammatically the gap in its self-relation (“Ich will mir ein Buch kaufen [. . .]; 
ich will mir aufschreiben [. . .]”). The self-relation is only indirect, the ich is trying to 
send a message to itself, to restore itself to itself, through writing. The helps explain 
the meaning of the enigmatic passage in the following paragraph: “Das Leben ist so 
allmächtig, dachte er, diese Hand wird es nicht unterwühlen können, und sah seine 
Rechte an.” (III: 29) “Leben” functions as a cipher for the chaotic flux of the 
“external” world that ceaselessly merges with and then separates from the “internal” 
flux of Rönne’s perceptions and associations.141 The right hand that will try and fail to 
“burrow underneath” or “undercut” this all-powerful “life” will attempt to do so by 
writing.  
When Rönne arrives at the institute to assume temporary directorship and 
begins doing the daily work of medical treatment (Behandlung), we need only to 
follow the hands to follow also the act of writing that is interposed between self and 
world.  
[E]s tat ihm wohl, die Wissenschaft in eine Reihe von Handgriffen 
aufgelöst zu sehen, die gröberen eines Schmiedes, die feineren eines 
Uhrmachers wert. Dann nahm er selber seine Hände, führte sie über die 
Röntgenröhre, verschob das Quecksilber der Quarzlampe, erweiterte 
oder verengte einen Spalt, durch den Licht auf einen Rücken fiel, schob 
einen Trichter in ein Ohr, nahm Watte und ließ sie im Gehörgang 
liegen und vertiefte sich in die Folgen dieser Verrichtung bei dem 
Inhaber des Ohrs: wie sich Vorstellungen bildeten von Helfer, Heilung, 
guter Arzt von allgemeinem Zutrauen und Weltfreude, und wie sich die 
Entfernung von Flüssigkeiten in das Seelische verwob. (III: 30) 
As he directs the nurses, he can let his hands speak for him, turning the nurses into a 
kind of tool for him, a tool of “science.” When he himself takes matters into his own 
hands, he grasps both instruments and human bodies with equal indifference: an x-ray 
                                                
141 In an oft-cited passage in “Epilog und lyrisches Ich,” Benn characterizes the writing of “Gehirne” 
(while working as a military physician in occupied Belgium) as follows: “[D]as Leben schwang in einer 
Sphäre von Schweigen und Verlorenheit, ich lebte am Rande, wo das Dasein fällt und das Ich beginnt. 
Ich denke oft an diese Wochen zurück; sie waren das Leben, sie werden nicht wiederkommen, alles 
andere war Bruch” (III: 127-8). 
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machine, a lamp, a back, an ear and the “occupant” of the ear, all these machines and 
body parts are handled and described (in a word, treated) with the same detachment. 
The relation to his patient is barely verbal, human, or interpersonal. It is the relation 
between an occupant of an ear who forms certain mental images of a pleasant, capable 
physician as a result of the alleviating of pressure in his inner ear. The mental event is 
most crudely reduced to a physical cause in the same way that human physical parts 
are treated like machines or tools. When the “accident” comes in,142 Rönne stills 
appears not to have heard or spoken a single word, felt a single feeling, thought a 
single thought, or to have observed anything beyond these separable parts. His 
detachment is complete. Then suddenly he is struck by the “tiefem Zusammenhange 
mit dem Lauf und dem Schicksal dieses Lebens er [der Finger] gebrochen schien, 
während er ihn jetzt versorgen mußte wie einen Fernen und Entlaufenen, und er 
horchte in die Tiefe, wie in dem Augenblick, wo der Schmerz einsetzte, eine fernere 
Stimme sich vernehmen ließe” (III: 30). Suddenly a depth emerges out of the flat, 
fractured surface of Rönne’s treatment of the scene – perhaps that depth only reveals 
itself because of the extremity of detachment and superficiality – and Rönne hearkens 
as a more distant voice makes itself heard. Is it his voice, the patient’s, is it even a 
human voice? If we can’t yet answer this question, we can at least note that this excess 
of detachment in feeling and sensation, the clinicality of modern medical science, 
opens up the possibility of some kind of mystical, hallucinatory sensation.  
The more deeply Rönne immerses himself in his duties, the more intense these 
sensations become, and the more clearly this distant voice lets itself be heard. 
Wenn ich durch die Liegenhalle gehe – dies beschäftigte ihn zu tief – in 
                                                
142 “Dann kam ein Unfall” – that is, when a person arrives who had had an accident and suffered broken 
a finger. The trope that Benn uses here is synecdoche / metonymy, in which (body) parts stand for 
(human) wholes, in which a person is indistinguishable from the accident he suffered, either a case 
(Fall) or an accident (Unfall), but never quite another person for him. Benn takes this technique to the 
extreme in his 1917 poem “Nachtcafé” ( I:19).  
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je zwei Augen falle ich, werde wahrgenommen und bedacht. Mit 
freundlichen oder ernsten Gegenständen werde ich verbunden; 
vielleicht nimmt ein Haus mich auf, in das sie sich sehnen, vielleicht 
ein Stuck Gerbholz, das sie einmal schmeckten. Und ich hatte auch 
einmal zwei Augen, die liefen rückwärts mit ihren Blicken; jawohl, ich 
war vorhanden: fraglos und gesammelt. Wo bin ich hingekommen? Wo 
bin ich? Ein kleines Flattern, ein Verwehen. (III: 31) 
As Rönne goes on his rounds, he is absorbed by the memories and associations of the 
patients, absorbed into a house that one patient longs for – the house that Rönne longs 
for is not mentioned, if there is such a house – or some memory of the taste of 
Gerbholz. Rönne has no memory of his own, only a dim reminder that he once had 
eyes, too, whose glances “ran backward” in both a spatial and temporal sense: 
spatially, a glance runs “backward” into the brain, connected the external world via 
nerves to the organic center where impressions and memories are to be stored and 
organized; temporally, a glance runs “backward” in the sense that it connects the 
present of what is seen to the past of what is remembered, experienced, felt. When that 
connection is cut off, when those two eyes cease to “run backwards,” the present is 
also destroyed because it becomes perpetual and perpetually disorienting.  
Rönne used to be there, present, on hand, without question, collected 
(“vorhanden: fraglos, gesammelt”). Now in the present tense, he asks himself the 
following questions, that is, a voice again makes itself heard, a voice that might belong 
to “him,” but that might also be a voice that emanates from him, but beyond him, the 
same distant voice that comes out of the depths of the “accident” and that here poses 
such overwhelming questions: “Wo bin ich hingekommen? Wo bin ich?” But in 
response to this “where” question he can only give a “what” answer: “Ein kleines 
Flattern, ein Verwehen.” The lack of identity is experienced first as a lack of place; 
personal disintegration is also a kind of spatial disorientation. The “content” of that 
disintegration is completely abstract, a flutter, a blowing-away, things which occupy 
no space and which indicate only a temporal process that is coming to an end, an 
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image of pure dissolution, disintegration. “Er sann nach, wann es begonnen hätte, aber 
er wußte es nicht mehr: ich gehe durch eine Straße und sehe ein Haus und erinnere 
mich eines Schlosses, das ähnlich war in Florenz, aber sie streifen sich nur mit einem 
Schein und sind erloschen” (III: 31). We notice again the seamless shift from “er” to 
“ich,” the indifference of grammatical person to the psycho-bio-linguistic problem that 
(de)composes this text. One house reminds “me” of a castle in Florence, but neither 
one of them is real, they are only images perhaps seen, perhaps imagined, evaporated 
from reality, merged into an appearance (Schein—an image and a light), a mental, 
perceptual phenomenon that is quickly extinguished. As soon as the first house is 
perceived, it merges with the memory of the alleged house in Florence; the space and 
time of the present come into perception only with the merging (streifen sich) of the 
past, which erases the distinction between them. Rönne exists on the border where that 
erasure is constantly happening (“Am Rande, wo das Dasein fällt, und das Ich 
beginnt”), his eyes forced open as it were, unable to “run backwards,” to run away 
from what he sees.  
He continues: “Es schwächt mich etwas von oben. Ich habe keinen Halt mehr 
hinter den Augen. Der Raum wogt so endlos; einst floß er doch auf eine Stelle. 
Zerfallen ist Rinde, die mich trug” (III: 32)143. Rönne no longer has a “Halt” behind 
his eyes: what he takes in of the world does not enter a fixed mental structure, nor 
does it cease; visual perception (not to mention the voices he hears) amounts to an 
infinite and ceaseless disorientation. This is an echo of Worringer’s concept of 
“ungeheure geistige Raumscheu” or spiritual agoraphobia, in which Rönne would be 
either the primitive or the Gothic man. If there is anything “expressive” or “Gothic” 
                                                
143 A strikingly similar formulation of exposed, vulnerable eyes occurs in Rilke’s Malte: “[. . .] und ich 
selbst, ja, mein Gott, ich habe kein Dach über mir und es regnet mir in die Augen” (6: 747) [“and as for 
myself, dear God, I don’t have a roof over my head and it is raining into my eyes” (28)]. And in a 
further formulation of this abstraction from space, Rönne remarks, “Er sei keinem Ding mehr 
gegenüber; er habe keine Macht mehr über dem Raum, äußerte er einmal” (III: 33) 
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about Benn’s prose, it would be in the following two aspects: (1) Rönne’s perception 
of the outside world is one of chaos, caprice and threat, exactly like the worldview that 
Worringer imputes to primitive and Gothic man. And like the Gothic man (and unlike 
the primitive), Rönne is not merely in need of “abstraction,” for as we have seen in his 
medical guise, he is already quite abstracted from “reality.” This abstraction is but a 
further source of Raumscheu; it does not lead to redemption from the chaos, but only 
to another manifestation of it. Just as Worringer’s Gothic man oscillates between a 
need for empathetic abstraction and a need for abstract empathy (the contradiction that 
Worringer names “expressive” and attributes to “non-organic life”), we can assume 
that Rönne makes a similar oscillation. If one pole of that oscillation is the perception 
of the outside world as chaos, a perception that threatens to destroy the coherence of 
the perceiver, then the other pole would be the impossible perception of the self as 
chaos from the outside perspective of the fixity of mechanical and physiological laws. 
Benn/Rönne is the fusion of both, and that fusion is constituted only in the delirium of 
writing. 
(2) Just as Worringer discusses the flattening of the three dimensional 
perception of an object onto a plane (i.e. the production of haptic space) as a procedure 
that liberates the otherwise closed material essence of the object, so does the text’s 
shifting-back-and-forth of grammatical person indicate a kind of “liberation” of 
perspective, of psychology, of language. Just as the “ich” falls apart and reveals what 
is primary (in this case, the brain), so do conventional or traditional forms of 
representation in language fall apart – or need to be broken apart – to reveal the 
primary syntax underneath, the brain-stem of language, the non-organic life of 
language, so to speak. This would be some primary core of language (analogous to the 
“closed material individuality” of the object of representation in Riegl and Worringer), 
which, as we have seen, Benn calls “das Primäre,” “das Wort,” “Satzbau” and 
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“primäre Setzung.” Delirious writing is the stylistic line that, like Worringer’s Gothic 
line (which brings surface and depth into contact both with each other and the eye—
and body—of the spectator), brings the surface of written language into contact with 
the depth of its primal power and with the eye and non-cerebral body of its reader. 
Rönne tells us that, once upon a time, that endless flux of perception came to a 
point that was presumably where a unified coherent ego used to be. Now the frame, 
the skin, the bark of that ego has fallen to pieces. In a reversal of the Freudian formula, 
“Wo es war, soll ich werden,” for Rönne a formless, contentless “es” has assumed or 
resumed the place where “ich” was. “Es schwächt mich etwas von oben.” The 
vanishing point of the self that used to organize or perspectivize space has itself 
vanished, and Rönne is plunged into a haptic space, not an optical one.144  
Hence the insistence on hands in the immediately following passages. Since 
eyes are no longer a reliable organ of perception, hands will have to suffice. “Oft, 
wenn er von solchen Gängen in sein Zimmer zurückgekehrt war, drehte er seine 
Hände hin und her und sah sie an” (III: 32). The gesture of a nervous, preoccupied 
person, namely pacing back and forth,145 is here replaced by the turning back and forth 
of his hands, to which Rönne turns his gaze as if they could provide a better grasp on 
the outside world, or on himself, than his eyes.  
Und einmal beobachtete eine Schwester, wie er sie beroch oder 
vielmehr, wie er über sie hinging, als prüfe er ihre Luft, und wie er 
dann die leicht gebeugten Handflächen, nach oben offen, an den 
kleinen Fingern zusammenlegte, um sie dann einander zu und ab zu 
bewegen, als bräche er eine große, weiche Frucht auf oder als böge er 
etwas auseinander. (III: 32) 
A nurse observes Rönne, who, in passing her by and smelling her rather than greeting 
her, makes another curious, repetitive, searching or imploring gesture with his hands, 
                                                
144 In “Die Reise”: “Er blätterte das Entgegenkommende behutsam auseinander mit seinen tastenden, an 
der Spitze leicht ermüdbaren Augen” (III: 46) 
145 See the scene of delerium in the Salpetrière hospital in Malte in Chapter 3.  
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moving his upturned palms back and forth as if he were breaking open a large fruit or 
splitting something apart.  
Sie erzählte es den anderen Schwestern; aber niemand wußte, was es zu 
bedeuten habe. Bis es sich ereignete, daß in der Anstalt ein größeres 
Tier geschlachtet wurde. Rönne kam scheinbar zufällig herbei, als der 
Kopf aufgeschlagen wurde, nahm den Inhalt in die Hände und bog die 
beiden Hälften auseinander. (III: 32) 
Rönne obsessively anticipates the gesture of the pulling-apart of the contents of the 
animal’s skull, as if he were acting out the gesture before the event took place, or as if 
the animal’s brain became in that instant merely a literal substitute for some other 
imaginary brain (his own?) that he had long been engaged in dissecting. Rönne 
doesn’t contemplate this gesture as an idea and afterwards he doesn’t remember it or 
return to it in his thoughts; rather he acts it out, performs it, and the outward gesture of 
his hands replaces the inward gesture of thinking. According to the way Rönne 
superimposes—or else radically separates, and indeed they somehow have the same 
effect—past, present and future, inside and outside, perception and memory and 
imagination, we see that if something is on his mind, then it is also in his hands, and if 
those hands are, from the first page onwards, to be associated with writing, then this 
passage finally brings the problem of writing into contact with the titular organ of the 
text.  
 
Part II: Verbal Scalpels and the Furrows of the Brain 
But that titular organ is not yet named, and Rönne’s language here is elusive, 
suggestive, and deferring. Rönne does not take the brains of the animal in his hands, 
rather only the “content” of the cracked-open skull, separating the two halves, 
breaking them open, breaking them apart. The word “content,” however, turns the 
passage toward the abstract, interrupting the brutal, blank literalness of the sentence 
and calling forth content’s abstract partner: form. What Rönne does in the gesture of 
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his hands (necessarily also the gesture of his writing) is to dissect, expose, even 
destroy “content,” the content of bodies, of selves (including his own), of narration 
and of language: the pulling-apart of content by (verbal) form. Words thus function 
implicitly as a kind of scalpel for Rönne, who cannot abide the fixity of meaning, who 
is compelled to use his hands, his eyes and his writing to expose the hidden or 
repressed “content” of reality, even if it means dissolving that “content” into utter 
chaos.146 It is precisely that scalpel-function of poetic form that Benn will later call 
“das Primäre,” the primary, originary or radical use of language that refuses all 
convention and self-evidence down to the smallest linguistic unit, the word, and builds 
something new that is both beyond and before “reality,” “Ich” and grammar, both the 
Urschicht and the Stil der Zukunft.  
But as Rönne’s obsessively repetitive gesture suggests, that mystical break-
through or summoning or creation of the primary is not permanent, nor does the threat 
of chaos or meaninglessness ever yield. Rather it is a constant, ceaseless problem. At 
the end of the text in a “speech” to the director of the hospital (now returned, we are 
more or less given to understand, because of Rönne’s inability to function as a 
physician): 
Rönne aber sagte: sehen Sie, in diesen meinen Händen hielt ich sie, 
hundert oder tausend Stück; manche waren weich, manche waren hart, 
alle sehr zerfließlich; Männer, Weiber, mürbe und voll Blut. Nun halte 
ich immer mein eigenes in meinen Händen und muß immer darnach 
forschen, was mit mir möglich sei. (III: 34) 
The text again refuses to name that crucial body part, thereby refusing to name itself. 
The emphasis remains on hands and gesture; the content doesn’t really matter because 
it is only matter. In any case, of all the matter or “content” that Rönne held in his 
                                                
146 Carl Einstein uses exactly the same metaphor to describe Benn’s “Hauptworte” in his 1927 review of 
Benn’s Gesammelte Gedichte: “[Benns Worte] sind weit wie Wolken und enthalten, man könnte sagen 
apriorisch, den Wechsel: die möglichen Nuancen und Färbungen; geistig aber sind sie präzise wie 
Skalpelle des Zerebrums. [. . .] Diese Substantive sind Mittel der Abkürzung: sie erläutern nicht, 
sondern geben den Umriß, worein simultan die Stufungen der Einzelergebnisse sich sammeln und 
subsummieren” (cited in Roland, 253 n 46, emphasis added JD).  
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hands (and for him, to hold is the same as to rip apart), whether it was a hundred or a 
thousand, hard or soft, male or female, they are all countless and the same and equally 
decomposable, perishable, dissectible, exposable, even and especially the “content” of 
his own skull, which he always holds in his hands, constantly researching into the 
limits of his possibility.  
It may not be farfetched to link forschen with furchen (to furrow a field); the 
Furchen147 that traverse the brain in the language of medical science; and the same 
“furrows” of writing from the old metaphor of boustrophedonic writing that survives 
in the etymologies of certain modern European words for reading as harvesting or 
gathering from the furrow (German lesen, French lire from Latin lira, furrow). 
Writing for Rönne would be the simultaneous forschen of his self and the furchen of 
his brain, the literal and figural writing of his brain, some primal digging or tracing of 
form into chaos that helps explain the strange image of writing as “unterwühlen” from 
the first page. Writing would then be the confrontation (Auseinandersetzung, 
Auseinanderbeugung) that interposes itself between an “ich” that must be exposed and 
a primal chaos that must be kept at bay. Writing would then be the delirious oscillation 
between the two extremes, between the rigidity and artificiality of given forms and the 
flux of pure formlessness—delirious writing would be the writing both inside and 
outside the furrows. Benn’s own commentary on his Rönne narratives from 
Doppelleben speaks to this precarious oscillation, to its possibility and its limit. He 
writes: 
An das Primäre können diese Dinge mit Zeitcharakter doch nicht 
anknüpfen, und wiederum die Voraussetzungen für Historisches besaß 
er [Rönne] nach Erfahrung und Anlage nicht. Alles schwebte also 
aneinander vorbei und ermüdete nur mit seinen Gewalten. Es mußte 
also etwas Drittes eintreten, eine Vermischung, und der strebte er 
                                                
147 In Malte, Rilke uses the phrase, “solche Furchen im Gehirne” to describe the “zähe 
Unvergänglichkeit” of the “Existenz des Entsetzlichen” as literal/metaphorical furrows traced on the 
human brain. (6: 776-8) 
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unaufhörlich zu, etwas, was gleichzeitig eine Aufhebung war und eine 
Verschmelzung, aber das gab es nur für Momente, in Fallkrisen, von 
Durchbruchscharakter, und das war immer der Vernichtung nahe. Aber 
nicht immer war man dazu fähig, und so sehen wir ihn nach diesem 
tastenden Vorstoß in das Vage zu einer ungünstigen Stunde, 
vormittags, zurückschrecken, sich selbst entfliehen und zunächst noch 
einmal sich der Norm versichern. (IV: 166-7) 
The reference here is to a scene from another Rönne novella, “Die Reise,” in which a 
group of Rönne’s colleagues discuss, over lunch, the charms of eating avocadoes. 
Rönne, at a loss to participate in the conversation, full of panic and disgust, finally 
musters a bland comment and “triumphantly” joins the ranks of the other gentlemen 
who know how to balance work and casual conversation.148 Rönne can neither 
extricate himself from the banal conversation, nor find inner access to the rush of 
aesthetic sensation; he remains trapped in the ready-made ich of everyday bourgeois 
life. Returning to the title story of Gehirne, we encounter a similar lapse:  
[W]enn er sich gesprächsweise zu dem Verwalter oder der Oberin über 
irgendeinen Gegenstand äußern sollte, wenn er fühlte, jetzt sei es daran, 
eine Äußerung seinerseits dem in Frage stehenden Gegenstand 
zukommen zu lassen, brach er förmlich zusammen. Was solle man 
denn zu einem Geschehen sagen? (III: 32) 
 That “förmlich” might mean something like “completely” or “utterly,” but given that 
we just encountered the word “Inhalt” a few lines earlier, it also might refer to the 
failure of form to realize itself, to take over. In such moments of artistic impotence, 
Rönne is left at best with a question, posed perhaps by the same “more distant” voice 
we heard earlier: “Was solle man denn zu einem Geschehen sagen?” (III: 32) The text 
is in fact full of such questions, posed by an impersonal voice (sometime in Konjuktiv 
I, as if to suggest that the voice is Rönne’s through erlebte Rede, sometimes narrated 
directly – although I have already suggested there is hardly a distinction between the 
two), blank imprecations of existential dread and alienation (not to mention bourgeois 
                                                
148 In this retreat into the habits and patterns of everyday speech and everyday bourgeois life, Rönne 
speaks and acts as das Man would act. Benn anticipates (here satirically) the anxious withdrawal from 
authentic, historical existence that Martin Heidegger will call das Man in Sein und Zeit (1928), §27. 
(18th Edition. Tübingen, Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2001.)  
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ennui): “Als ich anfing, blieb es bei mir?” (III: 29); “Hätte ich doch gelogen, als ich zu 
diesem sagte: Glück auf!” (III: 31); “Wo bin ich hingekommen? Wo bin ich?” (III: 
31); “Was solle man denn zu einem Geschehen sagen?”; “Wohin solle man sich dann 
sagen?” (III: 33); and finally, most important for our reading, for what we have on the 
brain, so to speak: “Wenn die Geburtszange hier ein bisschen tiefer in die Schläfe 
gedrückt hätte. . . ? Wenn man mich immer über eine bestimmte Stelle des Kopfes 
geschlagen hätte. . .? Was ist es denn mit den Gehirnen?” (III: 34).  
 As if in answer to this question, Rönne concludes his speech with a startling 
sequence or montage or words: 
Ich wollte immer auffliegen wie ein Vogel aus der Schlucht; nun lebe 
ich außen im Kristall. Aber nun geben Sie mir bitte den Weg frei, ich 
schwinge wieder – ich war so müde – auf Flügeln geht dieser Gang – 
mit meinem blauen Anemonenschwert – in Mittagsturz des Lichts – in 
Trümmern des Südens – in zerfallendem Gewölk – Zerstäubungen der 
Stirne – Entschweifungen der Schläfe. (III: 34) 
The afore-mentioned analogy to painting is to be established through a theory of 
haptic vision on the one hand, and through the verbal experiment of “syntax” on the 
other. Haptic space is tactile, space flattened, space organized around touching, in 
which the eye has a touching function, in which the hand sees the essence of things. 
To represent this space is destructive and violent (in Worringer and Riegl): it is an 
oppression or suppression, it is a flattening, it is an approximal, asymptotal approach 
at something ever-receding that must be violently forced into view/grasp. It is a 
restructuring of the visual world to release something that that world otherwise 
imprisons. Thus, in verbal poetic terms, the unexpected rush of condensed language is 
the end of Rönne’s brain, i.e. his goal, his completion, and his breakdown. Rönne 
wanders deliriously along this end-line, this border of inside and outside, literal and 
metaphorical, his skull cracked open, his hands trying to come to grips with the very 
content that his words, both methodical and ecstatic, have exposed. Benn’s 
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neologisms, his “montage,” his new syntax, join together words not as words, but as 
elements of syntax, words that loosen and join (“schwer erklärbare Macht des Wortes, 
das löst und fügt” [III: 133]), a syntax that is unstable, in which falling apart and 
putting together are one and the same. The words are new: they are unseen, unheard-
of, and the eye must pass over them slowly, reading each part, as if touching each part, 
to see what the whole might be. The reading process become tactile, haptic, delirious, 
just like Benn’s writing process, in its constant gripping, searching, grasping-after and 
prying-apart of meaning and structure. And as we have already seen, Benn’s Epilog 
und lyriches Ich likens the process of writing/reading to the life of a single-celled 
creature with Flimmerhaare, grasping words as sustenance in a kind of primal reading. 
Writing/reading amounts to a grasping after words that differentiate themselves from 
the sea of banality and convention, and the writer/reader is the one who gathers these 
words and writes them down, always in danger of collapsing into that chaotic sea, or 
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